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SOLVENCY II:
THE AMBITIOUS MODERNIZATION OF THE
PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF INSURERS AND
REINSURERS ACROSS THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU)
Michaell J-H. Smith*
This [Solvency II] is an ambitious proposal that will completely overhaul
the way we ensure the financial soundness of our insurers. We are setting a
world-leading standard that requires insurers to focus on managing all the
risks they face and enables them to operate much more efficiently. It’s
good news for consumers, for the insurance industry and for the EU
economy as a whole.
Charlie McCreevy, EU
Internal Market and Services
Commissioner1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The prudential regulation of the EU insurance and reinsurance
markets is poised to undergo a radical and modernizing sea change,
affecting not only EU insurers,2 but also those foreign insurers with
operations in the EU. This transformation will come in the form of the new
Solvency II regime, the overriding principles of which have been agreed
among the European Commission, Parliament and Council as set forth in
the Framework Directive (the “Framework Directive”) which was adopted
by the European Parliament in April 2009 and subsequently adopted by the
European Council on November 10, 2009.3
*

Paris, France; Member of the Connecticut and New York bars; Solicitor of
the Supreme Court of England and Wales.
1
See Press Release, European Commission, ‘Solvency II’: EU to Take Global
Lead
in
Insurance
Regulation
(Jul.
10,
2007),
available
at
http://europa.eu/press_room/index_en.htm (Search “Solvency II”; then follow
“0.9102” hyperlink).
2
As a general matter, references herein to “insurance” and “insurers” include
“reinsurance” and “reinsurers” respectively, unless otherwise noted.
3
See Council Directive 2009/138, art. 1, 2009 O.J. (L 335) 1 (EU), http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:335:FULL:EN:PDF
[hereinafter Framework Directive].
It is important to point out that the
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Solvency II is designed to address the various shortcomings of the
current Solvency I regulatory regime, a system which has been in place
since the 1970’s and which is widely seen as having failed to keep pace
with the changing reality of the financial and insurance markets.4 Once
fully implemented through various measures, the sweeping provisions of
Solvency II are designed to establish, among other things, EU-wide capital
requirements, valuation techniques and risk management standards. As a
result, Solvency II is expected to foster improved protection of
policyholders, stability of the financial system, modernize supervision,
deepen market integration and increase the competitiveness of insurance
undertakings. Moreover, considering that the EU represents the single
largest market for insurance, generating approximately 37 % of worldwide
total direct premiums written,5 Solvency II will necessarily play a
significant role in shaping insurance standards on an international level.
This Article provides a survey of certain of the more significant
provisions of the Solvency II regime, and by way of brief comparison,
highlights certain areas of divergence from the U.S. system. In addition,
this Article examines certain key difference between Solvency II and the
Basel framework (the regulatory standard applicable to financial
institutions),6 as well as addresses some of the concerns with Solvency II
based on comparisons to the Basel framework.

Framework Directive has relevance to the larger European Economic Area, See
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eea.
4
For an overview of Solvency I, see information on the European
Commission’s
website,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/insurance/solvency_i_en.htm (last visited Mar.
22, 2010) [hereinafter Solvency I].
5
See JOHN A. COOKE & HAROLD D. SKIPPER, DEP’T OF RISK MGMT. & INS.,
AN EVALUATION OF U.S. INSURANCE REGULATION IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD
INSURANCE
MARKET
3
(2008),
available
at
http://www.rmi.gsu.edu/insurance_regulation/rel_papers/CookeSkipper_Regulatio
nInternational.pdf [hereinafter World Insurance Market Evaluation].
6
See
Bank
for
Int’l
Settlements,
Basel
II
Framework,
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2010); see generally
website of the Bank for International Settlements for information as concerns Basel
II, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) [hereinafter
BIS Website].
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II. OBJECTIVES OF SOLVENCY II
A.

PROTECTION OF POLICYHOLDERS AND BENEFICIARIES

As stated by the European Parliament and Council in the
introduction to the Framework Directive, the overriding objective of
insurance regulation and supervision, as a general matter, is to adequately
protect policyholders and beneficiaries.7 In this regard, Solvency II is
designed to ensure, among other things, the financial soundness of
insurance undertakings and reduce the probability of consumer loss or
market disruption, thereby reinforcing confidence in the stability of the
European insurance sector.
B.

FACILITATE A SINGLE MARKET IN INSURANCE

Another main objective of Solvency II is to deepen integration of
the European insurance market by facilitating a single market as concerns
insurance throughout the EU,8 “limiting the room for national discretion
and national options”,9 making it easier for firms to do business across the
EU.10 More specifically, Solvency II seeks to remedy the current situation
whereby the provisions of the current insurance regulatory regime have
been unevenly applied by Member States, resulting in varying regulatory
requirements across the EU, undermining the internal market and hindering
the activities of insurance undertakings. In this regard, the Framework
7

See Framework Directive, supra note 3, recital ¶ 16, at 3; art. 27, at 28.
See Memorandum from the European Commission, ‘Solvency II’: Frequently
Asked Questions (FAQs) 1 (Jul. 10, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/insurance/docs/solvency/solvency2/faq_en.pdf
[hereinafter
FAQs].
9
Thomas Steffen, Chairman, Comm. of European Ins. & Occupational
Pension Supervisors, Official Presentation of the Solvency II Directive in
Strasbourg (Jul. 10, 2007), available at http://www.ceiops.eu/media/files/
speechesarticles/ThomasSteffen-KeyMessages10juli07.pdf [hereinafter Steffen
Presentation].
10
As is presently the case, and as a general matter, an undertaking which is
established and authorized in one Member State may carry out, pursuant to what is
commonly referred to as a “passport”, its activities in another Member State (a host
Member State) on a cross-border and / or freedom of establishment basis (e.g. via a
branch office) without authorization from the host Member State being required.
See, e.g., Council Directive 92/49, 1992 O.J. (L 228) 1 (EC), available at ://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31992L0049:EN:NOT.
8
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Directive will recast and consolidate fourteen existing directives applicable
to the regulation of the insurance market into a single risk-sensitive EUwide framework.11
It is worth briefly pointing out here that, as a general matter and by
way of comparison, in the U.S., the individual states, rather than the federal
government, are the principle regulators of insurance activities.12 In this
regard, truly uniform insurance regulations do not apply across the U.S.,
resulting in rather important regulatory variations among states (a
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article).13 In response to
the lack of harmonization in this area, among other actual and proposed
measures,14 the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC),
a voluntary organization of state insurance commissioners, has
promulgated various model laws, regulations and standards which have
been adopted, to varying degrees, among states.15 In particular, the NAIC
has initiated a financial regulation standards and voluntary accreditation
program for state regulators in an effort to help establish regulatory
cohesiveness on a national level.16
C.

IMPROVE COMPETITIVENESS

Another key objective of Solvency II is to improve competitiveness
of the insurance industry across Europe, fostering product innovation and
11

See Framework Directive, supra note 3, recital ¶ 1, at 1.
See, e.g., 1 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE §
2:2 (3d ed. 2009); Joseph F. Zimmerman, Dual Insurance Regulation: Is It
Desirable?, 27 J. INS. REG. 3 (2008); Elizabeth F. Brown, The Development of
International Norms For Insurance Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 953 (2009)
[hereinafter Development of International Norms].
13
See Development of International Norms, supra note 12, at 981-82. See
generally World Insurance Market Evaluation, supra note 5.
14
See, e.g., THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED
REGULATORY
STRUCTURE
126-28
(2008),
available
at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf. See e.g., Press Release,
The Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Treasury Releases Blueprint for a Stronger
Regulatory
Structure
(Mar.
31,
2008),
available
at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Fact_Sheet_03.31.08.pdf.
15
See BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED REGULATORY STRUCTURE, supra at 913.
16
See NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMM’RS, FINANCIAL REGULATION STANDARDS
AND
ACCREDITATION
PROGRAM
(2009),
available
at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_f_FRSA_pamphlet.pdf.
12
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helping to put downward pressure on prices.17 In this regard, and as
discussed elsewhere herein, Solvency II aims to reflect a “principle of
proportionality” as concerns, for example, the impact of related
requirements on small and medium-sized undertakings, as well as the
exercise of supervisory powers.18
D.

PROMOTE BETTER REGULATION

Mindful of lessons learned from the financial crisis, as discussed
further below, Solvency II continues to be developed as a tool to promote
better regulation of the insurance industry throughout Europe by applying
modern risk management and governance standards as well as
implementing an early warning system for market supervisors, all as
discussed in more detail below.19
III.

SCOPE OF APPLICABILITY OF SOLVENCY II

Solvency II markedly expands the scope of undertakings covered
beyond those currently subject to the provisions of Solvency I. In this
regard, the new framework is to apply to most EU insurers and those nonEU insurers with activities in the EU.20 Only those undertakings which
meet certain limited conditions, including having ! 5,000,000 or less in
annual gross written premium income, would be exempt from the

17

See FAQs, supra note 8, at 2.
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, recital ¶ 19, at 3; art. 29, at 28.
19
Id. art. 29, at 28. See COMM. OF EUROPEAN INS, & OCCUPATIONAL
PENSIONS SUPERVISORS, LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CRISEIS (SOLVENCY II AND
BEYOND),
CIELOPS-SEC-107/08
(2009),
available
at
http://www.cielops.eu/media/files/publications/reports/CIELOPS-SEC-107-08Lessons-learned-from-the-crisis-SII-and-beyond.pdf.
20
As concerns non-life insurance, the Framework Directive shall apply to
those activities described on part A of Annex I to the Framework Directive (see
Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 2(2), at 18, and those non-life operations
which are exempt from the scope of the Framework Directive are set forth in
Article 5. Id. Art. 5, at 19.
Those life insurance operations subject to the Framework Directive are set
forth in Article 2 (3). Id. at 18.
The Framework Directive will not apply, for example, to reinsurance
undertakings which by December 10, 2007 have ceased doing new business and
are in run-off. Id. art. 12, at 21.
18
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provisions of Solvency II.21 However, such excluded undertakings may
nevertheless elect to opt-in to the provisions of Solvency II.22
By way of exclusion, Solvency II will not apply to insurance
guarantee schemes, pension funds covered by Directive 2003/41/EEC,
credit institutions or financial conglomerates.23
IV.

LEGISLATIVE STRUCTURE OF SOLVENCY II

It is important to briefly understand the legislative Process which is
applicable to Solvency II. The regime is being adopted in accordance with
the Lamfalussy process, a framework designed to facilitate consistent
harmonization, often employed in the area of legislation applicable to the
financial services sector.24
A significant characteristic of the Lamfalussy process is the
involvement of a committee of supervisors who work in consultation with
businesses, consumers and other stakeholders.25 As applies to Solvency II,
this is the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Supervisors (“CEIOPS”), a group composed of high level representatives
from each of the Member States’ insurance and occupational pensions
supervisory authorities, as well as authorities of the Member States.26
As a brief overview, the Lamfalussy process is comprised of the
following four distinct levels:27
Level 1:
Level 1 includes the European legislative
instrument, in the form of the proposed Framework Directive,
which sets forth the various principles. The Framework Directive
was proposed by the European Parliament and the Council
21

Id. art. 4(1), at 19.
Id. art 4(5), at 19.
23
See FAQs, supra note 8, at 2.
24
See
European
Commission,
Lamfalussy
Process,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/insurance/solvency/lamfalussy_en.htm
(last
visited Mar. 24, 2010).
25
See id.
26
See Commission Decision 2004/6, arts. 1-3, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 30, 30 (EC),
repealed by, Commission Decision 2009/79, recital 1, 2009 O.J. (L 25) 28, 28
(EC) (establishing The Committee of European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS)).
27
See Comm. of European Ins. & Occupational Pensions Supervisors,
CEIOPS Comments to the Lamfalussy Review, at 6, CEIOPS Doc. 20/07 (Nov. 1,
2007), available at http://www.ceiops.eu/media/docman/public_files/publications/
lettersofcomments/CEIOPSCommentstotheLamfalussyReview.pdf.
22
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pursuant to Article 251 (2) of the European Community Treaty,
which provides for a co-decision process, and, as discussed above,
the Framework Directive has now been formally adopted.28
The Framework Directive is not directly applicable within the
domestic legal orders of Member States and only provides
objectives and goals that each Member State must implement
through laws and / or regulations at a national level.29 Therefore,
Directives prove to be somewhat of a flexible instrument. In this
regard, they leave room for interpretation and adaptation by each
Member State, and can create uncertainty as to the speed, extent
and consistency of their implementation within each Member
State.30 Such concerns are addressed, in part, by directly
applicable Level 2 measures under the Lamfalussy process.
Level 2:
Level 2, which is the current focus of the European
Commission, includes various measures to supplement, and render
operational, the Framework Directive.31 Such measures will
include further directives, and in addition, it is expected that
certain implementing measures will be taken in the form of
regulations which are directly applicable, meaning that they create
law which takes immediate effect in the same manner as a national
instrument, without additional steps being required on the part of
the national authorities.32 As a result, such Level 2 implementing
measures should facilitate a convergence of implementation across
the EU.
CEIOPS is also involved in Level 2 activities, in particular, in
advising the European Commission on the drafting of specific
28

Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 2007 O.J. (C 224) 1 [hereinafter
EU Treaty]; [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 689 (incorporating changes made by EC
Treaty); [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719; see Framework Directive, supra note 3; European
Commission, CO-DECISION or the “ordinary legislative procedure”,
http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2010).
29
See EUR-Lex, Process and Players, § 1.3.3, http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/droit_communautaire/droit_communautaire.htm#1.3.3
(last
visited Mar. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Process and Players].
30
See id.
31
See Comm. of European Ins. & Occupational Pensions Supervisors, List of
Policy Issues and Options for the Level 2 Impact Assessment of Solvency II, (Nov.
2009),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/insurance/docs/
solvency/solvency2/list_of_policy_issues_ia_ver3_en.pdf [hereinafter CEIOPS
Policy Issues and Options].
32
See Process and Players, supra note 29, § 1.3.2.
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implementation measures in consultation with undertakings,
market participants and other stakeholders.33 The European
Commission has committed to introducing such Level 2
implementing measures before October 2011, at least 12 months
before the new system will apply to insurance undertakings.34
Level 3:
Level 2 implementing measures will be further
supplemented by non-binding Level 3 standards and guidance. In
this regard, CEIOPS will provide technical advice to the European
Commission and issue supervisory standards and tools. In
addition, CEIOPS will provide recommendations and guidelines in
connection with the application of regulations and facilitate
convergent application across Member States and cooperation
among national supervisors.35
Level 4:
Level 4 consists of enforcement actions (e.g., legal
actions) to be taken by the European Commission in respect of
matters related to compliance by Member States with the various
related legislative measures.
V.

TIMING

The Framework Directive, and those Level 2 Directives which are
eventually adopted, are to be transposed by each Member State into its
national law by October 31, 2012.36 In addition, directly applicable Level 2
regulations are to come into force on the same date.37
It is worth noting that certain Member States such as the United
Kingdom,38 Denmark,39 and Germany,40 for example, have already taken

33

See Comm. of European Ins. & Occupational Pensions Supervisors, About
CEIOPS, http://www.ceiops.eu//content/view/2/2 (last visited Mar. 23, 2010)
[hereinafter About CEIOPS].
34
See FAQs, supra note 8, at 12.
35
See About CEIOPS, supra note 33.
36
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 309, at 115.
37
See id.
38
See, e.g., Financial Services Authority, www.fsa.gov.uk/ (last visited Mar.
24, 2010) (concerning the UK’s Individual Capital Advisory Standards (ICAS)
regime (a risk-based capital standard implemented by the FSA in 2004).
39
See, e.g., Danish FSA, http://finanstilsynet.dk/en/Tenaer/Solvens.aspx (last
visited Mar. 24, 2010).
40
See Aufsichtsrechtliche mindestanforderungen an das risikomanagement
[Regulatory minimum requirements for risk management], BAFIN, Jan. 22, 2009,
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steps to implement regulatory requirements in their respective jurisdictions
which are founded on the same principles that underpin Solvency II.
VI.

THREE PILLARS OF SOLVENCY II

One of the most significant developments of Solvency II is the
introduction of a more modern economic risk sensitive-based system, based
on a so-called “total balance sheet” approach where an array of risks and
their interactions are taken into account.41 In this way, Solvency II marks a
distinct departure from the often criticized formula-based solvency margin
approach of the current Solvency I regime.42 In this regard, Solvency II not
only takes into consideration the actual risks faced by an undertaking, but
also the measures that are in place to monitor, manage and mitigate such
risks. This multi-pronged approach can be divided into the following three
so-called “pillars,” drawing comparisons to the similarly structured Basel
framework applicable to the financial sector,43 each of which is described
in further detail below:
Pillar I:
Quantitative Requirements,
Pillar II: Governance & Risk Management Requirements,
Pillar III: Market Discipline and Transparency.44
A. PILLAR I: QUANTITATIVE REQUIREMENTS.
Solvency II introduces more sophisticated solvency requirements
for insurance undertakings. While solvency requirements under the current
Solvency I regime only apply in respect of insurance underwriting risks,
Solvency II will also require undertakings to hold capital against market
risk (e.g., risks related to the fluctuation in the level and market price of
assets), credit risk (e.g., risks related to fluctuations in the credit standing of
securities issuers, counterparties and / or debtors) and operational risk (e.g.,
available
at
http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Service/Rundschreiben/2009/
rs__0903__mariskva,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/rs_0903_m
ariskva.pdf.
41
See FAQs, supra note 8, at 1.
42
See Solvency I, supra note 4.
43
The Basel II rules on capital requirements for banks and investment firms
are implemented through the Capital Adequacy Directive. See generally Council
Directive 2006/49, On the Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit
Institutions (Recast), 2006 O.J. (L 177) 201 (EU).
44
Pillars II and III are often collectively referred to as “Pillar V.”
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risks related to a failure in internal processes).45 In this regard, the
solvency provisions of the Framework Directive have been developed with
a view to reflecting current and proposed international solvency guidelines
from the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).46
More specifically, the main requirements of Pillar I can be broken
down as follows: (i) technical provisions; and (ii) capital requirements
which include the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) and the Minimum
Capital Requirement (MCR).
1. Technical Provisions.
As is the case under the current EU regulatory regime,
undertakings will continue to be required to apply technical provisions
(“reserves”) against all insurance obligations towards policyholders and
applicable beneficiaries.47
The calculation of technical provisions is to be consistent with the
valuation of assets and liabilities (as described in more detail below) as
well as with international developments in accounting and supervision.48
More specifically, these reserves are based on curren market transfer value
(the amount an insurer would expect to pay in respect of the transfer of its
insurance rights and obligations).49 As a general matter, these provisions
are to be calculated as the sum of a best estimate50 plus a margin of risk.51
In this regard and to promote harmonization across the EU,, the European
Commission will be adopting implementing measures in respect of the
various methodologies and standards to be adhered to in respect of the
calculation of technical provisions.52
45

See, e.g., Framework Directive, supra note 3, recital 26, at 3; art. 100, at 51.
See FAQs, supra note 8, at 3.
47
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, arts. 76-86, at 45-48.
48
See id. recital 54, at 6; arts. 77-78, at 45-46.
49
See id. art. 77, at 45-46.
50
The “best estimate” is based on a probability-weighted average of future
cash flows, with regard to certain specified considerations as set forth in Article 77
of the Framework Directive. See id.
51
“The risk margin shall be such as to ensure that the value of the technical
provisions is equivalent to the amount that insurance and reinsurance undertakings
would be expected to require in order to take over and meet the insurance and
reinsurance obligations.” See id. at 46.
52
See id. art. 86, at 47-48. By way of example, certain of the high level issues
identified by CEIOPS and Commission Services for review in respect of technical
provisions relate to risk margin-related calibration issues and the determination of
46
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It is important to point out that, in a significant departure from
Solvency I and as concerns insurance risks located in the EU, Member
States may not require that the assets held to cover the technical provisions
related to those risks be located in the EU or in any particular Member
State.53
2. Capital Requirements: Solvency Capital Requirement
(SCR) and Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR).
Pillar I of the Framework Directive introduces two distinct, yet
interconnected, capital requirements -- the Solvency Capital Requirement
(SCR) and the Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR). These separate
solvency requirements were created, in large part, to facilitate monitoring
of insurance undertakings and to create a ladder of supervisory
intervention, identifying ailing insurance undertakings before the interests
of policyholders and beneficiaries are jeopardized.54 Such intervention and
each of the SCR and MCR are described in detail below.
a. Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR).
Undertakings are required to hold eligible own funds (as discussed
further below) covering the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR).55 The
SCR is designed to reflect a level of eligible own funds that enables
undertakings to absorb significant losses and, as a result, provide
reasonable assurances to policyholders and beneficiaries.56 As such, the
SCR is a risk-based calculation which takes into consideration various
risks, including non-life, life and health underwriting risk (e.g., as
applicable, premium, reserve, catastrophe), market risk, credit risk and
operational risk (e.g., legal risk) which will impose on undertakings stricter
standards as to regulatory capital.57 The SCR will need to be calculated by
undertakings at least once a year, and the results of such calculation will
need to be reported to the applicable supervisors.58
the risk-free interest rate term structure. See also CEIOPS Policy Issues and
Options, supra note 31, at 6, 16.
53
See id. art. 134, at 61-62.
54
See, e.g., id. recital 60, at 6; arts. 100-127, at 51-59.
55
See id. art. 100, at 51.
56
See id. recital 62, at 7.
57
See id. art. 101, at 51.
58
See id. art. 102, at 51-52.
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Pursuant to the Framework Directive, an undertaking may calculate
the SCR either pursuant to a new “standard” formula or using a full or
partial internal model, both as discussed below.59
i. “Standard” formula.
The Framework Directive provides for a “standard” formula for the
calculation of the SCR,60 taking into consideration various specified
“modules” of risk (e.g., non-life / life / health underwriting risk, market
risk, counterparty default risk).61 In this way, the standard formula is
calculated on a “modular” basis, such that exposure to each category is
evaluated as an initial step and then subsequently aggregated.62 In this
regard and pursuant to this standard formula, each of the aforementioned
risk modules is to be calculated using a Value-at-Risk63 measure such that
an undertaking must operate with a confidence level of 99.5 % over a oneyear period.64

59

See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art 100..
See id. arts. 103-108, at 52-54. In accordance with the standard formula, the
SCR is calculated as the sum of the Basic Solvency Capital Requirement (as
described in Article 104 of the Framework Directive), the capital requirement for
operation risk (as described in Article 107 of the Framework Directive) and the
adjustment for the loss-absorbing capacity of technical provisions and deferred
taxes (as described in Article 108 of the Framework Directive). Id.
61
See id. art. 104(1), at 52.
62
See id. recital ¶ 65, at 7.
63
Value-at-Risk (VaR) is a measure used to assess risk associated with a
portfolio of assets and liabilities. Specifically, Value-at-Risk provides a measure
of the “worst expected loss under normal conditions over a specific time interval at
a given confidence level.” See FAQs, supra note 8, at 4.
64
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 101(4), at 51.
[T]he Solvency Capital Requirement should be determined as the
economic capital to be held by insurance and reinsurance
undertakings in order to ensure that ruin occurs no more often
than once in every 200 cases or, alternatively, that those
undertakings will still be in a position, with a probability of at
least 99.5 %, to meet their obligations to policyholders and
beneficiaries over the following 12 months. That economic
capital should be calculated on the basis of the true risk profile of
those undertakings, taking account of the impact of possible risk
mitigation techniques, as well as diversification effects.
60
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As indicated above, Solvency II will introduce the requirement that
undertakings hold capital against market risk, that is to say investmentrelated risk.65 Such a requirement is designed to mitigate possible procyclical effects of the financial markets and the negative effects suffered by
an undertaking as a result thereof.66 Therefore, as concerns the market risk
module, undertakings will necessarily need to evaluate the appropriateness
and risks inherent in any particular investment strategy.67
One of the principle ways in which the design and potential impact
of the standard model, among other factors (e.g., own funds, valuation of
assets / liabilities), continues to be tested is through quantitative impact
studies (QIS).68 Such studies consist of simulations conducted by
undertakings on a voluntary basis, with the next study (QIS 5) scheduled
for 2010.69
ii. Full or Partial Internal Model.
As an innovative and forward-looking alternative -- one that is
generally applicable across undertakings and insurance products -Solvency II provides that any insurance undertaking may decide whether
to calculate SCR using full or partial internal modeling.70 Such models are
subject to the prior approval of the applicable supervisory authorities.71 In
any application for approval,72 undertakings must, among other things,
demonstrate that any internal model is widely used in and plays a
significant role in the undertaking’s internal risk management and decisionmaking processes (“use test”).73 An undertaking’s management is
responsible on an on-going basis for ensuring that any particular internal
model continues to operate appropriately.74 In addition, such partial
See id. at 7. Provisions specific to the calculation of the standard solvency
requirement are set forth in the Framework Directive at art. 105. See id. recital ¶
64, at 7. See id. art. 105, at 52-53.
65
See, e.g., id. art. 100, at 51.
66
See id. recital ¶ 61, at 6-7.
67
See FAQs, supra note 8, at 6.
68
See, e.g., Comm. of European Ins. & Occupational Pensions Supervisors,
Consultations, http://www.ceiops.eu/content/view/3/3/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
69
See id.
70
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 112-27, at 56-59.
71
See id. art. 113, at 56.
72
Id. Art. 112(3), at 56.
73
See id. Art. 120, at 57.
74
See id. Art. 116, at 57.
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internal modeling may be applied to the insurance business as a whole or to
one or more specific business units.75
b. Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR).
Pursuant to the Framework Directive, Member States must require
that insurance undertakings hold eligible basic funds (as discussed further
below) to cover the Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR).76 The MCR
represents a minimum solvency floor below which policyholders and
beneficiaries are exposed to an unacceptable level of risk if undertakings
were allowed to continue operating.77 A breach of the MCR exposes the
applicable undertaking to serious supervisory actions, as discussed further
below.
The MCR is calculated as a linear function of various variables (net
of reinsurance), including technical provisions, written premiums, capitalat-risk, deferred tax and administrative expenses.78
The MCR is based on an 85% “confidence level” over the
subsequent one-year period.79 Furthermore, the Framework Directive
provides that the MCR shall not fall below 25%, nor exceed 45%, of the
undertaking’s SCR.80 In addition, the MCR shall be subject to an absolute
floor. For example, subject to limited exceptions, an absolute capital floor
of ! 2,200,000 applies to non-life insurance undertakings.81
Undertakings are required to calculate the MCR on a quarterly
basis, at a minimum, and report related results to the applicable
authorities.82 Further details in respect of the calculation of both the MCR
and SCR (including as concerns internal modeling) will be the subject of
implementing measures to be adopted by the European Commission.83

75

See id. Art. 112(2), at 56.
Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 129(4), at 60.
77
See id. Art. 129(5), at 60.
78
See id. art. 129(2), at 60.
79
See id. art. 129(1), at 59-60.
80
See id. art. 129(3), at 60.
81
See id. art. 129(1), at 59-60.
82
Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 129(4), at 59-60.
83
See id. art. 129(1), at 59-60.
76
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3. U.S. System Applicable to Capital Controls; Riskbased Capital (RBC) System
In the U.S., undertakings are subject to a Risk-based Capital (RBC)
system, a capital adequacy standard model designed by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).84 An individual factorbased RBC model exists for each primary insurance type (life,
property/casualty, health), and each generic formula focuses on certain
risks that are common to the particular insurance type, rather than all risks
to which a particular undertaking is exposed.85 This capital adequacy
measure is supplemented by various additional state specific capital-related
requirements, including minimum capital requirements which vary among
states.86
Unlike the SCR and MCR under Solvency II which, among other
things, are based on overall confidence/target levels discussed above, RBC
is based on the principle that each particular risk faced by an undertaking is
to be assigned an equity capital.87 Unlike the Solvency II regime as
discussed above, operational and catastrophic risk are not explicitly taken
into consideration as part of U.S. RBC standards.88 Moreover, U.S. RBC
standards do not apply to reinsurers, which are subject to various statebased requirements, while as a general matter, reinsurers fall within the
scope of Solvency II.89 U.S. RBC standards employ a covariance formula
in respect of determining capital requirements,90 a basis which does not
reflect the approach adopted by Solvency II to account for the interaction
of such factors such as assets and liabilities and risk mitigation and
diversification.91
One of the most significant differences between Solvency II and
the current U.S. RBC system is the approach taken to internal models.
84

NAIC, Risk-based Capital General Overview, July 15, 2009, available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_caped_RBCoverview.pdf [hereinafter
Risk-based Capital General Overview]; Martin Eling & Ines Holzmüller, An Overview
and Comparison of Risk-based Capital Standards 2 (June 2008) (unpublished working
paper, on file with the University of St. Gallen Institute of Insurance Economics).
85
Eling & Holzmüller, supra note 84, at 4-5.
86
Id. at 3.
87
Id. at 4.
88
Id. at 15.
89
Id. at 20-21.
90
Risk-based Capital General Overview, supra note 84, at 2; Eling &
Holzmüller, supra note 84, at 20-21.
91
Eling & Holzmüller, supra note 84, at 20-21.
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Contrary to the approach as discussed above under Solvency II which
introduces the option of internal models across the collective insurance
industry, the use of internal modeling in the U.S. remains relatively
limited.92 Partial internal modeling is applied in the U.S., on an
incremental basis, in respect of certain products, subject to various
safeguards.93 In this regard, for example, while certain undertakings may
calculate required capital and reserves using internal models, such
undertakings are nevertheless required to also calculate such items pursuant
to a standard formula prescribed by the regulators, effectively providing for
an explicit floor in respect of reserves and required capital.94
In addition, as described above, the use of internal models under
the Solvency II system is subject to the prior review and approval of the
applicable supervisors. In contrast, rather than conducting their own
review and approval of internal models, U.S. supervisors tend to rely on the
analysis conducted by the particular undertaking’s actuaries in respect of a
model’s appropriateness and results.95
In 2008, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
announced a Solvency Modernization Initiative (SMI), which examines
international developments (e.g., Solvency II) and their potential
applicability to U.S. regulation.96 An important focus of SMI concerns the
review of the use of internal models, including the application of internal
models to a wider range of insurance products.97 By way of specific
example, consideration is being given to the possible use of full internal
modeling by an undertaking, subject to certain safeguards (e.g., prior
approval) as a replacement for RBC.98
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Therese M. Vaughan, The Implications of Solvency II for U.S. Insurance
Regulation, Networks Financial Institute at Indiana State University, Feb. 2009, at
11, available at http://www.insurance.naic.org/Releases/2009_docs/090305_
vaughan_presentation.pdf [hereinafter Implications of Solvency II for U.S.
Insurance Regulation].
93
Id.
94
Id. at 8, 11.
95
Id. at 11.
96
See Ramon M. Calderon, Dir., NAIC Ctr. For Ins. Policy & Research,
Presentation at the NAIC Casualty Actuarial Society Annual Meeting (Nov. 16,
2009),. See NAIC, NAIC Solvency Modernization Initiative, available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_ex_isftf_smi_overview.pdf
[hereinafter SMI].
97
See id.
98
See id.
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Enforcement

Pursuant to the Framework Directive, insurance undertakings must
have procedures in place to identify an undertaking’s deteriorating financial
condition and in the event of such deterioration, undertakings must
“immediately” notify the applicable supervisors.99 As discussed below, the
level of supervisory intervention and the specific mechanisms employed by
regulators will progressively intensify with the degree of erosion of the
undertaking’s financial health.100
As specifically concerns the SCR, within two months from an
undertaking observing non-compliance with this capital requirement, the
undertaking must submit a “realistic recovery plan” to the applicable
supervisors for approval.101 Within six months from the observation of
such non-compliance, the undertaking must re-establish the level of its
eligible own funds to cover the SCR or reduce the undertaking’s risk
profile to ensure compliance with the SCR.102 Supervisors may, “if
appropriate,” extend this period by an additional three months.103
Moreover, the applicable supervisor may grant yet another extension in the
event of an exceptional deterioration in the financial markets (the specific
factors to be considered by supervisors in granting this addition extension
are to be set forth in implementing measures adopted by the European
Commission).104 If the applicable supervisor should determine that the
financial situation of an undertaking will continue to deteriorate, such
supervisors may, under exceptional circumstances, restrict such
undertaking’s ability to dispose of its assets.105
99

See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art 136, at 62.
Id. arts. 136-39, at 62-63.
101
See id. art. 138(2), at 62. Such recovery plan must address certain specific
matters as set forth in the Framework Directive (e.g., estimates of management
expenses, income and expenditures). See id.art. 142, at 63.
102
See id.art. 138(2), at 62.
103
Id.
104
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 138(4), at 62-64; art. 143, at
64. By way of example, one of the high level issues identified by CEIOPS and
Commission Services for review in respect of Pillar II measures includes the
determination of the maximum period of time which supervisory authorities can
extend to undertakings in the event of exception market falls. See CEIOPS Policy
Issues and Options, supra note 31.
105
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 138(5), at 63. In this regard,
Member States are to take the steps required to restrict the free disposal of assets
100
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Non-compliance by an undertaking with the MCR is subject to
separate remedial provisions under the Framework Directive.106 Within
one month from the observation by an undertaking of non-compliance with
the MCR, such undertaking must provide to the applicable supervisors a
“realistic financial scheme.” Such plan is designed to restore, within a
period of three months from the observation of non-compliance, the
eligible basic own funds to at least the level of the MCR or to reduce its
risk profile accordingly.107 As is the case with the SCR, the applicable
supervisors may place restrictions on an undertaking’s ability to dispose of
its assets in light of continuing financial difficulties.108 Importantly, the
applicable supervisor shall withdraw the authorization granted to an
undertaking to engage in insurance business in the event that an
undertaking fails to comply with the MCR and the supervisors determine
that the submitted finance scheme is “manifestly inadequate” or the
undertaking fails to comply with such scheme within the applicable
period.109
In addition to those measures described above, the supervisory
authorities shall have the power, subject to a principle of proportionality, to
take “all measures necessary” to safeguard the interests of policyholders.110
5. Own Funds
As concerns an undertaking’s capital resources, the SCR and MCR
must be covered by eligible “own funds” (e.g., regulatory capital) which
are divided between “basic own funds” and “ancillary own funds.”111 In
this regard, basic own funds include subordinated liabilities and the excess
of assets over liabilities,112 and ancillary own funds include other items
which may be called on to absorb losses (e.g., letters of credit, guarantees,
other “legally binding commitments”, unpaid share capital).113
located in their territory at the request of the applicable undertaking’s home
Member State which shall specify what assets are concerned. Id.
106
See id. arts. 139-42, at 63.
107
See id. art. 139(2), at 62. Such finance scheme must address certain
specific matters as set forth in the Framework Directive (e.g., estimates of
management expenses, income and expenditures). See id. art. 142, at 63.
108
See id. art. 139(3), at 63.
109
See Framework Directive, supra note 3,art. 144(1), at 64.
110
See id. art. 141, at 63.
111
See id.art. 87-90, at 48.
112
See id. art. 88, at 48.
113
See id. art. 89, at 48.
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Furthermore, ancillary own funds are subject to approval by the applicable
supervisors, for example, as concerns either the specific monetary value to
be ascribed to such item or the method to be applied in determining such
value.114
Pursuant to the Framework Directive, own funds are classified in
accordance with a three tier system, based in part on an item’s degree of
liquidity, permanence and loss-absorbing capacity.115 Furthermore, the
Framework Directive prescribes the specific amount of an undertaking’s
own funds which may fall within each of the prescribed tiers.116 By way of
example, the proportion of Tier 1 items (high quality capital) must be
greater than 1/3 of the total amount of an undertaking’s eligible own funds
covering the SCR.117
As compared with other provisions of the Framework Directive,
the provisions relating to eligible own funds are relatively broad and high
level, and the related requirements are subject to clarification and
development through additional implementing measures.118
By way of comparison concerning the quality of capital resources,
for example, U.S. RBS standards do not follow this tiered approach to
available capital, but instead provide for a single overall amount of
available capital.119 Furthermore, rather than taking into consideration
account off-balance-sheet items (e.g., letters of credit) in the calculation of
an undertaking’s available capital, such items are instead taken into
consideration in the calculation of an undertaking’s required capital under
the U.S. RBS standards.120

114

See id. art. 90, at 48.
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 93, at 49.
116
See id.art. 98, at 50.
117
Id.
118
See id. Art. 97, at 50.
119
See Risk-based Capital General Overview, supra note 84, at 3-4. The
National Association of Insurance Commissioners appears to be moving in the
general direction of a tiered approach, at least as concerns the amout of collateral
security that will be required of reinsurers, see NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMM’RS,
REINSURANCE REGULATORY MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2009, available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_reinsurance_090915_reins_ref_mo
dernization_act.pdf.
120
Id.
115
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6. Valuation of Assets / Liabilities
For supervisory purposes and to limit the administrative burden on
undertakings, under the Framework Directive, valuation standards are to be
compatible, to the extent possible, with international accounting
developments.121 More specifically, the Framework Directive provides that
assets and liabilities shall be valued consistent with an amount determined
on an arm’s length basis.122 Particular methods and assumptions to be used
in the valuation of assets and liabilities will be set forth in future
implementing measures from the European Commission.123
By way of quick comparison, no single valuation methodology
applies across the U.S., as states apply varying approaches to valuation
including, for example, book value, market value, and amortized costs.124
7. Permitted Investments
As concerns investments, undertakings will enjoy increased
flexibility as concerns the scope of their investment decisions under the
Solvency II regime, provided that investments are made in compliance with
the so-called “prudent person principle” as set forth in the Framework
Directive.125 Pursuant to this principle, undertakings will only be permitted
to invest in assets and instruments which the undertaking may, for example,
properly identify, measure, control and monitor and take into account in the
undertaking’s assessment of its overall solvency requirements.126
Furthermore, assets are to be invested by undertakings such as to ensure the
“security, quality, liquidity and profitability of the portfolio as a whole.”127
In this regard, Member States will not be able to require that
undertakings invest in any particular category of asset or subject

121

See Framework Directive, supra note 3, recital ¶ 46, at 5.
See id. art. 75, at 45; the main principles applicable to the valuations of
assets are consistent, as a general matter, with the definition of fair value under
IFRS. See CEIOPS’ Advice for Level 2 Implementing Measures on Solvency II:
Valuation of Assets and “Other Liabilities,” at 3, October 2009, CEIOPS-DOC31/09. [hereinafter CEIOPS Level 2 Advice: Valuation of Assets and “Other
Liabilities”].
123
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 74, at 45; see also CEIOPS
Level 2 Advice: Valuation of Assets and “Other Liabilities,” supra note 122.
124
See e.g., Risk-Based Capital Standards, supra note 84.
125
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 132, at 60.
126
See id. art. 132(2), at 61.
127
See id.
122
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investment decisions to notification or approval requirements.128 However,
for example, in order to ensure the uniform application of applicable
provisions of Solvency II, the European Commission may adopt
implementing measures providing for qualitative requirements (e.g.,
monitoring, managing and reporting of risks) in respect of certain
investments.129
By way of comparison, U.S. rules applicable to permitted
investments vary from state to state and tend to be based on a combination
of the prudent person principle and a rules-based approach.130
B.

PILLAR II: GOVERNANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT
REQUIREMENTS.

As succinctly observed by Thomas Steffan, Chairman of CEIOPS
in his presentation of the Framework Directive, “… Solvency II is not just
about capital. It is a change of behavior – for the sake of enhanced
consumer protection, financial stability and efficiency of insurance
markets.”131
One of the ways in which this change in behavior will be brought
about, and heading lessons learned from the financial crisis, is through the
provisions of the Framework Directive applicable to enhanced governance
and risk management.132 In this way, governance requirements are able to
address certain risks which are not properly dealt with through the
quantitative requirements as set forth in Pillar I as discussed above.133 In
this regard, the Framework Directive requires insurance undertakings to
implement effective risk management systems, allowing undertakings to
identify, measure, manage and report risks.134 Such systems must provide
for the “sound and prudent management of the business” and, among other
128

See id. art. 133, at 61.
See id. art. 135, at 62.
130
See Implications of Solvency II for U.S. Insurance Regulation, supra note
92, at 12. The State of New York announced an intent to move toward a
principles-based system in respect of regulating reinsurers, see e.g.,
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/press/2007/p0710181.htm.
131
See Steffen Presentation, supra note 9.
132
Studies concerning actual and near failures of undertakings as conducted by
CEIPOS indicate that the “primary causes of failures were poor management and
inappropriate risk decisions rather than inadequate capitalisation per se.” See
FAQs, supra note 8, at 5.
133
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, recital ¶ 29, at 4.
134
See id. art. 44, at 34.
129
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things, include an adequate transparent organizational structure, be subject
to written policies and regular internal review.135 As concerns the scope of
such risk management systems, they must cover such matters as the risks
included in the prescribed SCR calculation, underwriting and reserving,
asset / liability management, investments and liquidity and concentration
risk management.136 Furthermore, such systems are required to be well
integrated into the particular organizational structure as well as the decision
making processes of the undertaking.137
Importantly, the Framework Directive places ultimate
responsibility with an undertaking’s management or administration as
concerns the undertaking’s compliance with the various measures adopted
in respect of the Framework Directive, including the implementation of the
required risk management system.138 Moreover, the Framework Directive
sets forth requirements as concerns those persons who may run the
undertaking or have other key functions.139 In this regard, such individuals
must be of “good repute and integrity” and have adequate professional
qualifications, knowledge and experience as concerns the effective
management of the undertaking.140
As part of its overall risk management framework, each
undertaking will be required to implement an internal control system,
including the establishing of risk-related “functions” or specific areas of
expertise and responsibility.141 Such functions include a compliance
function that serves to advise management on applicable compliance
matters, including in respect of the identification and assessment of
compliance risk,142 an internal audit function (e.g., responsibilities include
the evaluation of the adequacy and effectiveness of the internal control and
governance system)143 and an actuarial function (e.g., undertaking the
coordination of the calculation of technical provisions, ensuring the
appropriateness of the methodologies and models used by the undertaking,
135

See id. art. 41, at 33.
See id. art. 44, at 34.
137
See id.
138
See id. art. 40, at 33.
139
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 42, at 33. Matters related to
proof of good repute, and the recognition of same by Member States, are addressed
in Article 43 of the proposed Framework Directive, supra note 3.
140
See id.
141
See id. art. 46, at 35.
142
See id.
143
See id. art. 47, at 35.
136
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expressing an opinion as to the overall underwriting policy and adequacy of
reinsurance arrangements).144
As a general matter, an undertaking may outsource the foregoing
functions, among others. However, the outsourcing of critical or important
operational functions or activities145 is subject to certain enumerated
conditions. For example, such outsourcing may not materially impair the
quality of the undertaking’s governance system or unduly increase
operational risk.146 In order to ensure effective supervision of outsourced
functions or activities, supervisors are to have access to relevant data held
by the outsourcing provider as well as have the right to perform on-site
inspections.147 In any event, Member States are to ensure that in the event
that an undertaking chooses to outsource particular functions or activities,
such undertakings are to remain fully responsible for discharging their
obligations under the Framework Directive.148
1. Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA)
As a critical part of an undertaking’s risk management system,
each undertaking will be required to regularly undertake a so-called “own
risk and solvency assessment (ORSA).”149 In this regard, an undertaking
must assess the short and long term risks which it may face, or be
144

See id. art. 48, at 36. The requirement as to an actuarial function is
controversial considering that this requirement is not provided for in Solvency I
and will apply to both non-life and life undertakings. As an example regarding the
on-going consultations with CEIOP in respect of the contemplated actuarial
function, the actuarial trade association Group Consultatif Actuariel Européen has
proposed various specific technical and public interests standards to be applicable
in this area (e.g., public interest standards should encompass actuarial, ethical,
governance and communications standards). See Groupe Consultatif Actuarial
Européen, Professional Standards for the Actuarial Function under Solvency II
(Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://www.gcactuaries.org/documents.
145
The functions included within the governance system are considered to be
“key functions and consequently also important and critical functions.” See
Framework Directive, supra note 3, recital ¶ 33, at 4.
146
See id. art. 49, at 36.
147
See id. recital ¶ 37, at 4, art. 38, at 32.
148
See id. art. 49, at 36.
149
See id. art. 45, at 34. In this regard, CEIOPS interprets “regularly” to mean
at least annually. See CEIOPS, Issues Paper: Own Risk and Solvency Assessment
(ORSA)
¶
49,
at
12
(May
27,
2008),
available
at
http://www.ceiops.eu/media/docman/public_files/consultations/IssuesPaperORSA.
pdf [hereinafter CEIOPS: ORSA Issues Paper].
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anticipated to face, and determine the own funds necessary to meet the
undertaking’s solvency needs on an on-going basis.150 In this way,
Solvency II aims to integrate risk and capital management, necessarily
promoting and implicating effective and forward-looking risk management
as a principal consideration throughout the governance and decision
making process of an undertaking.151
The ORSA does not require the development of a specific internal
model or the calculation of capital requirements in addition to the SCR and
MCR.152 The choice as to the particular ORSA process adopted is left to
the discretion of the particular undertaking, however, the process must
meet prescribed guidelines.153 The results and information concerning the
particular process undertaken in respect of the ORSA must be reported by
an undertaking to the applicable supervisory authorities, thereby providing
supervisors with the means for evaluating the risk profiles of
undertakings.154
While the Framework Directive addresses the principal
requirements and matters to be addressed in the ORSA, certain
undertakings have argued that the Framework Directive does not provide
sufficient detail regarding the specific results which are to be achieved. As
a result, there is some uncertainty in the market, particularly on the part of
smaller undertakings worried that the requirements under the ORSA may
be overly complex and burdensome.155 Although the ORSA will likely be
subject to Level 3 guidance from CEIOPS, it is not expected that there will
be Level 2 implementing measures in respect of the ORSA.156 Therefore,
in an effort to address the calls of the market for guidance in this area,
CEIOPS has launched discussions regarding the scope and goals of the
ORSA and has offered preliminary guidance in this regard.157 By way of
example, CEIPOS has enumerated various principles which undertakings
should observe in conducting the ORSA (e.g., the ORSA should be
regularly reviewed and approved by the undertaking’s administrative or

150

See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 45, at 35; see CEIOPS: ORSA
Issues Paper, supra note 149, ¶ 9, at 5.
151
See e.g., Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 45, at 35.
152
See id. recital ¶ 36, at 4.
153
See id. art. 45, at 34-35.
154
See id.
155
See CEIOPS: ORSA Issues Paper, supra note 149, ¶¶ 2-3, at 4.
156
See id. ¶ 5, at 4-5.
157
See id. ¶ 6, at 5.
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management body; the ORSA process and results should be appropriately
evidenced, internally documented and independently assessed).158
This approach to enterprise risk management under Solvency II
marks one of the most significant differences from the current U.S. system.
In the U.S., such evaluation is not part of the RBC system, and
undertakings are not otherwise required to implement risk management
systems such as that provided under the ORSA.159 In this regard, while
undertakings in the U.S. are required to analyze the risks that they face by
virtue the U.S. regulatory regime (e.g., risk-based capital requirements),160
there is no requirement for these undertakings to prepare specific internal
risk assessment-related documentation and then provide such materials to
the applicable supervisors.161 It should be noted that the introduction of
enterprise risk management requirements are being considered as part of
the NAIC’s Solvency Modernization Initiative.162
2. Group Supervision
Under the Framework Directive, Member States will be required to
provide for group-level supervision of insurance undertakings.163
Significantly, Solvency II streamlines the group supervision process by
providing that group insurance undertakings are to be supervised through a
single “group supervisor” in the group’s home Member State, the duties of
whom would necessarily be exercised in cooperation with the relevant

158

See CEIOPS: ORSA Issues Paper, supra note 149, ¶ 55, at 13.
See SMI, supra note 96.
160
See Solvency Modernization Initiative (EX) Task Force, Issues for
Consideration in the Solvency Modernization Initiative 3 (June 14, 2009), available
at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_ex_isftf_090615_04_solvency_
issues.pdf.
161 See Letter from Mike Moriart, Chair, Risk Assessment Working Group (E),
Risk-Focused Examination Approach (Jan. 18, 2007) (on file with NAIC, available
at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_examover_fehtg_letter__risk_focus
ed_exams.pdf).
162
See SMI, supra note 96. An enhanced risk-focused examination approach
will be required to be applied by U.S. regulators in 2010, and the NAIC expects
that similar information to that provided by the ORSA will be collected by this
revised risk-focused examination approach. See Implications of Solvency II for
U.S. Insurance Regulation, supra note 92, at 9.
163
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, arts. 212-266, at 81-102.
159
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national supervisors.164
Such group supervisor will have primary
responsibility for the group’s supervision and chair a college of supervisors
made up of representatives from Member States where the group has
operations.165 This model marks a break from the existing system, argued
to be overly burdensome on larger group undertakings, which provides for
supervision on the group and sub-group level and which fails to define with
sufficient clarity the roles and duties of the various supervisory authorities
in this regard.166
These revised regulations as to group supervision will allow
insurance groups to operate more efficiently and result in a reduction of
related costs. In addition, the new group supervision rules are designed to
foster cooperation among supervisory authorities as well as improve
assessments of the overall financial situation of group undertakings.167
Moreover, under Solvency II, insurance groups will be able to avail
themselves of group-wide models and take advantage of certain group
diversification benefits.168
It is important to point out that the Framework Directive does not
contain the “group support” language as proposed in earlier drafts of the
Framework Directive (Title III).169 As a result, under the contemplated
regime, a particular insurance undertaking will not be permitted to use
capital held elsewhere in the group in order to calculate the undertaking’s
SCR, regardless of the group’s capital as a whole.170 However, the
European Commission has indicated that it may revisit the issue of group

164

See id. arts. 247-251, at 95-98.
See id. art. 248, at 97.
166
See Council Directive 98/78, 1998 O.J. (L 330) 1-12 (EC), available at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1998:330:0001:0012:EN:PDF.
167
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, arts. 247-251, at 95-98; FAQs,
supra note 8, at 10.
168
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, arts. 212-266, at 81-102; CEIOPS,
CEIOPS’ Advice for Level 2 Implementing Measures on Solvency II: Assessment of
Group Solvency (OCT. 2009), available at http://www.ceiops.eu/media/files/consultations/
consultationpapers/CP60/CEIOPS-L2-Final-Advice-Group-solvency-assessment.pdf.
169
See FAQs, supra note 8, at 11.
170
Press Release, European Commission, “Solvency II”: European Parliament
Approval of Proposed Directive Brings Modern Insurance Regulation Nearer,
(Apr. 22, 2009) (available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/09/621&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.)
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support once progress has been made in other various identified areas
related to insurance regulation.171
C.

PILLAR III: TRANSPARENCY AND MARKET DISCIPLINE.
1. Reporting.

The Framework Directive calls for consistent supervisory reporting
and disclosure across the EU, strengthening transparency and overall
market discipline.172
Specific details concerning the reporting requirements, which go
beyond those currently required to be disclosed under the current
regulatory regime, are to be developed through future implementing
measures (e.g., as to content, form, modalities).173
However, the
Framework Directive does provide certain high level guidance as concerns
reporting.174 For example, undertakings will be required to publicly
disclose a report, on an annual basis, concerning their solvency and
financial condition. This report is to include, for example, a description of
the system of governance and an assessment of its adequacy, a description
of the capital management including references to the structure and amount
of own funds and their quality, the amounts of the SCR and MCR and the
underlying assumptions, and any non-compliance with the foregoing.175
An undertaking may, on a voluntary basis, supplement the basic disclosure
with additional information concerning the undertaking’s solvency or
financial condition.176 As a practical matter, such Pillar III reporting will
likely draw upon information gathered in respect of Pillar I and the ORSA
of Pillar II.177 While certainly presenting challenges in seeking a balance
between proprietary and public information, such public disclosure is seen
as essential in strengthening market disciple by improving the

171

See Framework Directive, supra note 3, recital ¶ 141, at 13.
See id. art. 51, at 36.
173
See id. art. 56, at 38. By way of example, certain high level issues
identified by CEIOPS and Commission Services as being of particular importance
for review in respect of public disclosure concern the compatibility with other
reporting rules and the introduction of proportionate requirements for small
undertakings. See also CEIOPS Policy Issues and Options, supra note 31.
174
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 51, at 36.
175
See id. art. 51(1), at 37.
176
See id. art. 54(2), at 38.
177
See id. arts. 35, at 30; art. 45, at 34-35.
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accountability of undertakings and providing increased information to
policyholders and beneficiaries.
2. Supervision: Generally.
In addition to the points already discussed herein as concerns
supervision, a few additional points specific to the general principles of
supervision should be made here.178
Under Solvency II, Member States are to ensure that supervisors
are provided with the required “means, and have the relevant expertise and
capacity, and mandate” to carry out the principal objective of supervision
which is the protection of policyholders and beneficiaries.179 Furthermore,
taking into account the information available, supervisors are to give
appropriate consideration to the potential impact of their decisions as
concerns the stability of the larger EU financial systems.180 In addition, the
Framework Directive stresses that supervisors are to respect a principle of
proportionality, as indicated above, in respect of the application of their
powers.181
Supervision is to be based on a prospective risk-based basis,
including on-going verification, and a mix of on-site inspections and offsite activities.182 In addition, supervisors are to carry out their duties in a
“transparent and accountable” manner, with consideration to protecting
confidential information.183 Moreover, the Framework Directive provides
for measures to facilitate the supervisory convergence and the flow of
information among the various EU supervisory authorities.184
It is important to point out that the financial supervision of
insurance undertakings, including the business conducted by their branches
or through the freedom to provide services, shall be the “sole”

178

See Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Supervisors, CEIOPS’ Advice for Level 2 Implementing Measures on Solvency II:
Supervisory Reporting and Public Disclosure Requirements, (October 2009)
(available at http://www.solvencyii.ie/documents/CEIOPS-L2-Final-Advice-Ownfunds-Criteria-supervisory-approval-of-AOF.pdf).
179
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 27, at 28.
180
See id. art. 28, at 28.
181
See id. art. 34(6), at 30.
182
See id. art. 29, at 28.
183
See id. art. 31, at 29.
184
See id. art. 64, at 41.

2010] MODERNIZATION OF PRUDENTIAL REGULATION

385

responsibility of a particular undertaking’s home Member State.185 In the
event that the supervisors of a host Member State where an insurance risk
is located have reason to consider that an undertaking’s activities may
impact its financial soundness, then such supervisors are to so inform the
supervisors of such undertaking’s home Member State.186
3. Supervisory Review Process.
Another requirement introduced pursuant to the Framework
Directive is the Supervisory Review Process (SRP), a specific process
designed to improve the assessment of the ability of undertakings to
withstand adverse changes in economic conditions.187 As part of this
overall process, Member States are required to ensure that applicable
supervisors review and evaluate the “strategies, processes and reporting
procedures” implemented by undertakings as part of their compliance
efforts.188 Specifically, supervisors are to review and evaluate compliance
with such items as the system of governance (including the ORSA), and the
technical provisions, capital requirements, investment rules, the quality and
quantity of own funds, and requirements in respect of internal models, all
as set forth in the Framework Directive.189 Importantly, the Framework
Directive provides that supervisors are to conduct such review and
evaluations on a regular basis and that they should have the powers
necessary to remedy identified weaknesses or deficiencies.190
4. Capital Add-on.
As part of the supervisory review / enforcement process, the
applicable supervisory authorities may in “exceptional”191 circumstances
185

See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 30(1), at 28. Where an
insurance undertaking authorized in another Member State conducts business in a
host Member State through a branch office, then the supervisors of the
undertaking’s home Member State may conduct on-site verifications of the branch,
provided that such supervisors have first notified the supervisors of the host
Member State thereof. See id. art. 33, at 29.
186
See id. art. 30(3), at 29.
187
See id. art. 36, at 30.
188
See id. art. 36(1), at 30-31.
189
See id. art. 36(2), at 31.
190
See Framework Directive, supra note 3,art. 36(4-6), at 31.
191
“The imposition of a capital add-on is exception in the sense that it should
only be used as a last resort measure, when other supervisory measures are
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require, with justification, undertakings to set aside additional capital.192
Such an add-on, which may be applied in respect of a particular
undertaking or its group, will require the undertaking to maintain additional
capital in excess of the SCR.193 This capital add-on may be imposed when
the applicable supervisory authority identifies, for example, a significant
deviation from the applicable SCR or system of governance provided for
pursuant to the Framework Directive.194 The capital add-on should be
maintained for such time as the circumstances under which it was imposed
are not remedied.195 Further implementing measures will be adopted by the
European Commission in respect of the specific situations in which the
capital add-on may be imposed by applicable supervisors, in addition to the
particular methodologies to be employed in the calculation thereof.196
VII.

COLLATERAL REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO
REINSURERS

One of the most significant and continuing points of contention
between U.S. and EU reinsurers and regulators is the application of
collateral requirements to foreign reinsurers covering business in their
jurisdiction. The primary concern behind such requirements is that such
foreign reinsurers are not subject to the same local regulatory and judicial
enforcement regime and, therefore, such undertakings present a heightened
risk, and therefore should be required to pledge assets as a safeguard
measure.197
In this regard and as a general matter, U.S. regulators require
foreign (e.g., EU) reinsurers which are not licensed or accredited in a U.S.
state, and subject to various conditions, to post collateral in respect of their
operations in the U.S.198 In the EU, and as introduced through provisions
of the EU Reinsurance Directive, Member States are prohibited from
imposing collateral requirements on reinsurers from other Member
ineffective or inappropriate”. See id., recital ¶ 27, at 4; art. 37, at 31. See also id.
art. 282, at 89 (regarding the group capital add-on).
192
See id. art. 37, at 31.
193
See id.
194
See Framework Directive, supra note 3,art. 37(1), at 31.
195
See id. recital ¶ 28, at 4.
196
See id. art. 37(6), at 32.
197
See Gregory S. Arnold, The Doubtful Impact of an Optional Federal
Charter on the Reinsurance Collateral Debate, 44 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 79
[hereinafter Doubtful Impact of Optional Federal Charter].
198
See id. at 82. See supra notes 119, 130.
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States.199 However, Member States may choose to apply collateral
requirements to non-EU reinsurers which provide reinsurance to
undertakings regulated in Member States.200 By way of example, France
allows for the imposition of such requirements in respect of non-EEA
reinsurers.201
As a move, in part, to assuage U.S. regulators, the Framework
Directive contains language regarding the application of so so-called
collateral requirements to non-EU reinsurers. Specifically, the Framework
Directive prohibits EU Member States from requiring that a reinsurer
pledge assets to cover unearned premiums and outstanding claims
provisions if such reinsurer is an undertaking with its head office in a third
county whose solvency regime is deemed to be “equivalent” pursuant to the
Framework Directive.202 The meaning of “equivalent” has yet to be
defined or clarified, and more specifically, guidance has not been provided
as to whether the U.S. solvency regimes would be deemed to be equivalent
in this regard.
Many undertakings, insurance groups and regulators in both the
U.S. and the EU continue to call for a reform of collateral requirements,
arguing that such requirements are essentially outdated, discriminatory and
anticompetitive. With moves like Solvency II, and particularly the
collateral-related provisions discussed above, there may be reason for a
certain degree of measured optimism that compromises might eventually be
reached between EU and U.S. regulators in this regard.203

199

Council Directive 2005/68, 2005 O.J. (L323) 16 (on reinsurance and
amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 92/49/EEC as well as Directives
98/78/EC and 2002/83/EC, art. 32). As mentioned above in respect of the
Framework Directive, it is important to point out that this Directive also has
relevance to the larger European Economic Area, supra note 3.
200
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 172, at 72.
201
See Code des Assurances, C. Assur., art. R. 332-3-3 (French Insurance
Code).
202
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 172, at 72. Furthermore, as
concerns recoverables from reinsurance contracts against undertakings having their
head office in a non-EEA country whose solvency system is deemed to be
“equivalent” pursuant to the Framework Directive, Member States will be
prohibited from requiring that assets representing such recoverables be located in
the European Community, id. art. 134, at 61.
203
See, e.g., Doubtful Impact of Optional Federal Charter, supra note 197, at
106as concerns proposed reforms to collateral requirements from New York
regulators.
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As indicated in the introduction to this Article, the review herein is
intended to provide, among other things, a survey of some of the principle
regulatory changes introduced through Solvency II. However, it is
important to briefly point out that the Framework Directive also recasts
existing directives as indicated above, and as a result, addresses such other
significant matters such as requirements concerning the taking-up, pursuit
and prior authorization of undertakings wishing to engage in insurance
activities,204 provisions in respect of the exchange of information among
supervisory authorities and the promotion of supervisory convergence,205
duties of statutory auditors,206 and provisions specific to individual types of
coverage207 and to the reorganization and winding-up of insurance
undertakings.208
IX.

KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE BASEL FRAMEWORK
AND SOLVENCY II / ADDRESSING COMMON CONCERNS
WITH SOLVENCY II BASED ON COMPARISONS
TO BASEL II

As indicated above, Solvency II adopts the general three pillar
approach of Basel II, the regulatory standard for financial institutions.209
However, it is important to understand the various significant differences
between the two regimes, as well as bear in mind the key differences
between the financial and insurance industries.
Unfortunately,
commentators are often far too quick to apply the banking experience into
insurance. In this regard, the similarities between the Basel framework and
Solvency II are frequently overstated, leading critics of Solvency II to
argue that this initiative suffers from the same shortcomings of Basel II.

204

See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 14, at 24.
See id. art. 64, at 41.
206
See id. art. 72, at 43.
207
See e.g., id. art. 206, at 79 (health insurance).
208
See id. art. 269, at 103.
209
See BIS Website, supra note 6.
205
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KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE BASEL FRAMEWORK AND
SOLVENCY II

Before addressing some of the most frequent concerns with
Solvency II in this regard, it is important as an initial matter to address
some of the key differences between the Basel framework and Solvency II.
1. Range of Risks Covered.
The range of risks included under Pillar I of Basel II is focused on
operational risk, credit risk and market risk as concerns a financial
institution’s trading operations.210 As described above, Solvency II aims to
cover all quantifiable key risk areas. In this regard, Solvency II covers the
same categories as Basel II, but also includes an expanded array of risks,
including, by way of example, insurance risk, liquidity risk (an area of the
Basel framework which is subject to continuing attention) as well as
broader view of market risk across the entirety of an undertaking.211
2. Capital
Requirements / Ladder
Intervention.

of

Supervisory

Basel II provides for a single capital requirement.212 As described
above, Solvency II provides for broader Pillar I provisions. In this regard,
Solvency II provides for both a Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) and a
Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR). Once the SCR of an undertaking
is breached, the intervention of supervisors is triggered in order to remedy
the situation, and if the MCR is breached, increased supervisory measures
are triggered, all as described above.213 In this way, Solvency II provides
for a gradated approach to supervisory intervention, a nuanced system
which is not mirrored by Basel II’s approach to capital adequacy.
3. Internal Modeling.
The approach to internal modeling under Basel II is limited to
certain specific risk categories and specified applications (e.g., IRB
framework for credit risks, AMA framework for operational risk). In
210

See BIS Website, supra note 6, Pillar I.
See infra discussion of Pillar I provisions of Solvency II.
212
See BIS Website, supra note 6, Pillar I.
213
See supra discussion of Pillar I provisions of Solvency II.
211
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respect of credit risk, for example, companies are only permitted to use
internal modeling to determine certain specific risk components.214 In
contrast, as described above, Solvency II provides that any undertaking
subject to Solvency II may elect to use partial or full modeling, across
categories, as an alternative to using the standard formula for calculating
the SCR.215
4. Diversification.
Under Basel II, diversification is addressed through a general
assumption as to standard diversification which is then incorporated into
the general calculation. As such, any company-specific diversification is
particularly limited.216 Solvency II, however, aims to make diversification
specific to a particular undertaking and flexible enough to allow for group
level matters.
5. Stakeholder Participation in the Initiative’s
Development.
The level of stakeholder participation in the development of each
of Basel II and Solvency II is markedly different. Basel II was developed
by a central committee (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), with
relatively limited stakeholder participation.217 In contrast, as described
above, Solvency II continues to be developed with the active involvement
of the various stakeholders through such means as Quantitative Impact
Studies (QIS).
B.

COMMON CONCERNS WITH SOLVENCY II BASED ON
COMPARISONS TO BASEL II

Against this background we can now address in brief a few
common concerns with Solvency II based on comparisons to Basel II. In
this regard, the author consulted with Mr. Karel van Hulle, Head of the
Insurance and Pensions Unit of the European Commission responsible for

214

See BIS Website, supra note 6, Pillar I.
See infra discussion of Pillar I provisions of Solvency II.
216
See BIS Website, supra note 6, Pillar I.
217
See David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, In International
Administration, 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 547, 555-61 (2005).
215
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Solvency II (“Mr. van Hulle”), and his specific feedback is included
herein.218
1. Misinterpretation of the Objective of Solvency II–
Capital Standards.
Frequently, commentators argue that Basel II effectively seeks to
lower minimum capital requirements applicable to financial institutions.
Therefore, in light of the financial crisis that has exposed many financial
institutions as being undercapitalized, commentators question the
advisability of implementing a system such as Solvency II which likewise
seeks to relax capital standards in respect of insurance undertakings.
Such an argument is based on an inaccurate understanding of the
objective of Solvency II. As emphasized by Mr. van Hulle, the objective of
Solvency II is not to lower the capital requirements applicable to
undertakings, but rather to express these capital requirements as part of a
balanced and comprehensive reflection of the risks faced by any particular
undertaking.219 That being said, under the risk-based structure of Solvency
II, lower capital requirements may indeed result for these undertakings
which understand and manage their risks well. However, certain
undertakings may face higher capital requirements under Solvency II since
their capital may not have been risk-based, particularly affecting those
undertakings which have managed their risks less adequately or have
inadequate capital considering the amount of risk underwritten.
Furthermore, as concerns adjusting capital requirements and
mindful of concerns as to the health of undertakings, Mr. van Hulle stresses
that since there is no evidence that the EU insurance industry is
undercapitalized, there would appear to be no reason for a general increase
in requirements at this time.220
2. Use of Internal Modeling by Small and Medium
Undertakings.
Under Solvency II, the use of internal modeling is available to be
applied by any applicable insurance undertaking. Because of this, concerns
have been raised as to whether small and medium undertakings will have,
218

Interview with Karel van Hulle, Head of Unit, Ins. & Pensions Unit of the
Eur. Comm’n, in PLACE (Jan. 12, 2010).
219
Id.
220
Id.
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in reality, the competence to conduct such modeling. In this regard,
comparisons are drawn to the Basel II system, which as applied in the U.S.,
only permits internal modeling to be applied by a limited number of the
largest financial institutions.
While a standard formula is limited in providing only an
approximation, Mr. van Hulle stresses that as a general matter, a welldesigned internal model strengthens a particular undertaking’s focus on risk
management and provides a more attuned alignment of such undertaking’s
specific capital and risk requirements.221 While internal modeling is
complex, it is expected that undertakings, regardless of their relative size,
will be in a position to calculate the SCR on the basis of partial or full
modeling.222 In this regard, Mr. van Hulle points out that smaller
undertakings often provide specialized and niche services who understand
their particular risks very well, often even better than larger more
diversified undertakings. Moreover, certain national supervisors are
already actively working with undertakings, of varying sizes, in respect of
the development of internal models, in anticipation of Solvency II coming
into force in 2012. By way of example, the UK’s Financial Services
Authority (FSA) has created a dedicated Internal Model Approval Process
(IMAP) team and continues to distribute various guidance in respect of
internal modelling under Solvency II. In addition, the FSA has initiated a
pilot program whereby four undertakings (of varying types and sizes) have
been chosen to test the design of the IMAP. Furthermore, the FSA has
launched plans to start a pre-application process in respect of internal
models this year.223
3. Development of Internal Models.
In light of the financial crisis, concerns have been expressed as to
whether internal modeling under Solvency II will be subject to the same
shortcomings as seen as applies to financial institutions under Basel II.
Specifically, will Solvency II ensure that internal models are actually used
by undertakings to understand their risks, as opposed to such models being
developed simply as a tool to be used by regulators?

221

Id.
Id.
223
See Solvency 2 - IMAP Update Helping You Prepare, Financial Services
Authority Release (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
international/imap_update_oct.pdf.
222
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In this regard and as an initial matter, Mr. van Hulle stresses that it
is important to understand the differences between internal modelling as
between financial institutions and insurance undertakings.
Internal
modelling in respect of financial institutions must necessarily take into
account various factors which are difficult to predict (e.g., interest rates).
On the other hand, Mr. van Hulle points out that factors in respect of
internal modelling for insurance undertakings are often more discretely
defined and relatively stable (e.g., longevity). As concerns underwriting
risk, Mr. van Hulle remarks that internal modelling in insurance looks into
the past and projects into the future.224 In this regard, he notes that as
concerns underwriting risk, which is the principal insurance risk,
undertakings may have a long history from which to assess applicable risk
(e.g., longevity as applicable to life insurance).225
Insurers will elect to use internal modelling, as opposed to the
standard model, when internal models help to lower the particular
undertaking’s SCR. However, as discussed above, an undertaking which
decides to use partial or full internal modeling in respect of calculating
SCR may only do so once such model has been reviewed and approved by
the applicable supervisor, meeting various statistical, calibration, validation
and documentation standards.226 In this regard, any internal model must
also meet the so-called “use test” under Solvency II, a test which is
described above and which provides for more developed standards than
found under Basel II.227 Pursuant to this test, as discussed above, an
undertaking must demonstrate that the particular model is widely used in
and plays a significant role in the undertaking’s actual internal risk
management and decision-making processes.
In other words, the
undertaking must demonstrate that the model is not being used simply to
minimize capital requirements or for the benefit of regulators, but rather
that the model is actually being used as the basis upon which the business
of the undertaking is being run.228

224

See Interview with Karel van Hulle, supra note 220.
Id.
226
See supra p. 13.
227
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, art. 120, at 57.
228
See supra p. 13.
225
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4. Regulator Competence To Evaluate and Supervise
Internal Models.
Another area of concern in respect of Solvency II is whether
insurance supervisors will be adequately equipped to supervise internal
models. In this regard, critics of the use of internal models often point to
how the financial crisis has raised serious questions regarding the
competence of financial supervisors to evaluate and monitor the
proliferation of different internal models.
Unquestionably, internal modeling represents one of the most
significant single challenges for insurance supervisors. Among other
things, supervisors will need to possess the required technical knowledge,
as well as understand how the various risks facing undertakings are
modelled in order to evaluate the adequacy of any internal model. In this
regard and to help facilitate uniformity across jurisdictions, the European
Commission is currently developing uniform criteria which supervisors are
to apply in respect of the approval of any internal model.229 In addition,
extensive training sessions for national supervisors are being organized at
the EU level as concerns internal modeling and related issues and risks.230
5. Addressing the Financial Crisis.
In light of the global financial crisis and the criticisms made in
respect of Basel II (such criticisms frequently failing to take into account
the differed implementation of Basel II), concerns have been raised as to
whether, as a general matter, Solvency II adequately addresses the various
challenges and issues presented by this crisis.
In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that Solvency II is not
simply a reaction to the financial crisis, but rather represents an initiative
which has been (and continues to be) an evolving revision of the prudential
regulation of insurers. That having been said, many of the features of
Solvency II position the initiative as a fundamental tool and platform for
addressing many of the specific issues raised by the financial crisis.
Perhaps one of the most significant ways in which Solvency II helps to
address such issues is through the very nature of the initiative – a dynamic
229

See Comm. of Eur. Ins. & Occupational Pension Supervisors [CEIOPS],
CEIOPS’ Advice for Level 2 Implementing Measures on Solvency II on: The
Procedure to be Followed for the Approval of an Internal Model, CEIOPS-Doc28/09 (Oct. 2009).
230
See Interview with Karel van Hulle, supra note 220.
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risk-based capital system based on enhanced governance and risk
management. In this way, Mr. van Hulle stresses that Solvency II is able to
address such matters as the serious shortcomings in risk management
practices which have been exposed by the financial crisis. Furthermore,
Solvency II (Pillar III) promotes greater transparency and accountability,
another area of particular concern amplified by the financial crisis.
Moreover, and as discussed further herein, Solvency II aims to
address the problem of pro-cyclicality, an area of notable concern with
Basel II. In this regard and as discussed herein, the ladder of intervention
approach adopted by Solvency II (the multi-tiered approach ranging from
the SCR to the MCR) works to address possible pro-cyclical effects by
providing for a gradated231 and flexible approach232 to supervisory
intervention. In this way, Solvency II seeks to provide a dampener against
the situation where the impact of regulation increases the severity on the
overall economic, financial or insurance cycle.233
Various elements of Solvency II have been or are being considered
for amendment as a direct result of the financial crisis. In this regard, Mr.
van Hulle points to the possibility of attaching a greater importance to
financial stability issues, strengthening Tier I capital requirements, and
further addressing possible pro-cyclical effects as concerns supervisory
actions, as well as specific risks, such as concentration risk or liquidity
risk.234
Moreover, Mr. van Hulle identifies group supervision as an area of
particular focus of the European Commission in light of the financial crisis,
an area of supervision which has traditionally been treated as

231

See supra p. 18-19..
See Framework Directive, supra note 3, recital ¶ 61, at 6-7; art. 138(4), at
62-63. Solvency II provides that in the event of exceptional deterioration in the
financial markets, supervisors may grant an undertaking additional time in order to
re-establish the level of its own eligible funds to cover the SCR or reduce the
undertaking’s risk profile to ensure compliance with the SCR. Id.
233
See Comm. of Eur. Ins. & Occupational Pension Supervisors [CEIOPS],
Consultation Paper no. 64, Draft CEIOPS’ Advice for Level 2 Implementing
Measures on Solvency II: Extension of the Recovery Period, CEIOPS–CP–64/09
(Nov. 2, 2009).
234
See Interview with Karel van Hulle, supra note 220; see also Basel Comm.
on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Enhancements to the Basel II
Framework (July 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm
(promulgating amendments designed to enhance the Basel II framework by
strengthening minimum capital requirements and disclosure requirements).
232
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supplementary to solo supervision throughout the EU (and the U.S.).235
Solvency II aims to prioritize group supervision along with solo
supervision. In this regard, and as described herein, group supervision will
be strengthened under Solvency II through such significant measures as the
appointment by each group of a group supervisor.236
As an additional matter, the Value-at-Risk (VaR) approach adopted
by Basel II, in part, has been criticized for failing to account for so-called
“fat tail” events such as the financial crisis. In this regard, similar concerns
have been raised as concerns Solvency II which also contemplates the use
of VaR. Tail VaR is not currently contemplated to be included as part of
the standard formula under Solvency II out of concerns that doing so would
render the formula too complex.237 However, under Solvency II,
undertakings are provided with the opportunity to specifically account for
tail factors through the use of internal modelling. As discussed above, the
use of internal models is particularly restricted under Basel II, whereas
internal modelling is actively encouraged to be applied by any undertaking
subject to Solvency II and across the spectrum or risks categories.
It is important to bear in mind that while capital requirements are
key to any regulatory program, Solvency II takes a holistic approach to risk
management, combining capital requirements with qualitative requirements
(Pillar II) and market transparency measures (Pillar III). Therefore, the
various risk-based measures of Solvency II, taken together on a regimewide basis and as discussed in detail herein, are designed to help account
for stress events.
While no economically viable regulatory regime can provide an
absolute guarantee against failure, Solvency II is designed with the goal of
striking the necessary balances. That being said, and as discussed above,
Solvency II seeks to provide aggressive assurances as to the health of the
insurance industry, in providing, for example, what is generally agreed to
be a high confidence level of 99.5 % Value at Risk over a one-year period
or one failure in two hundred years.
X.

CONCLUSION

Solvency II is a fundamental review of the prudential regulation of
the European insurance industry, providing for a reinforced EU-wide,
forward-looking, risk-sensitive regulatory structure, as applicable to such
235

See Interview with Karel van Hulle, supra note 220.
See supra p. 12.
237
See Interview with Karel van Hulle, supra note 220.
236
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areas as capital adequacy, governance and risk management, as well as
market discipline and transparency. Through a total balance sheet
approach, undertakings will be required under Solvency II not only to
assess the actual risks faced by an undertaking, but also to implement such
measures required to monitor, manage and mitigate such risks.
Representing a further level of sophistication, Solvency II builds on the
general architecture of Basel II, addressing the specificities of the insurance
sector. Heading lessons from the financial crisis and the Basel framework,
Solvency II, as a whole, is designed to play a key role in helping to provide
an early warning system to reduce the likelihood of the collapse of
insurance undertakings and losses being suffered by policyholders and
beneficiaries.
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CONGRESS’ SELF-INFLICTED SISYPHEAN TASK:
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY’S FEDERAL ANTITRUST
EXEMPTION AND THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
COMPETITION ACTS OF 2007 AND 2009
Anthony J. Alt†*
INTRODUCTION
[T]he law of insurance antitrust is not a subject for the faint of
heart.1
~Robert H. Jerry, II
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many people had ideas on
how to lessen the impact of any such future catastrophe. One of those ideas
concerned the insurance industry. Some people interpreted various actions
of major insurance companies as attempts to avoid paying property-owner
damage claims caused by Hurricane Katrina.2 The simultaneous recordbreaking profits of property-casualty companies in 20053 made several
Congressmen skeptical of the efficacy of state insurance regulation,4 and
*

Juris Doctor, summa cum laude, Ave Maria School of Law. An earlier
version of this Article was selected by Jones Day as the winning article in the 2009
William E. Swope Antitrust Writing Competition. This version has been modified
to reflect the pending legislation of the Insurance Industry Competition Act of
2009. I especially thank Richard Myers for his feedback and example of
dedication, and Nell O’Leary Alt for her timeliness in asking the question,
“Really?”
1
Robert H. Jerry, II, The Antitrust Implications of Collaborative Standard
Setting by Insurers Regarding the Use of Genetic Information in Life Insurance
Underwriting, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 397, 398 (2002–2003).
2
See, e.g., Rep. Gene Taylor, Federal Insurance Reform After Katrina, 77
MISS. L.J. 783, 783–87 (2008) (describing the efforts of insurance companies to
deny claims caused by wind damage); John K. Warren, Note, Restoring
Responsibility and Accountability in Disaster Relief, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 893, 901 (2007) (purporting that some insurance companies delayed
payments in order to force claimants into settling for lesser amounts).
3
AMERICANS FOR INSURANCE REFORM, THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY’S
TROUBLING RESPONSE TO KATRINA 18 (2006) (noting that despite the hurricanes
and claims losses, 2005 was the property-casualty industry’s third greatest profit
year in history).
4
See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 2, at 789 (stating that the antitrust exemption for
the insurance industry should be repealed).
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they decided it was time to revisit a favorite whipping horse: the
McCarran-Ferguson Act’s (“MFA”) federal antitrust exemption for the
insurance industry.5 Their consternation with the MFA recently took the
form of two bills in Congress under the name of the Insurance Industry
Competition Act of 2007, in an effort to repeal the MFA’s federal antitrust
exemption for the insurance industry.6 The present Congress has
reintroduced an identical bill under the name of the Insurance Industry
Competition Act of 2009.7
The MFA provides that “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance.”8 Further, the Sherman
Act,9 Clayton Act,10 and Federal Trade Commission Act11 are only
“applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is
not regulated by State law.”12 The Sherman Act, however, is applicable to

5

McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2006). The term
“antitrust” appears to be limited to the United States. Brian Dean Abramson, Let
Them Eat Smoke: The Case for Exempting the Tobacco Industry from Antitrust, 6
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 345, 353 n.44 (2008). Other countries use
such terms as “competition” or “anti-monopoly” laws. Id.
6
S. 618, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1081, 110th Cong. (2007).
7
H.R. 1583, 111th Cong. (2009).
8
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
9
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006). Section 1 of the Sherman Act
contains a “restraint of trade” provision and states that “[e]very contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is . . . illegal.” Id.§ 1. Section 2 contains a
monopoly provision and states that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.” Id.§ 2.
10
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2006). The Clayton Act was passed in an
effort to address specific activities such as mergers and interlocking directorates of
competing companies that have substantially anticompetitive effects on the market.
15 U.S.C. §§ 18–19.
11
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006). The Act
prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). The
Act established the Federal Trade Commission to prevent persons or entities from
engaging in any unfair or deceptive acts. Id. §§ 41, 45.
12
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
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any agreement or act involving boycott, coercion, or intimidation
regardless of state law.13
Questioning of the MFA federal antitrust exemption for the
insurance industry is nothing new. Various groups have looked askance at
the exemption for decades, and proposals have on occasion been introduced
in an effort to repeal it or limit its scope. For example, the U.S.
Department of Justice issued a report in 1977 concluding that the insurance
industry did not need exemption from federal antitrust laws, and that
regulation without the MFA exemption would be desirable.14 That same
year, Congress considered an optional federal charter for insurance
companies and greater application of federal antitrust laws with the Federal
Insurance Act of 1977, but ultimately rejected the idea.15 In 1979, the
National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures
stated in a report that the insurance antitrust exemption in the MFA should
be repealed.16 In 1987, a flurry of activity in the Senate was aimed at
repealing or modifying the MFA antitrust exemption, none of which was
successful.17 The Insurance Competition Improvement Act was proposed
in 1989 to modify the exemption by providing a list of activities that would
be exempt, making the federal antitrust laws applicable to all other
activities.18 In 1993, the charge to repeal the exemption took the form of
the Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 1993—an effort to prohibit
insurers from price fixing, allocating regions among competitors, engaging

13

Id. § 1013(b).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE PRICING AND MARKETING OF INSURANCE:
REPORT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO THE TASK GROUP ON ANTITRUST
IMMUNITIES 30–31 (1977).
15
Federal Insurance Act of 1977, S. 1710, 95th Cong. (1977).
16
U.S. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND
PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES
225 (1979).
17
See S. 80, 100th Cong. (1987) (introduced by Sen. Metzenbaum to repeal
MFA; in introducing the bill, he indicated that the “McCarran-Ferguson Act has
long outlived whatever legitimate purpose it served,” 133 CONG. REC. 542 (1987));
S. 804, 100th Cong. (1987) (introduced to modify the antitrust exemption section
of MFA); S. 1299, 100th Cong. (1987).
18
Insurance Competition Improvement Act of 1989, S. 719, 101st Cong.
(1989).
14
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in tying arrangements, and monopolizing any part of the insurance
industry.19
Ten years later, a similar bill was introduced under the same name,
with the only difference being the year: the Insurance Competitive Pricing
Act of 2003.20 That same year, the Medical Malpractice Insurance
Antitrust Act of 2003 was introduced in Congress as an attempt to narrowly
modify MFA by addressing price-fixing, bid-rigging, and market
allocations with respect to medical malpractice insurance.21 Two years
later, the Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 2005 was introduced in the
House of Representatives in an effort to repeal the exemption while
providing safe harbors for certain activities.22
Recently, the Antitrust Modernization Commission released a
report questioning the MFA exemption.23
The report strongly
recommended that the insurance industry should not be singled out in order
to avoid federal antitrust compliance and litigation costs.24 It also stated
that arguments attempting to justify the MFA exemption based on the claim
that it is necessary in order to provide stable prices and ensure insurer
solvency are unpersuasive since “[t]he costs of price ‘stability’ typically
flow to consumers and result in inflexibility that undermines economic
growth.”25 The Commission viewed the insurance antitrust exemption as
unnecessary and recommended that all insurance activity should instead be
subject to a rule of reason analysis that weighs pro-competitive benefits
with any anticompetitive elements.26 Ultimately, the Commission placed
the onus on the insurance industry to justify its federal antitrust exemption
and to prove why it is still necessary.27
Therefore, the Insurance Industry Competition Act of 2007 was, on
the one hand, like a phoenix risen yet again from the ashes—it was nothing
19

Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 1993, H.R. 9, 103d Cong. (1993);
Insurance Competitive Pricing Act, S. 84, 103d Cong. (1993).
20
Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 2003, H.R. 448, 108th Cong. (2003).
21
Medical Malpractice Insurance Antitrust Act of 2003, S. 352, 108th Cong.
(2003).
22
Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 2005, H.R. 2401, 109th Cong. (2005).
23
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
350 (2007).
24
Id. at 351.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 354. The Commission also noted that other countries require ongoing
proof and justification for any exemption, which must be analyzed in present
market conditions to see if it should be abolished. Id. at 385 n.123.
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new. On the other hand, it is perplexing that the MFA federal antitrust
exemption remains intact when it has been repeatedly questioned for
decades. After so many groups have called for the repeal or modification
of the exemption, and given feasible alternatives that can be applied in
modern market conditions, now is an appropriate time to reassess the
purpose and necessity of the MFA exemption along with the needs of the
insurance industry and consumers. This Article suggests that the current
understanding and application of the MFA exemption differ from
Congress’s original intent, that proponents of the MFA exemption have not
sufficiently demonstrated a continued need for it, and that the exemption is
not the most effective way to protect the best interests of consumers.
Accordingly, the ideas contained in this latest legislation—the Insurance
Industry Competition Act of 2007, and recently reintroduced in Congress
as the Insurance Industry Competition Act of 2009—should not be
dismissed as yet another Sisyphean attempt by Congress. Rather, the ideas
from the bill should be seriously considered, though adapted in a new form
of legislation, in order to modify MFA’s antitrust exemption for the
insurance industry. Other commentators have suggested how the MFA
exemption could be modified, but there is a noticeable absence of literature
from the legal community on the approach embodied in the Insurance
Industry Competition Act of 2007 and 2009. This Article analyzes the
underpinnings of the Acts and shows why they are different from other
ways to modify the MFA exemption that have been suggested.
In order to understand why the Insurance Industry Competition Act
of 2007 should have been considered and why the Insurance Industry
Competition Act of 2009 should be seriously considered, or more broadly,
why the MFA antitrust exemption should be modified, it is necessary to
understand the evolution of insurance regulation in the United States
leading up to the MFA. Part I of this Article, therefore, provides the
historical backdrop to the MFA and its antitrust exemption for the
insurance industry. Part II discusses the passing of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, the purpose and intent behind it, along with the developing
understanding of the exemption, and provides an analysis of its current
meaning and effectiveness. Part III argues that the federal antitrust
exemption for the insurance industry in its present form has strayed from
Congress’s original purpose and intent, is not the most effective way to
protect the best interests of consumers, is unnecessary in modern market
conditions, and should be modified. It concludes by advocating the
implementation of legislation similar to the Insurance Industry Competition
Act of 2007 and the Insurance Industry Competition Act of 2009, though in
a modified form by providing advisory and regulatory authority to the
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Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, along with
express safe harbor activities for insurance companies in order for them to
operate efficiently while protecting the best interests of consumers and
maintaining a balance between state regulation and federal oversight.
I.

THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP TO THE MCCARRANFERGUSON ACT
The relationship between federal antitrust policy and state
economic regulation is driven . . . by attitudes toward
regulation.28
~Herbert Hovenkamp
A.

THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1700S–
1868

The insurance industry and the development of insurance
regulation have a colorful history in the United States, largely woven by the
threads of a uniquely competitive entrepreneurial drive.29 The first form of
insurance introduced in the United States was marine insurance for the
shipping industry.30 Fire insurance soon became prevalent, with Benjamin
Franklin and others organizing the first fire insurance company, the
Philadelphia Contributionship for the Insuring of Houses from Loss by
Fire, in 1752.31 Nevertheless, only a limited number of entities engaged in
the insurance business before 1776, due in part to restrictive British
legislation that prohibited non-English stock insurance companies from
being established in the United States.32
Subsequent to the Revolutionary War and the end of British rule,
however, insurance companies in the United States were no longer limited

28

Herbert Hovenkamp, Federalism and Antitrust Reform, 40 U.S.F. L. REV.
627, 630 (2006).
29
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the history of insurance
outside of the United States. For a comprehensive overview of the origins and
development of insurance in ancient times, see generally W.R. Vance, The Early
History of Insurance Law, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1908).
30
Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and
After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 J. CORP. L. 723, 726 (2000).
31
See id.
32
Laurence M. Hamric, The McCarran-Ferguson Act: A Time for
Procompetitive Reform, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1271, 1272 & n.5 (1976).
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to organizing themselves as mutual companies or voluntary associations.33
In 1787, the horizons broadened for the industry when the Baltimore Fire
Insurance Company became the first stock insurance company in the
United States.34 The primary method of organizing an insurance company
during the late 1700s and early 1800s was through state legislatures
granting special charters for insurance companies, beginning in 1794 in
Pennsylvania with the incorporation of the Insurance Company of North
America.35 At that time, insurance companies were relatively easy to start
and they could charge whatever premium they wanted.36 The relative ease
in starting an insurance company, combined with no regulatory oversight in
the setting of premiums, was both a blessing and a curse.
Insurance companies’ disparate approaches to the charging of
premiums in efforts to oust competition unsurprisingly resulted in
significant problems. For instance, with respect to the fire insurance
industry alone, the period from 1791 to 1850 resulted in a net loss for
companies.37 Only 1000 of the fire insurance companies out of the 4000
that had been started prior to 1877 survived.38 Nevertheless, some
insurance companies made efforts as early as 1806 to increase profitability
and lessen price competition by making informal agreements to fix
premium rates.39 The number of rate-making agreements expanded for the
next thirteen years, resulting in the establishment of local associations that
companies would join, with member companies binding themselves to only
charge rates that had been agreed upon.40 These early efforts by fire
insurance companies and property-casualty companies at establishing some
sort of standardized rates,41 however, were somewhat thwarted by

33

See JOHN G. DAY, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN THE UNITED
STATES 3 (1970) (noting that the first forms of entities providing insurance prior to
the Revolutionary War were individual underwriters, voluntary associations, and
mutual companies).
34
MARY ELIZABETH RUWELL, EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CAPITALISM: THE
FORMATION OF AMERICAN MARINE INSURANCE COMPANIES 44 (1993).
35
Hamric, supra note 32, at 1272–73.
36
Spencer L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance
Rate Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 MICH.
L. REV. 545, 547 (1958).
37
Id. at 548.
38
Id. at 547-48.
39
Id. at 548.
40
Id.
41
See Hamric, supra note 32, at 1273.
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companies that charged such low rates that they did not even cover
contractual obligations when they came due.42
The highly competitive nature that was present during the early
1800s in the insurance industry resulted in a need for regulation imposed
from outside of the industry.43 Insurance companies in the United States
were largely unhindered by governmental control and regulation during
that time. Insurance regulation was done on the state level, and consisted
of restrictions built into insurance company charters which contained
financial reporting requirements, loss-claim reserve provisions, restrictions
on investments, and minimum capitalization requirements.44 These
restrictions and requirements, however, did not regulate rates, and were
largely ineffective since the states had a conflict of interest in enforcing
them.45 The penalty for insurance companies violating their charter
provisions was for the state to prevent the companies from conducting
business within its boundaries—a course of action states were disinclined
to follow since it would have reduced jobs for its citizens and decreased
taxes revenues.46 After 1837, state regulation of insurance through
restrictions built into company charters became even more ineffective due
to states abandoning such charters; instead, states began adopting general
incorporation requirements for new companies.47
Some states, however, did try to adopt a more active regulatory
stance toward the industry, though they directed their efforts primarily at
foreign insurance companies rather than domestic ones. For instance, in
1824, New York imposed reporting requirements on foreign companies,48
and in 1827, Massachusetts mandated that foreign companies file a copy of
their charters with the state along with information concerning their stock,
42

Irwin M. Stelzer, The Insurance Industry and the Antitrust Laws: A Decade
of Experience, 1955 INS. L.J. 137, 141 (1955).
43
Hamric, supra note 32, at 1273. See also Stelzer, supra note 42, at 141
(describing the industry between 1835 through the Civil War as being
characterized by “keen competition”).
44
Katherine M. Jones, Law, Politics, and the Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Case of Insurance Regulation and the Commerce Clause, 1938–
1948, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 345, 356 & n.53 (2004–2005).
45
Id. at 356.
46
Id.
47
See Peter R. Nehemkis, Jr., Paul v. Virginia: The Need for Re-Examination,
27 GEO. L.J. 519, 523 n.17 (1939) (indicating that after 1837, the primary way of
incorporation an insurance company shifted from the granting of special charters to
general incorporation laws).
48
Id. at 523.
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debts, and investments.49 Other states imposed restrictions and penalties on
foreign insurance companies in addition to levying taxes and requiring
companies to pay fees in connection with forced loans, required deposits,
licenses, and advertising, much to the chagrin of the companies.50 These
regulations and restrictions, however, were not uniform from state to
state.51
With the advent of the 1850s came the creation of a few regulatory
state agencies, while the federal government remained uninvolved with the
industry.52 The appointment of the first state insurance commissioner
occurred in 1850.53 In 1855, Massachusetts created a board of insurance
commissioners, and New York established the position of the
Superintendent of Insurance in 1859.54 The growth in state regulation
became an increasing irritation for insurance companies, who regarded the
increased oversight and various restrictions and taxes on foreign companies
as unconstitutional and unjust.55
In spite of burgeoning state regulation, the insurance industry
experienced an enormous growth in the number of companies during the
1860s.56 Accompanying this rapid growth, however, were questionable
practices aimed at squeezing out competitors, including misleading
advertising, false information about stocks and capital,57 and the continued
practice of charging unprofitable premium rates.58 After the end of the
Civil War, two noteworthy events occurred with respect to the industry’s
two primary concerns—state regulation and competition. First, the
insurance industry sought to rid itself of state regulation by lobbying
Congress for a national bureau of insurance59 in order to obtain one
uniform set of governmental regulations.60 In addition, the first attempt at
setting uniform rates on a national basis was made when the fire insurance

49

Id. at 523-24.
Nehemkis, supra note 47, at 524 & n.26.
51
See DAY, supra note 33, at 20–23.
52
See Michael D. Rose, State Regulation of Property and Casualty Insurance
Rates, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 677 (1967).
53
Id.
54
Nehemkis, supra note 47, at 524.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 520.
57
Id. at 520–21.
58
Stelzer, supra note 42, at 141.
59
Rose, supra note 52, at 673.
60
Nehemkis, supra note 47, at 525.
50
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industry created the National Board of Fire Underwriters,61 simultaneous to
the creation of regional rate associations.62 These events signified a
common perspective and approach within the industry that would influence
its actions for the next seventy-five years: they established the precedent of
insurance companies seeking national regulation and collaboration.
The industry’s attempts to have Congress create a national bureau
of insurance were prompted in part by the National Banking Act of 1864—
insurance companies wanted to be federal institutions like national banks
and rid themselves of state legislation, which they viewed as excessive and
oppressive to foreign companies.63 Although the insurance industry was
able to get two bills introduced into Congress, neither of them were
successful.64 The industry remained undeterred and sought a different
venue for ridding itself of state regulation: the courts. The National Board
of Fire Underwriters partnered with the Underwriters’ Agency of New
York in order to support a case in court challenging the constitutionality of
state regulation of insurance.65 This effort resulted in the case Samuel B.
Paul v. Commonwealth of Virginia.66
B.

1868: SAMUEL B. PAUL V. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Virginia had passed a statute in 1866 that required foreign
insurance companies to deposit a bond ranging between $30,000 and
$50,000 with the state prior to receiving a license in order to conduct
business within Virginia.67 A related statute required that no person could
act as an agent for a foreign insurance company in Virginia without a
license.68 Paul was an agent for several insurance companies incorporated
in New York, and applied for a license as their agent, but he and the
61

Stelzer, supra note 42, at 141.
Jones, supra note 44, at 357. These regional and national efforts of
companies to set uniform rates went on without regulatory supervision despite their
anticompetitive nature. Id.
63
Nehemkis, supra note 47, at 524–25.
64
S. 299, 40th Cong., (2d Sess. 1868); H.R. 738, 39th Cong., (1st Sess. 1866).
The proposed National Bureau of Insurance would have included a National
Insurance Commissioner appointed by the President, and a section of the Treasury
Department which would have handled all regulatory transactions involving
money. Nehemkis, supra note 47, at 525.
65
Nehemkis, supra note 47, at 526–27.
66
75 U.S. 168 (1868).
67
Id. at 168.
68
Id. at 169.
62
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companies refused to post the required bond.69 Although the State of
Virginia refused to grant him a license as an agent to conduct insurance
business within the state, Paul issued a policy to a Virginia citizen in
violation of the state’s statutes, and was subsequently indicted.70 The
National Board of Fire Underwriters provided and funded two highly
prominent attorneys (one of them a former Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court) to represent Paul and the interests of the insurance industry.71
Paul and the insurance industry challenged the statutes under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause72 by claiming that the foreign insurance
companies were citizens and should not be subject to discriminatory state
legislation that was not applicable to domestic companies.73 They also
argued that the statute was unconstitutional by claiming that insurance was
interstate commerce, exclusively subject to the regulation of Congress
based on the Commerce Clause,74 and therefore the states lacked authority
to regulate the activity.75 The Court rejected the arguments and declared
the statute constitutional by holding that the insurance companies were not
“citizens” under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and that “[i]ssuing a
policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce” or an interstate
transaction for purposes of the Commerce Clause, thereby leaving
Congress without authority to regulate the industry.76 As a result, Paul
temporarily ensured continued state regulatory authority over the insurance
industry to the exclusion of federal oversight.
C.

INSURANCE REGULATION: 1869 TO 1944

Despite the decision in Paul, the insurance industry continued its
challenges of the constitutionality of state regulation of insurance. There
69

Id. One commentator has suggested that Paul’s refusal to post the bond
when applying for his license was due to instructions from the four insurance
companies he represented, presumably in connection with the Underwriters
Agency of New York and the National Board of Fire Underwriters. Nehemkis,
supra note 47, at 526–27.
70
Paul, 75 U.S. at 169.
71
Nehemkis, supra note 47, at 527–28.
72
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
73
Paul, 75 U.S. at 170–71.
74
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes”).
75
Paul, 75 U.S. at 170, 172.
76
Id. at 177, 183.
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were ten different Supreme Court cases between 1869 and 1927 that
challenged state regulation or taxation, but the Court consistently held that
insurance activities were not interstate commerce.77 In addition, repeated
legislative attempts were made in Congress to create a national bureau of
insurance and classify insurance activities as interstate commerce, but none
were successful.78 Committees in Congress also considered, but rejected,
various resolutions advocating a constitutional amendment that would have
allowed Congress to exercise regulatory authority over insurance.79 The
industry’s incessant drive for federal regulation, whether right or wrong,
was likely because it “considered it more advantageous to be regulated by a
toothless, laissez-farish mastiff like the Federal Government than by those
smaller but possibly more harassing watch dogs, the individual states.”80
Because Paul and its progeny held that issuing an insurance policy
was not interstate commerce, when Congress passed the Sherman Act in
1890 based on authority from the Commerce Clause declaring any
agreement, contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
interstate commerce as illegal,81 the insurance industry did not think that a
federal antitrust law such as the Sherman Act was applicable to insurance.82
This view was reinforced in 1913 by the Supreme Court espousing mutual
exclusivity between state and federal regulation (dual federalism83) in New
77

See Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274, 276–77 (1927); Nw.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132, 137–38 (1918); N. Y. Life Ins. Co.
v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1913); Nutting v. Massachusetts,
183 U.S. 553, 556–58 (1902); N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389, 401
(1900); Noble v. Mitchell, 164 U.S. 367, 370–71 (1896); Hooper v. California, 155
U.S. 648, 655–56 (1895); Phila. Fire Ass’n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 118
(1886); Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U.S. 566, 573, 576 (1870); Ducat
v. Chicago, 77 U.S. 410, 415 (1870).
78
U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 576 & n.8 (1944)
(Stone, C.J., dissenting)(listing several bills introduced between 1899 and 1906 in
the House and Senate).
79
Id. at 579 & n.13.
80
Sigmund Timberg, Insurance and Interstate Commerce, 50 YALE L.J. 959,
969 n.42 (1941).
81
Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(2006)).
82
Larry D. Carlson, The Insurance Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 57
TEX. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (1979).
83
Dual federalism is “a system for dividing functions between the state and
national government that left each considerable autonomy within its own areas of
jurisdiction.” David R. Beam et al., Federalism: The Challenge of Conflicting

2010]

CONGRESS’ SELF-INFLICTED SISYPHEAN TASK

411

York Life Insurance Company v. Deer Lodge County when it stated that “if
insurance is commerce and becomes interstate commerce whenever it is
between citizens of different States, then all control over it is taken from
the States, and the legislative regulations which this court has heretofore
sustained must be declared invalid.”84
Accordingly, the industry’s view of itself as exempt from federal
antitrust law presumably did not change in 1914 with the passing of the
Clayton Act85 and Federal Trade Commission Act.86
Therefore, the
various insurance companies that exchanged actuarial data and engaged in
price fixing and boycotting of companies not part of member association
groups continued in their ways.87 To justify their activities, the insurance
industry claimed that unrestricted competition without some collaboration
among companies would create a plethora of undesirable results such as
unsustainable premium rate competitions and inadequate reserves for the
payment of claims.88 Although some states tried to enforce legislation
against the sharing of actuarial information and collaborative rate setting,
their efforts were largely ineffective.89 Instead of trying to make rate
setting illegal, they began passing legislation to regulate rates, often
accompanied by antimonopoly prohibitions.90 State regulation of rates,
however, was intended primarily to guard against insurance companies
from becoming insolvent by charging unsustainably low premiums, not to
cap excessive rates.91
In 1915, however, an unusual twist to the exclusivity of state
regulation of insurance occurred. The Supreme Court in Thames & Mersey
Marine Insurance Company, Ltd. v. United States invalidated the federal
Theories and Contemporary Practice, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE
DISCIPLINE 247, 248 (Ada W. Finifter ed., 1983).
84
N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 509 (1913).
85
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–
27 (2006)).
86
Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006)).
87
See Carlson, supra note 82, at 1130 (describing the companies as
“confident” that their activities remained immune from federal antitrust laws).
88
DAY, supra note 33, at 20–21.
89
Id. at 19. Cf. Jones, supra note 44, at 359 (indicating that nearly all state
insurance commissions were inadequately funded).
90
See Rose, supra note 52, at 681–82 (describing the states’ approach to
collaborative efforts among insurance companies, and indicating that by 1944,
thirty-three states had provisions to regulate rates).
91
Jones, supra note 44, at 359.
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stamp tax on ocean marine insurance policies since it viewed “insurance
during the voyage” as an “integral part of the exportation” due to “the
demands of commerce.”92 Marine insurance companies worried that the
decision could be interpreted as making federal antitrust laws applicable to
insurance under the Commerce Clause.93 The companies, therefore,
lobbied Congress to expressly exempt the marine insurance industry from
federal antitrust laws.94 Congress considered the marine insurance industry
unique given its international implications, and in a pragmatic and
precedential move exempted the marine insurance industry from all federal
antitrust laws in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920,95 primarily for
reinsurance and international underwriting purposes.96 The collaborative
efforts among the insurance companies continued largely unhindered,97 and
the precedent for a statutory exemption from federal antitrust laws was
established for the insurance industry.
The events of the 1930s opened the door slightly to the possibility
of change to government regulation of the industry. The Great Depression
prompted Congress to pass new economic regulations, and the Supreme
Court began lifting its restrictive view of Congress’s ability to regulate
economic issues.98 In 1938, President Roosevelt initiated an in-depth
antimonopoly investigation, and the Temporary National Economic
Committee analyzed the state of competition in the insurance industry.99
The Committee made several findings. Notably, it found that states were
92

Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19, 26 (1915).
See Rose, supra note 82, at 675.
94
Id.
95
Merchant Marine Act, ch. 250, § 29, 41 Stat. 988, 1000 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 38 (2006)).
96
Rose, supra note 82, at 675–76. Over four decades later, the Senate
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly reexamined the exemption for marine
insurance and expressed great concern about a virtual monopoly in hull insurance
and agreements that severely limited entry into the market and discouraged price
competition. Id. at 676.
97
See Hamric, supra note 32, at 1275 (indicating that state enforcement and
regulation left the insurance “compact system” intact).
98
See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
37–38 (1937) (holding that Congressional authority to regulate commerce is
plenary and extends to intrastate activities if “they have such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions”); Jones,
supra note 44, at 365.
99
Jones, supra note 44, at 370–71.
93
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struggling to regulate the insurance industry because of the concentration
of business in only a handful of companies and the interstate activities of
the companies.100 Five life insurance companies accounted for more than
50% of the industry’s resources; 87% of all life insurance assets were
owned by the twenty-five largest life insurance companies.101 To remedy
the high level of concentration in the industry among the largest
companies, the Committee proposed greater enforcement of antitrust
provisions for prosecuting anti-competitive behavior while retaining state
regulation of the industry in general.102
Little changed, however, until Thurman Arnold was put in charge
of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department.103 Arnold initiated an
effort to address insurance abuses at the national level.104 In 1942, the
Justice Department filed suit against South-Eastern Underwriters
Association, a regional group made up of approximately 200 fire insurance
companies, for violating sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by controlling
90% of the fire insurance market in six states through conspiracies to fix
premiums and boycott non-member companies.105 The district court
dismissed the case based on the precedent from Paul v. Virginia, which
held that insurance was not interstate commerce or trade.106 On appeal, the
Supreme Court continued its broadened approach from Wickard v. Filburn
in interpreting the Commerce Clause107 and maintained its view from
Parker v. Brown that state and national authority can be exercised
concurrently.108 The Court effectively overruled Paul v. Virginia by
holding that insurance is interstate commerce and is subject to the

100

Id. at 371, 373.
Id. at 371.
102
See id. at 373 (noting that the Committee’s final report stated that federal
power should be utilized and antitrust prosecution should be “pursued more
vigorously”).
103
Id. at 360.
104
Id.
105
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 51 F. Supp. 712, 713
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legislative powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause, including the
Sherman Act, which forbids premium rate-fixing agreements.109
As a result of the Court’s decision, the insurance industry’s longdesired hope for federal regulation turned into fear. The industry presumed
that as a result of the decision in South-Eastern Underwriters Association,
the federal government would pass legislation requiring greater
competition and apply federal antitrust laws, resulting in the bankruptcy of
a large number of companies.110 Some insurance companies tried to use the
decision to their advantage by refusing to follow state regulation or pay
state taxes by claiming that such restraints on interstate commerce now
violated the Constitution.111
II.

THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT AND THE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY ANTITRUST EXEMPTION: WHAT IT MEANT
THEN AND WHAT IT MEANS NOW
The continued state regulation of insurance throughout the
twentieth century is an historical anomaly.112
~Katherine M. Jones
A.

THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT OF 1945

Before the Supreme Court had decided South-Eastern
Underwriters Association, Representative Walter introduced the WalterHancock bill in Congress in order to expressly ensure continued state
regulation of insurance and entirely exempt insurance from federal antitrust
regulation.113 The House of Representatives passed the bill, but it did not
pass in the Senate.114 An important reason the bill did not pass was that it

109

United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 560-61
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enjoyed little support from the insurance industry.115 In fact, the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) opposed the notion of
completely exempting the insurance industry from federal antitrust laws.116
After the bill did not pass, the NAIC released a report emphasizing
the need for continued state regulation of insurance, but asked for only a
partial exemption from federal antitrust laws for certain activities.117
NAIC’s primary concern was to preserve state regulation and taxation of
insurance.118 NAIC made a proposal to the Senate to avoid unrestricted
competition, and to allow for collaborative practices within the industry
that were proclaimed to be in the public interest.119
Section 2(a) of the NAIC’s proposal provided for the retention of
state regulation and taxation of insurance.120 Section 2(b) prevented all
federal law from invalidating, impairing, or superseding any state laws
regulating insurance.121 Section 3 called for an exemption from the Federal
Trade Commission Act and Robinson-Patman Act.122 Section 4(a)
provided a moratorium during which the Sherman Act and Clayton Act
would not apply, though Section 4(c) made the Sherman Act applicable
during the moratorium to acts of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.123
Section 4(b) proposed exempting seven activities: (1) any agreement or
concerted or cooperative action which prescribed the use of rates; (2) the
use of those rates; (3) any cooperative or joint service, adjustment,
investigation, or inspection agreement relating to insurance; (4) any
agreement or concerted or cooperative action among two or more insurers
to insure, reinsure, or otherwise apportion the risks; (5) any agreement or
concerted action with respect to the payment of insurance agents or
brokers; (6) any agreement or concerted action with respect to the
collection and use of statistics; and (7) any agreement or concerted action
providing for the cooperative making of insurance rates, rules, or plans.124
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The result of the NAIC’s proposal was, like many proposals for
legislation, a catalyst for compromise. There was great debate between
those who had previously supported the approach of total exemption from
federal antitrust laws embodied in the Walter-Hancock bill, and those who
supported the NAIC’s approach of providing limited exemptions based on
the seven express safe harbor activities.125 Senators Ferguson and
McCarran supported the NAIC’s approach; they modified and proposed it
under the form of S. 340 by deleting the exempted activities specified in
section 4(b) of the NAIC’s proposal, and by specifying that the Sherman
and Clayton Acts cannot invalidate, impair, or supersede state laws.126
The Senate made several amendments to the bill which the House
of Representatives did not include in its approved version of the bill, and
the result was a major modification of the bill in the joint conference
committee.127 The committee removed the exemption from the Federal
Trade Commission Act and the Robinson-Patman Act, provided that there
would be a moratorium during which the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal
Trade Commission Acts would not apply, but after which they would apply
“to the extent that such business is not regulated by state law.”128 The
House voted in support of the modified version of the bill without debate,
and the Senate adopted it less than a week later.129 President Roosevelt
signed the modified version of S. 340 into law on March 9, 1945,130 which
has become known as the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The final version made
into law indicates that the primary purpose of the Act was to preserve state
regulation of insurance:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance
is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the
Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to
the regulation or taxation of such business by the several
States.131
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The MFA further expressly subjects insurance to the continued
oversight of state regulation by providing that:
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged
therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which
imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance.132
These sections of the MFA were intended to alleviate conflicts
between state regulation and taxation of the insurance industry and the
Dormant Commerce Clause.133 Congress, however, retained the ability to
preempt state law if it passes legislation indicating that it specifically
applied to the business of insurance.134 The passing of the MFA is
explained in part because it came on the heels of Roosevelt’s New Deal, at
a time when there was a push from certain Congressmen to protect states’
rights and regulatory authority in an effort to limit the mushrooming of
federal oversight.135
The final part of § 1012(b) of the MFA contains the insurance
industry’s controversial limited exemption from federal antitrust law:
That after June 30, 1948 . . . the Sherman Act, . . . the
Clayton Act, and . . . the Federal Trade Commission Act,
as amended, shall be applicable to the business of

132

Id. § 1012(a)–(b).
Jones, supra note 44, at 387. The Dormant Commerce Clause is the
principle that states cannot “unjustifiably . . . discriminate against or burden the
interstate flow of articles of commerce. . . . ‘[D]iscrimination’ simply means
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511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994).
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insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated
by State law.136
The Act goes on to specify that the Sherman Act is always
applicable to “any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of
boycott, coercion, or intimidation.”137 The purpose of the MFA federal
antitrust exemption was to allow for cooperative rate-making efforts among
insurance companies so that they could “underwrite risks in an informed
and responsible way”138 given the “unique difficulty of accurately pricing
the insurance product.”139 Although the federal antitrust exemption was
only a “secondary purpose” of the MFA,140 it created significant
controversy as to its precise meaning and scope.
B.

THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
EXEMPTION OF THE MFA

The MFA’s exemption of “the business of insurance” from federal
antitrust statutes to the extent that such business is regulated by state law
and is not an act or agreement to boycott, intimidate or coerce is essentially
a reverse preemption by Congress; that is, Congress preempted itself from
regulating insurance unless it expressly states otherwise in legislation. As
such, it is unusually deferential towards state regulation.141 By including
the federal antitrust exemption in the MFA, Congress sought to bolster
state regulation and increase state efforts to prevent exploitative practices
in the industry, while reserving some federal antitrust enforcement with
respect to acts involving boycotts, intimidation, coercion, and when states
did not exercise regulatory authority over activities in the industry.142
As a result of the MFA, Congress gave the opportunity to states to
preempt federal antitrust laws by regulating antitrust in the business of
136
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insurance themselves if they were not doing so already. Thus, there was a
push to get states to seize the opportunity to pass legislation during the
three-year moratorium following the enactment of the MFA during which
the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts did not apply
to insurance companies.143 The NAIC produced model laws that states
could adopt, including laws for the regulation of rates, an Unfair Trade
Practices bill, and “Little Clayton” acts in an effort for states to adopt
legislation that would regulate every part of insurance, and thereby preempt
the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts.144 While
groups such as the NAIC attempted to help states take advantage of the
MFA federal antitrust exemption, the exemption’s applicability in certain
situations was still uncertain. The complication was (and still is) that the
MFA did not provide a definition of what constitutes the “business of
insurance,” nor specify what it means for something to be regulated by
state law, nor provide guidance on what amounted to a boycott. This
resulted in a need for courts to interpret the statutory exemption. A survey
of court decisions reveals the inexpedient nature of the exemption’s
ambiguity.
1. Understanding the “Business of Insurance”
After Congress passed the MFA, courts struggled to determine the
contours of the federal statutory exemption. The threshold question in any
situation is whether something qualifies as the “business of insurance.”
The initial trend among lower courts was to interpret this phrase broadly to
include nearly every activity of an insurance company.145 Eventually,
however, this broad interpretation was narrowed when the Supreme Court
made a distinction between general activities of insurance companies and
activities that relate directly to “the business of insurance.”146 The former
are subject to federal law notwithstanding the exemption since the MFA
“did not purport to make the States supreme in regulating all activities of
insurance companies.”147 That is, not all activities of insurance companies
automatically fall within the exemption. Application of the phrase is thus
143

Carlson, supra note 82, at 1137.
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145
See, e.g., Transnational Ins. Co. v. Rosenlund, 261 F. Supp. 12, 28 (D. Or.
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exemption).
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more concerned with the nature of the activity rather than the fact that it is
an insurance company that is engaged in the activity.148
Beginning in 1979, the Supreme Court adopted a more restrictive
approach to the MFA antitrust exemption, which has continued to the
present day. In Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., the
Court construed the meaning of “business of insurance” narrowly when it
looked for three elements to determine if something qualifies as the
business of insurance: (1) whether or not the activity involves the spreading
and underwriting of a policyholder’s risk; (2) whether the activity is
connected to the contractual relationship between the company and the
insured; and (3) whether the activity is limited to entities within the
insurance industry.149
Three years later in Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno, the
Court refined and formalized these elements from Royal Drug into a
tripartite test to determine if an activity should be considered as part of the
business of insurance: “[F]irst, whether the practice has the effect of
transferring or spreading a policyholder’s risk; second, whether the practice
is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the
insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the
industry.”150 Each of the factors is relevant, though none of them is
determinative.151 Some courts have held, however, that the first factor—
transferring or spreading risk—is the primary characteristic of the business
of insurance,152 and allow more flexibility in classifying an activity as
constituting the business of insurance if this factor is present.153
Under the first prong of the test—transferring or spreading of a
policyholder’s risk—the Court has made a distinction between the
spreading of risk and the reduction of risk.154 Actions that do not involve
an insurer assuming risk and distributing it among a group of similarly
situated people fail to qualify as part of the business of insurance.155 Thus,
148
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activities connected with products with no insurance risk, such as the
searches and examinations involved with title insurance, do not qualify as
constituting the business of insurance since title insurers assume little if any
risk and such activities are often done by entities other than the insurance
companies.156 This factor, however, is not always easily discernible, and
cannot be applied with extreme rigidity.
For example, although
reinsurance and retrocessional insurance agreements involve reducing the
amount of risk and liability of insurance companies and perhaps would not
qualify under the Pireno test, they are considered as part of the business of
insurance.157 Thus, one of the problems with the first factor is that it is
subject to various interpretations and exceptions, and does not provide clear
guidance on what should constitute the business of insurance.158
Under the second prong of the test, the activity must be an integral
part of the contractual relation between the insurer and insured in order to
qualify as constituting the business of insurance. Activities that are not part
of the insurer-insured contract, and which have only an indirect effect on it,
are not part of the business of insurance.159 Although this sounds
straightforward, the involvement of agents and brokers with policyholders
and insurers prevents definitive boundaries from being drawn.160
The third prong of the test requires that the activity be limited to
entities within the insurance industry. This prong, too, suffers from
ambiguity. For instance, enactment of state law permitting insurance
companies to enter into certain agreements with third party providers does
not necessarily mean that the third prong of the test will be met.161
Insurance companies, therefore, must not only determine if the state
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regulates the activity, but must ensure that it falls under the MFA
exemption.162
Thus, while the Supreme Court has identified three factors that
should be considered when determining if an activity constitutes the
business of insurance, the effectiveness of the Pireno test is questionable
given the uncertainty that courts have in applying it. The factors when
viewed separately can lead to contradictory conclusions, and it is unclear as
to which factor should be given more weight when they conflict.163 This
muddies the understanding of when the MFA exemption should apply. In
addition, application of the test does not always exempt activities that
Congress intended to be exempt. For instance, activities such as
cooperative-rate making and pooling of loss data were intended by
Congress to fall within the MFA exemption, but would fail the Pireno test
since they do not directly affect the insurer-policyholder relationship
required by the second prong.164 Thus, certain activities, even though they
would fail the test, qualify as part of the business of insurance as
exceptions due to Congressional intent.165 The necessity of making such
exceptions points to the inherently flawed structure of the test. Thus, while
the Pireno test keeps the scope of the MFA exemption somewhat limited
and provides some guidance on how to interpret the exemption, its
effectiveness is plagued by ambiguity.166
162
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2. Deciphering the Meaning of “to the Extent that such
Business Is Not Regulated by State Law”
After it is determined whether an activity qualifies as constituting
the “business of insurance,” the second requirement for an activity to fall
under the MFA exemption is that it must be regulated by state law. The
Supreme Court, however, has never defined what “to the extent that”
means with respect to state regulation and what amount of state regulation
is required before the exemption applies.167 Even if there is state regulation
in a certain area of insurance, it does not necessarily preclude application of
federal antitrust laws.168
The general rule that lower courts have adopted in determining
whether sufficient state regulation exists is that a state is considered to
regulate “the business of insurance within the meaning of [Section 2(b) of
the MFA] when a State statute generally proscribes or permits or authorizes
certain conduct on the part of the insurance companies.”169 Therefore, the
second requirement under the MFA is not difficult to meet. As long as the
state has the ability to regulate a particular activity, that ability suffices
even if the state does not actively exercise its regulatory authority.170 For
instance, the Eighth Circuit has held that the mere existence of a state
statute granting authority to the state insurance commissioner to investigate
trade practices was sufficient to invoke immunity under the MFA antitrust
exemption even though the state merely retained “inchoate” regulation.171
Further, the exemption applies even if the state regulation is inadequate or
ineffective.172 The Supreme Court, however, has noted that if state
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insurance regulations are a “mere pretense,” they may not be sufficient to
qualify under the MFA antitrust exemption.173
This low standard on what constitutes sufficient state regulation,
although it remains the current standard, is contrary to Congressional
intent, which was that federal antitrust laws would apply where states were
not adequately regulating an activity.174 The original intention and
understanding behind the MFA exemption was that states must actively and
affirmatively regulate the same areas covered by federal antitrust laws
otherwise federal antitrust laws would be fully applicable.175 Further, it
was intended that state law must be “explicit” concerning the actions it was
meant to regulate, and should be of a prohibitive nature rather than
permitting a certain practice.176
Thus, modern understanding and
application of this part of the exemption restricts the applicability of federal
antitrust laws much more than Congress intended.
3. The Meaning of Boycott, Coercion, or Intimidation
from § 1013(b)
Lastly, in order for an activity to qualify under the MFA
exemption, not only must it be within the “business of insurance” and
regulated by state law, it also cannot constitute a boycott, coercion, or
intimidation. The breadth of the boycott exception of the MFA as codified
in 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) is not evident from the wording. Courts that have
considered the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) have usually had to address
boycotts, though the principles used in considering boycotts can be applied
to coercion and intimidation as well.177
The Supreme Court first examined the meaning and scope of the
boycott exception in § 1013(b) in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v.
Barry.178 While the Court considered various meanings of the term
“boycott,” it did not settle upon a precise definition.179 The Court did,
however, hold that the language of the boycott exception is “broad and
unqualified” and is not limited to actions against competing insurance
173
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companies or agents.180 Thus, insurance companies can be subject to the
Sherman Act not merely for boycotts against competitors, but also for
boycotts against policyholders or other non-competitive third parties.181
In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, the Court highlighted
the primary feature of a boycott when it stated that essentially a boycott
consists of a concerted refusal to agree in one transaction in order get
someone to accept the terms of an entirely different transaction.182 That is,
“unrelated transactions are used as leverage to achieve the terms
desired.”183 Therefore, under Hartford Fire, there must be two separate
transactions, one in which there is a refusal to deal in order to obtain
acceptance in a second, different transaction. As such, price fixing is not
necessarily a boycott under the MFA exception if it is merely a refusal to
deal with another party based solely on the terms of a single transaction.184
In general, the application of the Sherman Act under the boycott exception
of § 1013(b) should be interpreted broadly, consistent with Congressional
intent.185 Even with this approach, however, “[e]xactly what types of
activity fall within the forbidden category is . . . far from certain.”186
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III.

PUTTING THE SISYPHEAN TASK TO REST: A HYBRID
APPROACH
So the point is, is there something that needs to be fixed? 187
~Michael McRaith

The MFA, though perhaps less than a model of clarity, is
significant legislation for a variety of reasons. One major reason is the
importance of the subject matter it regulates: the insurance industry.
Insurance plays an integral role in modern American society by protecting
families, businesses, and individuals from unexpected economic burdens.
In addition, the American economy relies to a great extent on the insurance
industry. In 2002, there were over 5000 insurance companies which had
combined revenues of $1.2 trillion in the United States.188 More current
figures indicate that the premium dollars of insurance companies comprise
approximately 10% of the American economy.189 An average American
family easily spends over $7000 each year to meet all of its insurance
needs, including auto, home, life, and health insurance.190 Insurance,
however, is currently the last major industry in the United States that is
regulated by the states.191 In fact, all other major industrialized nations
regulate insurance on the national level.192 It is beyond the scope of this
Article, however, to discuss the arguments for or against continued state
187

Hearing on Statutory Immunities and Exemptions: The McCarranFerguson Act Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission 53 (Oct. 18, 2006)
[hereinafter Hearing on Statutory Immunities and Exemptions], available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-exemc/pdf/mainexemptions/mccarran/10.18.06.pdf (statement of Michael McRaith, Chairman of
the Broker Activities Task Force of the NAIC).
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State Regulation of Insurance Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 8 (June 20, 2006) [hereinafter
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary], available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-exemc/mainexemptions/mccarran-ferguson.shtml (testimony of Michael McRaith, Chairman of
the Broker Activities Task Force of the NAIC).
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Id. (testimony of Elinor Hoffmann, Assistant Attorney General of New
York).
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available
at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-exemc/mainexemptions/mccarran-ferguson.shtml (written testimony of Michael McRaith,
Chairman of the Broker Activities Task Force of the NAIC).
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regulation and taxation of the insurance industry in general.193 It is limited
to an analysis of the interplay between federal antitrust laws and state
regulation as currently embodied within the MFA antitrust exemption.
The repeated questioning of the MFA antitrust exemption, and in
particular with the Insurance Industry Competition Act of 2007 and 2009,
brings further reason to pause and consider what should be done
concerning the MFA exemption, whether to leave it in place without any
change, repeal it entirely, or modify it. Groups have answered these
questions in various ways since the enactment of the MFA. It is generally
agreed that the purpose of antitrust laws is to promote the welfare and best
interests of consumers.194 It is also widely held that entirely unregulated
competition in the insurance industry is not an alternative.195 Thus, the
disagreement is over what exactly the best interests of consumers are, who
should ensure that they are protected, and how that is best accomplished.
A.

NO CHANGE: THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE

Of course, the easiest approach to the MFA antitrust exemption is
to leave it entirely intact with no modifications. Proponents of leaving the
MFA antitrust exemption in place try to justify it on several grounds. First,
proponents of preserving the MFA exemption argue that the exemption is
necessary because insurance is a unique product in that it is essentially a
promise to pay a future obligation upon the occurrence of a contingent
future event.196 Because these costs are purportedly far more unpredictable
193

See National Insurance Act of 2006, S. 2509, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (for a
proposal to allow insurance companies to opt out of state regulation, apply for a
federal charter, and be subject to federal regulation).
194
See, e.g., Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 188, at
4 (testimony of Elinor Hoffman); Hearing on Statutory Immunities and
Exemptions, supra note 187, at 8 (written testimony of Michael McRaith)
(indicating that the main priority “is to protect consumers”).
195
E.g., Dirlam & Stelzer, supra note 142, at 214. The MFA is, of course,
based not just on the conclusion that continued regulation of insurance by the states
is in the best interests of consumers, but also on the assumption that regulation of
insurance in general is necessary. Various reasons have been given on why
government regulation is necessary: (1) to ensure that insurance companies remain
solvent; (2) to ensure reasonable rates; and (3) to monitor the fairness of policy
terms. Carlson, supra note 82, at 1138–39.
196
Hearing on Statutory Immunities and Exemptions, supra note 187, at 17
(statement of Julie Gackenbach, Representative, National Association of the
Mutual Insurance Companies).
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than other products and services,197 in order for insurers to set accurate
premiums and remain solvent they must accurately estimate future costs,
which requires accumulating a large amount of claims data—something
few companies would be able to develop because of cost.198
Proponents of the exemption argue that repealing it would prevent
certain pro-competitive activities such as loss-data sharing and rate-making
from continuing,199 which could threaten the solvency of companies.200
The claim is that certain collaborative activities allow companies to offer
more affordable products by reducing costs connected to calculating
adequate rates.201 This has the further alleged benefit of helping to protect
all companies from mispriced products and ultimately from insolvency.202
In addition, reducing costs connected with determining adequate prices is
alleged to help smaller companies compete.203 As a result, consumers have
more companies from which to buy insurance and are protected from
companies becoming insolvent based on the prevention of rates that are too
low.
This argument, however, is misleading. The reporting of historic
data on past losses by insurance companies and the pooling of such
information by rating associations has long been recognized to have procompetitive benefits and would withstand Sherman Act scrutiny even in the
absence of the MFA exemption.204 Proponents of the exemption are
accurate in claiming that other elements of rate-making would be per se
illegal under the Sherman Act, or at the very least would be questionable
under a rule of reason analysis. For instance, projections of future trends in
pricing or costs (“trending”); the development of “end rates” that would be
197

Horning, supra note 139, at 14.
Id.; see also Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 188,
at 152 (testimony of Kevin Thompson, Senior Vice President, Insurance Services
Office) (indicating that in 2005 it cost over $11 million for the Insurance Services
Office to provide advisory prospective loss costs for one type of insurance
product).
199
Achampong, supra note 166, at 155. It is not possible to consider all of the
alleged pro-competitive activities in this Article; discussion, therefore, has been
limited to the activity of elements of rate-making.
200
Hearing on Statutory Immunities and Exemptions, supra note 187, at 37
(statement of Michael McRaith).
201
See Achampong, supra note 166, at 155.
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Hearing on Statutory Immunities and Exemptions, supra note 187, at 37
(statement of Michael McRaith).
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Id. at 15–16 (statement of Julie Gackenbach).
204
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sufficient to cover all prospective loss costs, expenses in underwriting the
risk, and factoring in sufficient profit; and the collaborative creation of
“loss development” information that estimates ultimate costs of reported
but claims not yet paid would not likely be permitted without the MFA
exemption.205
Nevertheless, the necessity of end rates that factor in an expense
and profit component that is not connected to an individual company’s
particular expenses profits is dubious in the first place. Finalization of
pricing would ideally be determined by particular insurance companies in
order to avoid exaggerated expenses or profits because there is virtually an
unlimited amount of discretion in determining how many years of data
should be considered, how to average such data, and how much weight
should be given to different averages.206 In addition, prospective loss costs,
trending, and loss development could be supplied by independent actuarial
companies rather than rating associations. This would not necessarily
result in higher premiums for consumers. For instance, the State of
California repealed its antitrust exemption for collective rate-making
activities with respect to automobile insurance.207 In the ten-year period
following the repeal of the state antitrust exemption, rates lowered
significantly, dropping California from the third costliest state in the nation
for automobile insurance to the twentieth.208 Further, the solvency of
companies is not a significant factor as evidenced by the fact that since
1950, only 0.66 of 1% of insurers have become insolvent.209
Second, proponents of retaining the exemption as it currently exists
argue that it has worked well since its enactment by ensuring a competitive
market, and that state monitoring of anticompetitive, unfair, and deceptive
trade practices has been effective.210
This position, however, is
questionable. Although all fifty states plus the District of Columbia have
some type of state antitrust statute,211 there are a number of states that have
exemptions for insurance activities, which means that even if an antitrust
205

ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST, supra note 177, at 47–50.
Hearing on Statutory Immunities and Exemptions, supra note 187, at 50
(statement of Jay Angoff).
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Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, note 188, at 23 (statement
of Bob Hunter, Insurance Director, Consumer Federation of America).
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(statement of Michael McRaith).
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(statement of Michael McRaith).
211
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST, supra note 177, at 35.
206

430

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:2

violation occurred, many of these states would not bring an action against
the companies.212 In states that do not have broad exemptions, the antitrust
penalties are not as severe as federal antitrust penalties, making them less
of a deterrent for illegal behavior.213 Further, there is no private right of
action in most states for unfair insurance trade practices.214 Even in a
situation such as the State of New York’s recent investigation of various
companies for bid-rigging and customer allocation that resulted in over $3
billion in settlements for restitution and penalties,215 the settlements did not
cover activities that were applicable on a nation-wide basis; they were
limited to only the few states that joined in the investigation.216 Therefore,
state antitrust regulation does not appear to be as effective as proponents of
the exemption claim.
Of course, for purposes of the MFA exemption, the question is not
merely whether increased federal antitrust enforcement would be more
effective in deterring or punishing anticompetitive behavior. Even certain
state officials have recognized that increased enforcement of federal
antitrust laws would be more effective at protecting the best interests of
consumers.217 This alone argues for modification of the exemption. But
for those who insist on continued near-exclusive state enforcement of
antitrust regulation, the question is also whether the current understanding
and application of the MFA exemption correlate to the original intention of
Congress in crafting it. The original understanding and intention of the
exemption is that there would be active state regulation, and without such
regulation, the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts
would be applicable.218 Unfortunately, the current understanding and
application of the MFA exemption require only a minimal showing of state
oversight (the mere ability to exercise authority) in order to preempt federal
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Donald C. Klawiter, Chair, Section of Antitrust Law for the American Bar
Association, Letter to the Honorable Arlen Specter, Chairman, Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, July 27, 2006 (on file with ABA, available at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/antitrust/060728letter_1-wa_2604707_2.pdf).
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(statement of Jay Angoff).
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antitrust laws,219 thereby granting a level of latitude to the industry it was
not meant to have.
Proponents of retaining the exemption also argue that repeal would
result in uncertainty and frequent, costly litigation, subjecting the industry
to varying interpretations by a large number of judges.220 While this
argument raises a valid point, there is no indication that litigation as a result
of increased application of federal antitrust statutes would be substantially
more than the number of lawsuits that have been needed and continue to be
needed to determine the meaning of the MFA exemption in particular
circumstances.
Therefore, while proponents of retaining the status quo try to meet
the Antitrust Modernization Commission’s call to justify the insurance
industry’s exemption under the MFA,221 they have not satisfied their
burden of explaining its continued necessity.
B.

MODIFYING THE EXEMPTION: OPENING THE DOOR OF
POSSIBILITY

Those who argue for repeal of the MFA antitrust exemption for the
insurance industry do so based on a number of reasons. The current trend
is to question and remove regulatory immunities.222 Further, some claim
that the exemption immunizes activities that have significant anticompetitive effects, while not immunizing others that are only questionably
anticompetitive. For example, one scholar has pointed out the irony that
certain anticompetitive horizontal restraints such as price-fixing agreements
are immunized, but certain vertical agreements in which insurers engage in
peer review of providers of prescription drugs are held to be outside the

219

See supra Part II.B.ii.
See, e.g., Hearing on Statutory Immunities and Exemptions, supra note
187, at 53, 78–79 (statements of Michael McRaith).
221
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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See J. David Cummins, Property-Liability Insurance Price Deregulation:
The Last Bastion? 1, in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE:
RESTORING COMPETITION AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY (J. David
Cummins ed., 2002) (noting that in the last two decades, various industries, such as
airlines, trucking, railroads, telecommunications, and banking, have experienced
deregulation with regard to prices and entry and exit restrictions); Hovenkamp,
supra note 28, at 630–31 (stating that antitrust laws are now applicable to
industries such as telecommunications which previously had enjoyed significant
“regulatory immunity”).
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“business of insurance.”223 Another argument is that repealing the
exemption would result in increased competition,224 and would collectively
save insurance consumers an estimated $45 billion per year.225 It has also
been asserted that repealing the exemption would make antitrust
enforcement uniform, which would benefit consumers and insurance
companies by removing inefficient multiple proceedings under disparate
laws, and thereby limiting the possibility of inconsistent results.226
Proponents of repealing the exemption further argue that the
exemption is unnecessary in light of alternatives that can better protect the
best interests of consumers. One alternative is to repeal the exemption, but
allow certain insurance activities to still be exempt from federal antitrust
laws under the state action doctrine.227 The state action doctrine, which
originated in Parker v. Brown, provides immunity to private parties if their
conduct is authorized and regulated by the state.228 In order for the state
action doctrine to apply, however, there must be a clear articulation in
state policy concerning the activity, and the state must actively supervise
the policy.229 This is a higher standard of regulation than that required by
the current interpretation of the MFA exemption, and seems more in line
with the original Congressional intent in passing the MFA. In fact, §
1012(b) of the MFA (“to the extent that such business is not regulated by
state law”) is arguably a codification of the state action doctrine from
Parker.230 President Roosevelt espoused this position when he wrote to
Senator Radcliffe that “there is no valid reason for giving any special
exemption from the antitrust laws to the business of insurance. . . . The
antitrust laws do not conflict with affirmative regulation of insurance by the
States.”231
The state action doctrine clearly contains a higher standard of
supervision by the state than the MFA does and is arguably more in line
with the original intention and understanding behind the MFA exemption.
This approach would leave intact the federalist purpose behind the MFA,
223
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and alleviate fears that encroaching on state regulation of antitrust in
insurance is a step towards federal regulation of insurance in general.232
Relying on the state action doctrine alone, however, might result in
insurance companies demanding that state insurance codes be changed in
order to clearly meet the requirements of state action analysis, and it would
also result in a need for litigation in order to determine the scope of the
doctrine since it is largely undeveloped in the insurance context due to the
current application and understanding of the MFA exemption. Further,
many states have already chosen not to assume an active and affirmative
stance to antitrust regulation in the insurance industry.233 Thus, repeal of
the exemption and reliance on the state action doctrine alone would result
in a continued disparate approach to antitrust enforcement. Full repeal of
the exemption and relying on the state action doctrine alone, therefore,
seems unwise in light of the uncertainty and lack of uniformity that would
result. Nevertheless, reliance on the state action doctrine in addition to
exempt safe harbors would help remedy any drawbacks to relying on the
state action doctrine alone.
Thus, in addition to the state action doctrine, proponents of
repealing the MFA exemption have also proffered safe harbors as another
alternative to the MFA exemption. It is significant that the NAIC prior to
the enactment of the MFA proposed a list of seven safe harbor activities
that it viewed as sufficient for the insurance industry; it never asked for a
blanket exemption from federal antitrust laws.234 Proponents of repeal
argue that express safe harbors would prevent or at least lessen litigation to
determine what activities would be acceptable in the aftermath of full
repeal of the exemption since they would be expressly permitted or not, and
they would permit recognized pro-competitive activities beneficial to the
industry and consumers that require a certain amount of collaboration
among companies.235
Those who oppose repeal of the MFA exemption, and therefore
oppose the implementation of safe harbors, argue that safe harbors do not
232
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provide the clear protection to insurance companies of legitimate
collaborative, pro-competitive activities, but would still require judicial
interpretation of the safe harbors if the language is too ambiguous.236 In
addition, it is argued that it might be difficult to compile a comprehensive
list of all activities that should be explicitly exempted.237
The safe harbor approach, however, seems to reach a middle
ground between those who favor complete repeal of the MFA exemption
and those who wish to preserve it in its present form. If formulated
properly, express safe harbors would protect desirable pro-competitive,
collaborative activities such as compiling and sharing of historical and
prospective loss cost data, and standardized policy forms. This would
prevent any sort of chilling effect on activities beneficial to the best
interests of consumers by providing insurance companies with confidence
in the legality of the activities. At the same time, it would not permit
insurance companies to raise illegitimate defenses to challenged activities.
Ultimately it would help provide clarity to all parties involved, and would
further uniformity in antitrust enforcement. Nevertheless, it would require
significant deliberation on what activities should be expressly exempted
and how the safe harbor exemptions should be worded. A reasonable
approach to the safe harbors would be to adopt the seven activities
specified by the NAIC during the deliberation of the MFA.
C.

THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY COMPETITION ACTS OF 2007 AND
2009

The latest proposed alternative to the MFA exemption was the
Insurance Industry Competition Act of 2007,238 now the Insurance Industry
Competition Act of 2009.239 The express purpose of the Insurance Industry
Competition Act of 2009, borrowing from its 2007 predecessor, is “[t]o
further competition in the insurance industry.”240 It proposes to do this by
repealing the MFA exemption and making the Sherman, Clayton, and
Federal Trade Commission Acts applicable to the insurance industry by
amending the MFA (§ 1012(b)) from: “That after June 30, 1948 . . . the
236
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Sherman Act, . . . the Clayton Act, and . . . the Federal Trade Commission
Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the
extent that such business is not regulated by State law”241 to:
That after June 30, 1948 . . . the Sherman Act, . . . the
Clayton Act, and . . . the Federal Trade Commission Act,
as amended, as it relates to unfair methods of competition,
shall be applicable to the business of insurance. The
Federal Trade Commission Act, as it relates to areas other
than unfair methods of competition, shall be applicable to
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is
not regulated by State law.”242
It also proposes to do away with the boycott exemption in § 1013
by striking § 1013 altogether.243 Further, it proposes that authority be given
to the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to issue
joint statements concerning their policies on joint activities in the insurance
industry.244
The Insurance Industry Competition Act of 2009, therefore, would
make the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts
applicable to the insurance industry in virtually full force. It proposes to do
so, however, without providing any safe harbors for the insurance industry.
As such, it is an extreme form of legislation in that it would subject the
insurance industry to full federal scrutiny of its practices, though tempered
by possible exceptions that could arise from the state action doctrine.
The Act’s approach in trying to accomplish its express purpose of
furthering competition in the insurance industry, therefore, seems to suffer
from overzealousness. The Act would subject insurance companies to
ambiguity with respect to nearly every collaborative practice, although this
would put them in no worse position than companies in nearly every other
industry. This seems harmful to possible pro-competitive practices in that
insurance companies would be hesitant to engage in them due to their
unknown legality. It also seems unnecessary given that such a chilling
effect could easily be avoided by providing express safe harbors. As such,
the Act is inadvisable in its proposed form.
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Nevertheless, the Act should not be dismissed entirely. Its
proposal suggests that the current application and understanding of the
MFA have strayed from Congress’s original intent and purpose. In
addition, it provides an element that is worthy of consideration in any
discussion of the MFA exemption and how it should be handled, whether
preserving, repealing, or modifying it in some way. It suggests a
heightened role of oversight by the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission in a concrete way. The Act would authorize the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to issue joint
statements regarding joint activities in the insurance industry, which is
reasonable if any sort of accommodation with respect to federal antitrust
laws is made;245 companies would also likely be able to obtain advisory
opinions from the Department and the Commission. If such authorization
is exercised, it could help provide clarity on what is acceptable under
federal antitrust law. Such statements would be helpful in providing
guidance to the insurance industry on what activities are acceptable,
regardless of whether the MFA exemption is repealed or left in place.
Further, the original federalist purpose behind the MFA would be preserved
to a certain extent. States that “provide the same exemptions as the federal
government or follow federal precedent would be able to pursue antitrust
actions against insurance companies under their state law.”246
Thus, while the Act is not an ideal form of legislation, it introduces
an element—statements or advisory opinions from federal agencies—that
should be seriously considered. New legislation with similar provisions
would also further Congress’s original intent of having active antitrust
regulation. If express safe harbors are added to the Insurance Industry
Competition Act of 2009 or to a similar bill, it would essentially preserve
the same pro-competitive activities currently allowed under the MFA
exemption, give clarity on which specific activities are legal, and also
provide a greater deterrent to any activities that are not in the best interests
of consumers.
245
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CONCLUSION
This Article has provided a broad overview of the history of
antitrust regulation of the insurance industry in the United States and a
snapshot of its present state today. Since its enactment, the necessity and
advisability of the MFA federal antitrust exemption has been consistently
questioned. This consistent questioning of the exemption places the burden
on its proponents to justify its relevance and effectiveness in protecting the
best interests of consumers. Those who favor fully retaining the exemption
in its present form provide reasonable concerns about the exemption’s
repeal or modification. Such concerns, however, do not provide adequate
justification for the exemption when any benefit that the exemption
provides can also be accomplished more effectively by express safe
harbors, combined with advisory statements from the Department of Justice
and Federal Trade Commission. As such, the Insurance Industry
Competition Act of 2009 should be given serious consideration, though
modified, in order to provide express safe harbors for pro-competitive
activities. If the current bill is modified, or a similar bill proposed and
adopted, Congress’s self-inflicted Sisyphean task of seeking to protect the
best interests of consumers would finally come to a desirable end.
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BOOK REVIEW: THE LANGUAGE OF LIVES
Jill C. Anderson

!

For outsiders, perhaps it is the historian’s relationship to the
particular that epitomizes the discipline and frames our expectations as
readers. To mine boundless archival sources for shards of a story, and to
fashion those odd individual shapes into a coherent one among many
possible narratives -- this speaks to an intellectual calm beyond the reach of
most of us. Delivering on this expectation, Timothy Alborn’s Regulated
Lives: Life Insurance and British Society, 1800-1912 tells a story of a
little-understood institution’s path into modernity, assembled of wellchosen detail on a foundation of comprehensive research.! Importantly,
Alborn’s excavation of Victorian life insurance fills gaps in business
history. But its most surprising feature, one that readers glimpse just a few
pages into the book, is the sweep of its conceptual departure point: the
meaning of life.
And not just one meaning, but four distinct
conceptualizations of modern life – as he terms them: the sympathetic, the
numbered, the medicalized, and the commodified life" -- that Alborn argues
evolved during the Victorian era and are uniquely merged in the institution
of life insurance.#
A preliminary project of Alborn’s book is to name and strain out
these life-dimensions, in something like the way a prism takes in white
light and separates it into a spectrum.$ He then shows how those bands
came to be braided together, each one developing alongside and in tension
with the others as they shaped Victorian life insurance and in turn were

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Visiting Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. I am
grateful to the University of Connecticut’s Insurance Law Center and Pat McCoy
in particular for the opportunity to share perspectives on Regulated Lives with
Sharon Murphy, Geoff Clark, and Tom Baker, with Peter Kochenburger
moderating the discussion with his usual expertise and generosity. I owe much to
Susan Schmeiser for teaching me how to read more smartly and sensitively.
Finally, many thanks are due Tim Alborn for giving us this important, lovingly
crafted book to convene around and celebrate.
1
TIMOTHY ALBORN, REGULATED LIVES: LIFE INSURANCE AND BRITISH
SOCIETY, 1800-1914 (2008).
2
Id. at 7.
3
Id. at 7-13.
4
This metaphor is borrowed from the author, who uses it to depict the
fragmentary nature of modernity and its resistance to being folded into grand
narrative without stranding or jettisoning facts that do not follow its plot. Id. at
296-97.
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shaped by that institution as a producer of culture. As this express project
of the book unfolds, a parallel, subtler plot of sorts develops at a linguistic
level. In breaking out a typology of “lives,” the author calls into service a
figure of speech that is ubiquitous in life insurance and in insurance in
general: metonymy, the non-literal use of a word to represent an associated
concept.& “Lives,” in the parlance of insurance, is nearly always shorthand
for something associated with lives: e.g., policy holders, policies, bodies,
medical subjects, breadwinners, health states, predictions of longevity, and,
of course, deaths. In Regulated Lives, Alborn’s multiple meanings of “life”
both complicate and organize the underlying, undifferentiated metonym in
ways that mirror certain strange and intriguing paradoxes inherent in life
insurance.
Among the fourfold typology of “lives,” we encounter first the
sympathetic life. Within this meaning, it is one’s contemplation of dying
and leaving others destitute that is essential to the demand for life
insurance,' and insurers aimed to generate a “sympathetic exchange” with
the public.( The more impersonal numbered life was the province of the
actuary, who tabulated life expectancies and organized them into mortality
tables. This was the relatively easy task, at least as it reflected mortality for
“healthy males,” but actuarial science was considerably more challenged to
convert mortality statistics into meaningful risk categories. While actuaries
were zooming out from persons to numbers to norms (sometimes very far
out, as when seeking in vain an ancient “law of mortality” in the early
nineteenth century),) medical examiners were focusing closely on
individual bodies. In a break from therapeutic or investigative applications
of medicine, they applied the latest science to scrutinize medicalized lives
for signs of defect that would render them uninsurable.* And finally, the
development of these conceptual categories all took place within a

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
5

See MERRIAM-WEBSETER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 782 (11th ed. 2003).
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rationalizing market that equated mortality with money, giving us the
commodified life.!+
Anyone who doubts that these categories work beyond
characterizing British life insurance should consider the recent public
controversy over guidelines for breast cancer screening through
mammography.!! When a federally appointed medical advisory panel
recommended delaying routine mammograms, citing a low likelihood that
more aggressive screening would save lives in significant number,!" the
ensuing public debate echoed the tensions that Alborn has identified, in
another life-and-death context. Both might be characterized as sympathy
meets medicine meets math meets money.!#
These four conceptualizations of life might appear to be
interrelated as natural allies or rivals with their tensions following
predictable plotlines. Sympathy, for example, stands apart as humanizing
life insurance, defining certain essential relations that must hold between
the insurer and the insured (can the policyholder trust the insurer to be a
surrogate breadwinner?) and between that insured and his dependants (is
the policyholder sensitive enough to their plight to pay premiums for their
benefit alone?). Symbolized in literature by the Victorian deathbed,!$ the
perspective of sympathy recognizes the policyholder as an individual with
complex relationships and responsibilities, in contrast to the other three
more objectifying dimensions.!& And just as the deathbed motif has given
way in to its contemporary equivalent, the hospital bed, we might anticipate
a story of life insurance’s “softer feelings” losing ground to the cold
rationality of the mortality table or the scrutiny of the medical examination
table.
A more complex dynamic emerges in Regulated Lives, however,
notably in the chapter on the gatekeeping practices, by which insurers
excluded or charged higher premiums based on risk. Insurers in the early
to mid-nineteenth century screened applicants based on interviews,
referrals, and a proposal form.!'
Early gatekeeping was largely
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interpersonal, intuitive, and trust-based; in other words, “intimate but
unreliable.”!( With a widening market, a burgeoning field of diagnostic
medicine, and growing mistrust of the truthfulness of applicants, insurers
by 1900 had come to rely chiefly on medical examinations to police
adverse selection.!) A triumph for the medicalized conception of life? Not
so fast. The indignity of the medical exam made it unpopular with
consumers and sales agents alike.!* Products that dispensed with the exam
gained favor in the early 1900s, striking a blow for sympathy as mediated
through the market.
Another surprising relationship emerges in the tension between
numbered and medicalized conceptions of life, two dimensions of science
that appear from a distance to reinforce each other. Starting from the
baseline of confident mortality tables, it seemed to insurers that diagnostic
medicine could be brought into the service of actuarial science. Medicine
held the prospect of refining the sweepingly general mortality statistics by
introducing meaningful risk categories. Once having identified the markers
of mortality, the medical gaze could be trained on the individual body in
order to screen out or rate up “inferior lives,” or so insurers hoped.
But bodies do not give up “Fate’s secrets”"+ easily, we learn, either
individually or in the aggregate. This was true in two senses. First, being
“poked and prodded” made people uneasy enough when undertaken by an
attending physician for the purpose of treatment; swapping the attendant
with the “medical police”"! and replacing therapy with evaluation only
made the scrutiny more objectionable. Second, many features that were
deemed abnormal (e.g., a lanky build,"" albumin in the urine,"# etc.) turned
out to be of little use as predictors of mortality. It made sense that insurers
screened for lung problems in a period of rampant tuberculosis, but even
some of this attention was misplaced, as when insurers took chest
circumference and breathing capacity as a measure of respiratory health."$
Much of Victorian gatekeeping of the medicalized life calls to mind the
saw of “looking for one’s lost keys under the lamppost”: insurers tended to
collect information on deviance that was easy to detect (e.g., epilepsy,
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insanity, physiognomic judgments), with disappointing results for risk
classification."& But in the end – and here is the twist wrought by the
numbered conception of life – there was always the law of large numbers.
Medicine might take pains to sniff out pathology in applicants, but as
numbered lives, those applicants were often normal enough to be
insurable."' Doctors had arrived at the actuaries’ starting point: “the future
could be predicted only for aggregate populations and never for
individuals.”"( This nuanced story of medical thinking, counterposed to
statistical thinking, showcases Alborn’s typology of “lives” to full effect,
so much that it is hard to imagine how we have been able to talk about life
insurance at all without it up until now.
And how do we talk about life insurance, or insurance more
generally? Metonym is central to the language of insurance, beginning with
its key term, risk. While risk’s literal meaning is the possibility of loss, it is
just as often used figuratively to signify the insured: not the actual risk
itself, but the individual associated with risk.") Nowhere is this semantic
slippage more arresting than in life insurance. Lives in this specialized
context is a reduction of “life” in the sense we ordinarily intend it, a boiling
down of the “noble self” of personhood into the “six sheets of paper” that
interest the insurer."* Whatever the ordinary meaning of this most
expansive word, anyone not habituated to the language of insurance would
likely find the industry’s references to “lives” jarring. Imagine what an
individual might consider to be “prerequisites for ‘a model life’” and
compare it to this 1861 medical advisor’s list: “absence of scars or
hoarseness, a capacious and symmetrical chest, and ‘equable’ pulse, and ‘a
considerable warmth to the skin.’”#+ As one Victorian novelist voiced
through a character, nothing could be “more likely to destroy natural
feeling . . . than to sit down with strangers and reduce his life to the
measure of an insurance table,”#!
Alborn adopts the industry-wide usage of “lives,” and while he
does not address this aspect of insurance rhetoric outright, he seems to put
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the tension between it and a more ordinary meaning of “life” in play, and
playfully so, on the book’s cover. “Regulated Lives,” on its own might
suggest to a bookstore browser an account of the ways that the activities of
living are governed. But quite the opposite of activity is the focus of life
insurance, which might at least as accurately have been termed “death
insurance.”#" Not only does the title put a twist on “life” as we know it, it
sets up an ambiguity in and on the book’s terms. We may read these plural
lives as those belonging to the Victorians themselves,## or as the four
conceptual categories (the four “lives”) that organize this history and that,
in a sense, regulate one another.
Thus the word “life” has many lives in this book, depending on
which strand of modernity we are tracing. Sympathetic lives are lives
entrusted to insurers. Numbered lives are counted lives and measured
lives, with longer lives subsidizing shorter lives, or else ominously logged
in a Registry of Declined Lives. Medicalized lives are screened lives,
healthy lives, hazardous lives, or lives “looking sickly and indifferent.”
And commodified lives are marginal, good, select, under-average, first
class or doubtful, and lives that sometimes lapse (which of course does not
entail death; rather, they just fade away and fail to pay premiums). It
seems the one thing that lives are not, or at least not with any salience, is
lived.
Through its typology of life-senses, Regulated Lives casts
insurance as a technology that slices up the meaning of “life” and
recombines the conceptual strands into new forms – a semiotic, nineteenthcentury tranching and bundling of sorts.
There is something
psychologically odd about life insurance, though, that complexity alone
does not capture. In order to insure our lives we must contemplate death . .
. for the purpose of not having to think about the ramifications of death. In
contemplating, we overcome denial of death’s inevitability and
unpredictability, yet we insure precisely in order to deny death its full
force, to bring some of death’s aftermath into check. In the final pages of
Regulated Lives, Alborn captures the paradox of life insurance in the darkly
incisive musings of Gregory, the insurance clerk in Julian Barnes’s novel,
Staring at the Sun: “[W]hen it came down to it, what people were trying to
do was get the best deal they could out of being dead . . . Even those who
admitted that they themselves would not actually get the money could still
be entranced by the transaction.”#$ Gregory concludes of insureds that
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“when departing, they struck the best deal they could. How strange. How
admirable, he supposed, but how strange.”#& This strangeness is what many
of us find fascinating about life insurance, and about this book. Perhaps it
derives from the fact that, no matter which strand of its meaning we are
tracing, we are always looking at the death side of life.
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Jill C. Anderson
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For outsiders, perhaps it is the historian’s relationship to the
particular that epitomizes the discipline and frames our expectations as
readers. To mine boundless archival sources for shards of a story, and to
fashion those odd individual shapes into a coherent one among many
possible narratives -- this speaks to an intellectual calm beyond the reach of
most of us. Delivering on this expectation, Timothy Alborn’s Regulated
Lives: Life Insurance and British Society, 1800-1912 tells a story of a
little-understood institution’s path into modernity, assembled of wellchosen detail on a foundation of comprehensive research.! Importantly,
Alborn’s excavation of Victorian life insurance fills gaps in business
history. But its most surprising feature, one that readers glimpse just a few
pages into the book, is the sweep of its conceptual departure point: the
meaning of life.
And not just one meaning, but four distinct
conceptualizations of modern life – as he terms them: the sympathetic, the
numbered, the medicalized, and the commodified life" -- that Alborn argues
evolved during the Victorian era and are uniquely merged in the institution
of life insurance.#
A preliminary project of Alborn’s book is to name and strain out
these life-dimensions, in something like the way a prism takes in white
light and separates it into a spectrum.$ He then shows how those bands
came to be braided together, each one developing alongside and in tension
with the others as they shaped Victorian life insurance and in turn were
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shaped by that institution as a producer of culture. As this express project
of the book unfolds, a parallel, subtler plot of sorts develops at a linguistic
level. In breaking out a typology of “lives,” the author calls into service a
figure of speech that is ubiquitous in life insurance and in insurance in
general: metonymy, the non-literal use of a word to represent an associated
concept.& “Lives,” in the parlance of insurance, is nearly always shorthand
for something associated with lives: e.g., policy holders, policies, bodies,
medical subjects, breadwinners, health states, predictions of longevity, and,
of course, deaths. In Regulated Lives, Alborn’s multiple meanings of “life”
both complicate and organize the underlying, undifferentiated metonym in
ways that mirror certain strange and intriguing paradoxes inherent in life
insurance.
Among the fourfold typology of “lives,” we encounter first the
sympathetic life. Within this meaning, it is one’s contemplation of dying
and leaving others destitute that is essential to the demand for life
insurance,' and insurers aimed to generate a “sympathetic exchange” with
the public.( The more impersonal numbered life was the province of the
actuary, who tabulated life expectancies and organized them into mortality
tables. This was the relatively easy task, at least as it reflected mortality for
“healthy males,” but actuarial science was considerably more challenged to
convert mortality statistics into meaningful risk categories. While actuaries
were zooming out from persons to numbers to norms (sometimes very far
out, as when seeking in vain an ancient “law of mortality” in the early
nineteenth century),) medical examiners were focusing closely on
individual bodies. In a break from therapeutic or investigative applications
of medicine, they applied the latest science to scrutinize medicalized lives
for signs of defect that would render them uninsurable.* And finally, the
development of these conceptual categories all took place within a
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rationalizing market that equated mortality with money, giving us the
commodified life.!+
Anyone who doubts that these categories work beyond
characterizing British life insurance should consider the recent public
controversy over guidelines for breast cancer screening through
mammography.!! When a federally appointed medical advisory panel
recommended delaying routine mammograms, citing a low likelihood that
more aggressive screening would save lives in significant number,!" the
ensuing public debate echoed the tensions that Alborn has identified, in
another life-and-death context. Both might be characterized as sympathy
meets medicine meets math meets money.!#
These four conceptualizations of life might appear to be
interrelated as natural allies or rivals with their tensions following
predictable plotlines. Sympathy, for example, stands apart as humanizing
life insurance, defining certain essential relations that must hold between
the insurer and the insured (can the policyholder trust the insurer to be a
surrogate breadwinner?) and between that insured and his dependants (is
the policyholder sensitive enough to their plight to pay premiums for their
benefit alone?). Symbolized in literature by the Victorian deathbed,!$ the
perspective of sympathy recognizes the policyholder as an individual with
complex relationships and responsibilities, in contrast to the other three
more objectifying dimensions.!& And just as the deathbed motif has given
way in to its contemporary equivalent, the hospital bed, we might anticipate
a story of life insurance’s “softer feelings” losing ground to the cold
rationality of the mortality table or the scrutiny of the medical examination
table.
A more complex dynamic emerges in Regulated Lives, however,
notably in the chapter on the gatekeeping practices, by which insurers
excluded or charged higher premiums based on risk. Insurers in the early
to mid-nineteenth century screened applicants based on interviews,
referrals, and a proposal form.!'
Early gatekeeping was largely
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interpersonal, intuitive, and trust-based; in other words, “intimate but
unreliable.”!( With a widening market, a burgeoning field of diagnostic
medicine, and growing mistrust of the truthfulness of applicants, insurers
by 1900 had come to rely chiefly on medical examinations to police
adverse selection.!) A triumph for the medicalized conception of life? Not
so fast. The indignity of the medical exam made it unpopular with
consumers and sales agents alike.!* Products that dispensed with the exam
gained favor in the early 1900s, striking a blow for sympathy as mediated
through the market.
Another surprising relationship emerges in the tension between
numbered and medicalized conceptions of life, two dimensions of science
that appear from a distance to reinforce each other. Starting from the
baseline of confident mortality tables, it seemed to insurers that diagnostic
medicine could be brought into the service of actuarial science. Medicine
held the prospect of refining the sweepingly general mortality statistics by
introducing meaningful risk categories. Once having identified the markers
of mortality, the medical gaze could be trained on the individual body in
order to screen out or rate up “inferior lives,” or so insurers hoped.
But bodies do not give up “Fate’s secrets”"+ easily, we learn, either
individually or in the aggregate. This was true in two senses. First, being
“poked and prodded” made people uneasy enough when undertaken by an
attending physician for the purpose of treatment; swapping the attendant
with the “medical police”"! and replacing therapy with evaluation only
made the scrutiny more objectionable. Second, many features that were
deemed abnormal (e.g., a lanky build,"" albumin in the urine,"# etc.) turned
out to be of little use as predictors of mortality. It made sense that insurers
screened for lung problems in a period of rampant tuberculosis, but even
some of this attention was misplaced, as when insurers took chest
circumference and breathing capacity as a measure of respiratory health."$
Much of Victorian gatekeeping of the medicalized life calls to mind the
saw of “looking for one’s lost keys under the lamppost”: insurers tended to
collect information on deviance that was easy to detect (e.g., epilepsy,
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insanity, physiognomic judgments), with disappointing results for risk
classification."& But in the end – and here is the twist wrought by the
numbered conception of life – there was always the law of large numbers.
Medicine might take pains to sniff out pathology in applicants, but as
numbered lives, those applicants were often normal enough to be
insurable."' Doctors had arrived at the actuaries’ starting point: “the future
could be predicted only for aggregate populations and never for
individuals.”"( This nuanced story of medical thinking, counterposed to
statistical thinking, showcases Alborn’s typology of “lives” to full effect,
so much that it is hard to imagine how we have been able to talk about life
insurance at all without it up until now.
And how do we talk about life insurance, or insurance more
generally? Metonym is central to the language of insurance, beginning with
its key term, risk. While risk’s literal meaning is the possibility of loss, it is
just as often used figuratively to signify the insured: not the actual risk
itself, but the individual associated with risk.") Nowhere is this semantic
slippage more arresting than in life insurance. Lives in this specialized
context is a reduction of “life” in the sense we ordinarily intend it, a boiling
down of the “noble self” of personhood into the “six sheets of paper” that
interest the insurer."* Whatever the ordinary meaning of this most
expansive word, anyone not habituated to the language of insurance would
likely find the industry’s references to “lives” jarring. Imagine what an
individual might consider to be “prerequisites for ‘a model life’” and
compare it to this 1861 medical advisor’s list: “absence of scars or
hoarseness, a capacious and symmetrical chest, and ‘equable’ pulse, and ‘a
considerable warmth to the skin.’”#+ As one Victorian novelist voiced
through a character, nothing could be “more likely to destroy natural
feeling . . . than to sit down with strangers and reduce his life to the
measure of an insurance table,”#!
Alborn adopts the industry-wide usage of “lives,” and while he
does not address this aspect of insurance rhetoric outright, he seems to put
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the tension between it and a more ordinary meaning of “life” in play, and
playfully so, on the book’s cover. “Regulated Lives,” on its own might
suggest to a bookstore browser an account of the ways that the activities of
living are governed. But quite the opposite of activity is the focus of life
insurance, which might at least as accurately have been termed “death
insurance.”#" Not only does the title put a twist on “life” as we know it, it
sets up an ambiguity in and on the book’s terms. We may read these plural
lives as those belonging to the Victorians themselves,## or as the four
conceptual categories (the four “lives”) that organize this history and that,
in a sense, regulate one another.
Thus the word “life” has many lives in this book, depending on
which strand of modernity we are tracing. Sympathetic lives are lives
entrusted to insurers. Numbered lives are counted lives and measured
lives, with longer lives subsidizing shorter lives, or else ominously logged
in a Registry of Declined Lives. Medicalized lives are screened lives,
healthy lives, hazardous lives, or lives “looking sickly and indifferent.”
And commodified lives are marginal, good, select, under-average, first
class or doubtful, and lives that sometimes lapse (which of course does not
entail death; rather, they just fade away and fail to pay premiums). It
seems the one thing that lives are not, or at least not with any salience, is
lived.
Through its typology of life-senses, Regulated Lives casts
insurance as a technology that slices up the meaning of “life” and
recombines the conceptual strands into new forms – a semiotic, nineteenthcentury tranching and bundling of sorts.
There is something
psychologically odd about life insurance, though, that complexity alone
does not capture. In order to insure our lives we must contemplate death . .
. for the purpose of not having to think about the ramifications of death. In
contemplating, we overcome denial of death’s inevitability and
unpredictability, yet we insure precisely in order to deny death its full
force, to bring some of death’s aftermath into check. In the final pages of
Regulated Lives, Alborn captures the paradox of life insurance in the darkly
incisive musings of Gregory, the insurance clerk in Julian Barnes’s novel,
Staring at the Sun: “[W]hen it came down to it, what people were trying to
do was get the best deal they could out of being dead . . . Even those who
admitted that they themselves would not actually get the money could still
be entranced by the transaction.”#$ Gregory concludes of insureds that
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“when departing, they struck the best deal they could. How strange. How
admirable, he supposed, but how strange.”#& This strangeness is what many
of us find fascinating about life insurance, and about this book. Perhaps it
derives from the fact that, no matter which strand of its meaning we are
tracing, we are always looking at the death side of life.
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REVIEW OF TIMOTHY ALBORN’S
REGULATED LIVES
Sharon Murphy*
One of the most important recurring themes in Timothy
Alborn’s Regulated Lives: Life Insurance and British Society, 18001914 is the idea of Victorian gatekeeping, meaning the use of
application forms, statistical tables, and medical exams to carefully
select only those lives that conformed to a company or industrydefined standard norm.1 As Alborn demonstrates, this process of
determining who would be permitted to join a company’s pool of
policyholders and at what rate of premium was fraught with anxiety
not only for the applicant, but likewise for the medical doctors, sales
agents, and company directors, each of whom had a stake in the
success or failure of the gatekeeping process.2 Yet while individual
decisions regarding individual lives by individual actors were the
public face of gatekeeping, the process was ultimately based on the
definition of a standard normal life in the aggregate. In order both to
reduce underwriting individual lives with an unacceptably higher
than average probability of mortality and to set accurate premium
rates, companies first had to determine average mortality rates for
their target clientele.3 Ironically, for an industry dependent on
actuarial tables during an era when statistical knowledge reigned
supreme, numbers proved to be the Achilles’ heel for life insurers.
Victorian gatekeeping publicly promised a rational, scientificallybased classification of lives, yet privately delivered little more than
educated guesswork with the hope that future mortality would not
prove their estimations to be woefully inadequate.4

*
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The nature of all insurance enterprises is spreading risk
across a large group of people. Thus, the key to operating a
successful, profitable insurance company is to accurately assess the
overall risk of the entire pool of policyholders, and then to set
premium rates which reflect that level of risk. But, as Alborn
demonstrates, this was a particularly vexing problem for British life
insurers. Not only was the process of determining average mortality
much more complex than it might initially appear, but that process
was further confounded by the difficulty of deciding whose mortality
was relevant for compiling those tables: which people actually
belonged to this group of people interested in spreading risks among
themselves.5 If companies could assume that everyone would
purchase a life insurance policy, then this problem of determining a
predicted mortality experience would be greatly simplified, since it
would be based on the mortality of the population as a whole. Yet in
reality, not everyone desired insurance (at least not at first), and
companies initially sought to underwrite only the least risky lives.6
Insurers thus needed to calculate tables based on the expected
mortality experience of their target clientele. And whereas predicting
mortality rates for the overall population was a difficult task, gauging
the future mortality of a significant subset was especially daunting,
not least because the attributes of this group were endlessly shifting.
On the micro level, membership within the target risk pool
was subject to continuous change.7 Insurers had to face the problem
of trying to guarantee that new individuals who joined the group did
not unfavorably impact the aggregate risk profile of the body of
policyholders.8 If a company was excessively selective in accepting
policyholders, it would be in danger of having insufficient lives
across whom to spread the risk adequately. Additionally, an overly
restrictive target group would limit the firm’s ability to increase its
market share in the future. Yet by defining the parameters of the
target group more broadly, companies would require even more
precise knowledge of each additional applicant to ensure that the
5
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See, e.g., ALBORN, supra note 1, at 33-42.
8
Id. at 220-21, 271-73.
6

2010]

BOOK REVIEW: REGULATED LIVES

449

clientele was not being drawn primarily from the least favorable
portion of the potential risk pool.9 Likewise, as companies and the
industry inevitably tried to expand the life insurance market, by
necessity they would need to start accepting less desirable lives.
Thus, the industry needed a way to select the best lives (i.e., those
predicted to live the longest among their peers), and then decide how
to treat other applicants who failed to meet this highest of
standards.10 This is where Alborn’s gatekeeping – the personal
assessment of individual risks – became so crucial.
Unfortunately, shifting parameters for the target risk pool was
not the only hurdle in the development of accurate mortality tables.11
Companies were trying to make predictions about mortality twenty,
thirty, even forty years into the future, yet external factors impacting
expected mortality on the macro level were likewise in rapid flux
during the nineteenth century. For example, urbanization facilitated
the spread of disease, industrialization enlarged the number of
hazardous occupations, and transportation innovations encouraged
travel to less salubrious climates; all of these factors increased
mortality rates among certain populations. On the other hand,
improvements in medical knowledge and medical care, better
sanitation, access to fresh foods, etc., were lowering mortality rates
for another subset of the population. Yet these factors did not merely
cancel each other out; rather, they impacted different segments of the
population to differing degrees, making calculations of future
mortality a constantly moving target.
Therefore, the very first problem which life insurers needed
to work out was the computation of accurate mortality tables, and
what is most important to note here is the amount of sheer guesswork
involved in this endeavor throughout the nineteenth century.12 Yet,
at the same time, the entire industry was founded upon the premise
that mortality was governed by scientific laws which were easily
accessed and understood by the trained company actuary.13 Firms
9
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assured the public that they could accurately predict how many
people of a given age would die in a given year, so by purchasing
insurance, the policyholder was merely spreading the risk of his or
her individual death across the aggregate of people of the same age.14
Life insurance advertisements and sales agents were thus adamant
that life insurance was not a matter of gambling, and they pointed to
countless tables of data to buttress this assertion.15
Despite their public assertions to the contrary, insurance
executives throughout the nineteenth century were never certain that
they had the right statistical foundation for their premium rates.16
They suspected that the available tables based on whole population
data greatly overstated mortality.17 Not only did these tables include
many low-income individuals for whom mortality was higher than
average, but they also did not take into account the rigorous selection
process of insurers.18 Yet tables based purely on a company’s past
experience (so-called select life tables) were likewise plagued with
problems. In an industry making predictions over the long term,
most companies were too young to draw accurate conclusions from
their limited experience. Although industry executives understood
that the benefits of careful medical selection were short-lived, most
of the policies available for use in a select life table were recently
acquired and thus still benefitting from that selection advantage.
Finally, the crafting of a select life table based on past experience
assumed that all future applicants would be similarly selected, and
that it would not be necessary for the firm to loosen its selection
criteria in attempting to increase its market share. One potential
solution to this problem would be to adopt an overly-conservative
table, returning the excess as bonuses to policyholders in mutual
companies or as dividends to stockholders. Yet this option would
open the door to cut-rate competition from companies employing
more liberal tables. Additionally, many companies sold both life
insurance and life annuities; an overly-conservative mortality
14
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schedule would wreak havoc on the annuity business even as it
guaranteed the safety of the insurance line.
By the second half of the nineteenth century, life insurers
(working mainly through the professional organization for British
actuaries) would agree upon a table that they believed would serve as
an acceptable basis for the selection process.19 Based on the
combined experiences of twenty major life insurance offices, this
“Healthy Males” table suffered from many of the same shortcomings
as other select life tables.20 Yet because it was so widely adopted
within the industry, it set the standard for the expected mortality of
healthy males at a given age21 (lessening the problem of cut-rate
competition)22. All insurance applicants would now be judged based
on their predicted adherence to this norm.23 As data continued to
accumulate, applicants once denied coverage for falling outside the
acceptable risk pool were now embraced, And as mortality risks
shifted, these tables would be repeatedly revised over the remainder
of the century.24 While the Healthy Males table was still imperfect,
by working together as an industry insurers were finally able to
achieve a reasonably accurate mortality table on which to base their
decisions.25
Of course, in setting the standard normal life of a healthy
male, firms still needed to decide who fit that standard and how to
deal with applicants falling outside of this category such as women,
less than perfectly healthy males, or people exposed to greater
mortality risks due to a dangerous occupation, residence in an
unhealthy climate, or hazardous travel. Thus, even the compilation of
a moderately-accurate mortality table did not eliminate the necessity
of Victorian gatekeeping.26 Gender, occupation, or travel were all
factors which companies could identify with relative ease, choosing
either to reject the applicant outright or add a surcharge to the risk
19
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(which, as Alborn points out, was often based more on the maximum
that the market could bear rather than an accurate reflection of the
nature of the risk).27 Health issues, on the other hand, were of the
highest concern for the industry, and the greatest efforts at Victorian
gatekeeping were devoted to uncovering hidden health problems.28
British life insurers were obsessed with the possibility that applicants
would engage in adverse selection.29 They feared that people with
reason to believe their lives would fall short of the predicted
longevity would be most likely to apply, and that the applicant would
hide this information (either inadvertently or intentionally) from the
company.30
Just as companies struggled throughout the century to
determine an accurate basis for their aggregate mortality tables, they
likewise grappled with the problem of ascertaining the health risk
posed by individual applicants.31 During the first half of the century,
the main means of gatekeeping entailed health questions on an
application form, the corroboration of these answers by reliable
friends and medical attendants, and a personal appearance before the
board of directors.32 However, each of these means contained
serious drawbacks. As companies extended their reach beyond the
metropole, it became increasingly difficult for the board to
personally examine each applicant or to judge the reliability of
witnesses.33 Additionally, doctors began demanding payment for
their services34, yet their observations were likely to be biased in
favor of their patients.35
Finally, the application form depended first and foremost on
the honesty of the applicant (“has the applicant ever spit blood?”).36
Yet even when the policyholder had been completely forthcoming,
27
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he or she may have had an underlying medical issue that was as of
yet undetected, or a seemingly innocuous symptom that the applicant
failed to associate with a larger medical problem.37 The desire to
ensure that all policyholders conformed to the “healthy male”
standard set in the tables drove companies to construct ever more
complicated questionnaires, demanding that applicants respond to
multiple queries about numerous specific ailments or symptoms, as
well as providing a detailed family history.38
The gatekeeping of the application form was then reinforced
with a more robust medical examination.39 Rather than relying on the
information provided by personal doctors, companies began hiring
physicians to conduct detailed screenings of all applicants.40 In order
to facilitate comparisons across applicants and medical personnel,
these exams became increasingly routinized.41
Once again,
companies sought to statistically define what constituted normal
characteristics for their standard healthy male.42
By setting
parameters for acceptable height, weight, pulse, blood pressure, etc.,
life insurers exuded confidence that they understood the statistical
impact of these factors on their standard normal life – and then could
adjust rates accordingly for those who fell outside these parameters.43
Yet as had been the case with the creation of mortality tables, these
guidelines were of necessity a combination of sound medical
knowledge and educated guesswork.44 In attempting to numerically
define and categorize applicants, firms repeatedly found their efforts
thwarted by the uniqueness of individual lives.
In placing so much confidence in the accuracy and objectivity
of statistics, life insurers were part of a much larger nineteenthcentury phenomenon. As Geoffrey Clark already mentioned,
historians such as Patricia Cline Cohen (A Calculating People: The
Spread of Numeracy in Early America. University of Chicago Press,
37
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1982), Theodore M. Porter (The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 18201900. Princeton University Press, 1986), and Lorraine Daston (in The
Probabilistic Revolution. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Press, 1990) have all documented a rapid increase in the use and
acceptance of statistics in daily life during the early decades of the
nineteenth century. On both sides of the Atlantic, people were
becoming more numerically literate and they increasingly associated
data with objective truths, subjecting to quantification not just
economic questions but civic, social, and moral issues as well. For
the life insurance industry, a statistical understanding of the factors
contributing to mortality would not only ensure the long-term
viability of the industry but would create confidence among the
general public that life insurance premiums were based on
scientifically sound principles and not merely a matter of chance.
Yet their search for statistical surety was, of necessity, elusive.
Regulated Lives reflects not only the nineteenth-century obsession
with numbers and calculation but, more importantly, underscores the
messiness and contingency inherent in that compilation of “objective
truth.”

REGULATED LIVES IN
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT
Geoffrey Clark*
Readers of this journal are likely to be more familiar with the legal
doctrines pertaining to contemporary insurance practice than they are with
the scholarly roots of Timothy Alborn’s Regulated Lives: Life Insurance
and British Society, 1800-1914.1 This essay is meant to provide some
historiographical context in order that readers may appreciate the full
measure of Alborn’s achievements in this book.
Regulated Lives is the latest arrival on a tide of historical and
sociological research into insurance appearing in the last 25 years or so.
Although numerous smaller tributaries may be identified, two major
streams of scholarship have led to these studies into the social and cultural
history insurance. The first of these is the company history, a work
typically commissioned by a firm’s directors to celebrate the passing of a
noteworthy milestone. All too often, especially among the older sort, these
histories are cast in a heroic Victorian mold, featuring as dramatis
personae the “Great Men” who stood at the company’s helm, steadfastly
navigating stormy and shark-filled waters to make their sesqui- or
bicentennial ports. Gratifying tales of profit and endurance for the stockholders and employees who must have comprised the main readership of
these volumes, but their aims usually did not reach beyond chronicling the
progress of the firm and celebrating its success.
This is not to denigrate some really first-rate company histories
written by outstanding historians that have documented the rise of the
British insurance business over the past 300 years, works like P. G. M.
Dickson’s The Sun Insurance Office (1960)2, Barry Supple’s Royal
Exchange Assurance (1970)3, and Clive Trebilcock’s Phoenix Assurance
(1985)4. But even the best of them, as Alborn himself phrases it, mainly
*
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adopt the perspective of the board room.5 The problem is not just that the
histories of remarkably successful firms must inevitably have a whiggish
whiff. It is also, and more importantly, that while the companies portrayed
in these accounts may suffer boardroom clashes, recalcitrant sales staffs, or
the usual interdepartmental rivalries, the fundamental unit of analysis
remains the firm as a monolithic entity. This perspective was adopted even
by older general histories like Harold Raynes’ History of British Insurance
(1964)6, which narrate a story largely bounded by the field lines of
company entrepreneurship, technical innovation, and state regulation.
One of the achievements of Alborn’s book is to show at a much
finer level of detail that the nineteenth-century British insurance business
was internally driven by different constituencies working to some extent at
cross-purposes because they attributed to their customers different
ontological or aesthetic meanings: they were sympathetic subjects to the
pitch men, forensic puzzles to medical examiners, numerical data to the
actuaries, and commodities to the ledger-keepers and stockholders.7 And
not all of these terms could dovetail into a consistent and cohesive, to say
nothing of coercive, address to the insured subject. As a result, Alborn
presents a view of the nineteenth-century insurance firm as pluralistic in its
organization and at times internally divided in its goals, and therefore
incapable of formulating and enforcing the micro-strategies of control
imagined by Michel Foucault and the acolytes of “governmentality.”8
The second major stream of scholarship leading to Regulated Lives
and other recent studies of insurance flows from the history and philosophy
of science literature on the emergence of probabilistic thinking, the
development of statistical analysis, and the strikingly obsessive and
pervasive reference to number as a legitimating authority in the modern
world. Prominent among researchers in this field are the philosopher Ian
Hacking and historians of science Ted Porter and Lorraine Daston, who are
concerned with describing the epochal mental and intellectual
transformations that were associated with reconceptualizations of chance,
mathematics, and reason from the seventeenth through the twentieth
centuries.9 Although this body of scholarship is impressive in its ambition
5
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and scope, and while it has greatly influenced researchers in a variety of
fields, its preoccupation with seismic shifts in the history of ideas
inevitably give short shrift to the nitty-gritty details of how, and to what
extent, probabilism and statistical technique were absorbed into what
Daston refers to as “the practice of risk” in her seminal Classical
Probability in the Enlightenment (1988).10 But it is worth noting that it was
only at the urging of the distinguished historian of science Charles
Gillespie, who thought her initial draft too absorbed in theory in her book,
that Daston added a chapter on the concrete application of probability
theory to risk-taking and insurance.
We have then in these two scholarly streams the truffle-hunting
company historians narrowly focused on the fortunes of the firm, and the
parachutist intellectual historians attentive to shifting conceptual
landscapes but less adept at tracing the details of how probability and
statistics were translated into practical activity. The recent wave of
insurance histories has sought to bridge this gap between the aerialists and
the troglodytes by joining business and economic history with social and
cultural history. Regulated Lives stakes out this new ground for the period
in which Britain’s life insurance industry grew to maturity. It stands
alongside Robin Pearson’s Insuring the Industrial Revolution: Fire
Insurance in Great Britain, 1700-1850 (2004)11 and my own Betting on
Lives: The Culture of Life Insurance in England, 1695-1775 (1999)12 in
providing synthetic studies of the development of the British insurance
market (in most respects the progenitor of the modern insurance business)
while also teasing out the meanings of insurance to various market
participants and in the culture at large.13
In comparing my account of the early formation of the British
insurance market in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with Alborn’s
account of its subsequent development across the long nineteenth century,
the continuities in business practice and culture are more striking than the
dissimilarities. This is a surprising result given the widely shared
assumption by experts that the character of life insurance fundamentally
NATURAL LAW AND LAWS OF NATURE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE:
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10
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changed after the foundation, in 1762, of the Equitable Society (the first
firm to issue sell “modern” age-based premium insurance) and the
appearance of several imitators near the end of the eighteenth century.14
Alborn shows that, despite refinements in actuarial knowledge, product
design, marketing, and medical screening, in important respects the life
insurance industry displayed the same tentative reliance on actuarial data
and appealed to the same speculative tastes of its customers as it did in the
previous century.15
Nineteenth-century actuaries, for example, generated a succession
of mortality tables that generally confirmed one another’s evaluations of
the risk of death at specified ages – the risk of mortality, that is, among
middle-class adult males, a group that actuaries established as a standard
reference population.16 It had been obvious to Daniel Defoe as far back as
the 1690s that other factors such as occupation or place of residence were
likely to be at least as important as age in determining the likelihood of
death.17 150 years later actuaries showed little inclination to compile
mortality tables that quantified those risks or to calculate the mortality
profile for “non-standard” populations like women or the working classes.18
Instead, insurers resorted to other techniques for coping with increased
quanta of risk (or at least the increased uncertainty of risk) posed by these
groups. One such method was termed “rating up” of under average lives,
an intuitive procedure by which insurers notionally added some number of
years to proposed lives that would compensate for their perceived
deficiencies in health and habits from those of good male lives of the same
age.19 In other words, insurers took their carefully calibrated demographic
scales and then crudely pressed their thumbs down on one side in order to
make them appear in balance.
Another method of reckoning with demographic uncertainty
involved the office of the marketer rather than the actuary. Rather than
investing the time and effort to attain systematic mortality data of select
populations with differing demographic profiles, insurers cannily shunted
higher-risk lives into endowment insurance or contingent debt policies,
which provided a financial inducement to purchasers to live long.20 These
14
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highly successful marketing devices transferred some demographic risk
from the firm to the consumer, who effectively bet on his or her own
longevity, a speculative atavism from eighteenth-century life insurance.21
This speculative dimension of life insurance was also carried into
the nineteenth century through the bonus system, another device popular
with the public in which companies periodically distributed accumulated
excess premiums among policyholders.22 The insurance bonus generated
demand by giving life insurance the appearance of paying dividends in the
medium term like other investments.23 It also reflected firms’ enduring
caution in relying too heavily on actuarial data, and their corresponding
conservatism in maintaining premiums above their true value, again, an
approach characteristic of eighteenth-century life insurance companies.24
A third noteworthy thread of continuity pertains to the medical
screening of lives proposed for insurance. The fact that insurers in the
Victorian era ultimately limited their use of medical surveillance,
acquiescing in the face of market competition to regard as acceptable lives
deemed “normal enough,” recall the loose and intuitive (although
admittedly less discriminating) classification of insurable lives in the
eighteenth century as those drawn from a broadly defined prime of life and
not obviously infirm or besotted.25
One of those lives rejected by insurance offices belonged to Robert
Louis Stevenson, whose “crazy health,” as he himself described it, made
him absolutely uninsurable.26 (The offices proved right: he died aged 44.)27
But Stevenson did live long enough to exact some literary revenge in a
novella he wrote with Lloyd Osbourne titled The Wrong Box, , a comedy of
errors about the maniacal winding up of a tontine.28 One of the book’s
central characters is an insufferable pedant and middle-class improver
named Joseph Finsbury, the author of several edifying essays including
“‘Life Insurance Regarded in its Relation to the Masses’, read before the
Working Men’s Mutual Improvement Society, Isle of Dogs, . . . [and ]
received with a ‘literal ovation’ by an unintelligent audience of both
21
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sexes.”29
Stevenson’s caricature of the middle class’s moralistic
condescension in recommending the manifold benefits of life insurance, as
well as the working class’s uncomprehending assent to professional
expertise and numerical authority, has a recognizable basis in Alborn’s
description of the social dynamics of Victorian life insurance.30 Many
companies – not least the growing cadre of “industrial” offices – moved
down market to enlist the multitude of laboring families in the cause of
financial improvement and social respectability. Alborn also demonstrates
that the mathematical basis of insurance – its legitimating scientific
foundation – was roundly ignored by customers who were swayed much
more by emotional appeals than by the calculus of mortality, whose
authority they uncritically accepted.31
Finally, Stevenson’s hilarious juxtaposition of Finsbury’s vaunting
praise of life insurance with its tepid reception by his audience suggests
something about the limitations of insurance to subject people’s lives to its
manifold controls.32 Alborn not only describes the difficulty of bending all
parts of the insurance bureaucracy towards a common goal, he observes
that the objects of that bureaucratic control evaded or transcended the
categories into which the insurance industry tried to place them.33 Despite
the implication of its title, Regulated Lives is in fact an optimistic book.
Optimistic, because it suggests that the widely feared totalizing capabilities
of modern financial and bureaucratic institutions is exaggerated and that
insurance companies, however grandiose their real or imagined ambitions,
are too compromised from within and too vulnerable to rivals from without
to exert too exact a control over our bodies and our lives. This is an insight
well worth celebrating, along with this superb book.

29
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AUTHOR RESPONSE: REGULATED LIVES
Timothy Alborn*!
To repeat one of the acknowledgements in my book, I wish to
thank the University of Connecticut School of Law for so directly shaping
the direction Regulated Lives took as it evolved over the past decade; and
more specifically, in this case, for sponsoring such a stimulating (and
flattering) discussion of my book earlier this year. (That panel discussion,
which was the genesis of the three reviews to which I’ve been asked to
respond, also featured stimulating comments from Tom Baker and Patricia
McCoy, the past and present directors of the Insurance Law Center.) The
privilege of responding to such incisive reviews accompanies several
opportunities: to rethink imperfections in execution, to elaborate on some
unfinished business, and to smuggle in a few historical “out-takes” that will
assist me in carrying out the first two tasks.
To start with the book’s title, Regulated Lives. All three reviewers
imply, more or less directly, that this title is not quite right, since the
insured lives discussed therein were not quite regulated. As Sharon
Murphy points out, actuaries did not know as much as they often claimed
regarding the statistical laws dictating morality; as Geoffrey Clark points
out, medical screening techniques often had more in common with the
eighteenth-century gatekeeping devices he describes in Betting on Lives
than with obviously “modern” diagnostic methods; and as Jill Anderson
points out, the title Regulated Lives implies a book about “the activities of
living” but in fact contains a more ambiguous “typology of life-senses.”
Sharon Murphy made a similar point more critically in her review of my
book for EH.net: “the voice of the insuring consumer is largely absent,
appearing only as reflected by the firms themselves.”"
So is there a meaningful sense in which the lives discussed in this
book (however they might have been defined) were regulated? I would
argue that there is: namely, the large extent to which the various groups
who were involved in the industry thought they were engaging in forms of
regulation, and—even when they consciously fell short of their
aspirations—kept trying to do so for most of the nineteenth century. The
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search for a hoped-for “law of mortality” lurked in actuarial papers into the
1880s, and doctors continued to insist that their careful medical
examinations were vital to the success of life insurance, in the face of
mounting evidence that they made little difference. In their persistent
ambition to regulate their customers’ lives, the actuaries and doctors in my
book represented a very significant break with Clark’s eighteenth-century
actors. In the process, they contributed to an increasingly regulatory
culture, albeit one whose reach has often been exaggerated.
In the realm of statistics, a useful contrast can and should be drawn
between eighteenth-century demographic thought, which (as Clark states in
Betting on Lives) “did not possess the immediate and overwhelming
persuasiveness that many historians have attributed to statistical
knowledge” (118),# and a nineteenth-century belief in a “law of mortality”
that hovered between religious faith and scientific certainty. As Murphy
points out, there was a wide gap between this belief and what was
statistically possible for much of the century (although not as wide as she
implies, since the tables they used adequately corrected for the inclusion of
lower-income individuals). Some of this actuarial hubris derived from the
training of nineteenth-century insurance technicians, which tended towards
astronomy and mathematical physics: Augustus De Morgan and Benjamin
Gompertz (to cite two examples) extended the order they saw in the
heavens to the human populations who bought life insurance. Some of it,
as I point out in my book, derived from the marriage of convenience
between this sincere form of certainty and the more dodgy variety
expressed by salesmen, who were eager to use the scientific basis of life
insurance to divert policyholders’ attention from the periodic waves of
severe uncertainty that enveloped its financial side.
Medical practice in the nineteenth century, especially prior to the
“therapeutic revolution” just before the century’s end, fell famously short
of what anyone would define as “modern medicine.” Hence it comes as no
surprise that medical surveillance in life insurance recalled what Clark calls
the “loose and intuitive” methods of an earlier era. Rather more surprising
is the extent to which life insurance companies insisted on medical
screening at all, given the discipline’s modest diagnostic capacity and the
availability of actuarial fixes (endowment policies and contingent debt
schemes) that rendered medical exams largely unnecessary.
An
explanation for this puzzle, as Murphy implies, lies in the strange mixture
of hubris and paranoia on the part of company directors. With prominent
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London physicians whispering in their ears, companies set in motion a
proliferating arsenal of screening techniques between 1850 and 1920; at the
same time, they never retreated from their conviction that adverse selection
was a serious threat to their bottom line. Here again, I would argue, we
find a perverse desire to regulate (among doctors and directors alike) in the
face of evidence that these regulatory devices accomplished little beyond
scaring customers away.
Insurance salesmen often appear in my story as policyholders’
allies, who deflected the regulatory urge of actuaries, doctors, and
managers. They not only played the role of friend to the insured, they often
actually were friends of the insured—their wide circles of friends were why
they got the job in the first place. Hence we find them going to bat for
policyholders to reduce extra premiums, settle contested claims, and
otherwise soften the industry’s unbending façade. What I would add to this
story (and in keeping with my claim about a regulatory culture that
pervaded Victorian Britain) is the sheer volume of oppressively hot air that
these insurance agents added, bellows-like, to the Victorian tropes of
domestic duty and sentimental morality. Even though these salesmen
mostly preached to the converted, their message—multiplied thousands of
times over— added to a general Victorian culture that was ceaselessly
intent on teaching people how to improve their lives.
All this adds up to a distinctly regulatory culture in which the
whole (what Clark calls “the widely feared totalizing capabilities of
modern financial and bureaucratic institutions”) is often a good deal less
than the sum of its parts. One very good reason for this, as I emphasize in
my book, was the fractured nature of expertise that comprises any
regulatory regime. The lives in my book achieved relative autonomy
precisely because they were subject to regulation by so many different
people. If one doctor didn’t give candidates for insurance the answer they
was looking for, they could try another down the street. If one company
required a medical exam, would-be policyholders could try their luck with
another that was willing to substitute a double-or-nothing bet for a safer, if
more stringent, contract. This range of choices yielded a paradox, which
remains with us to this day in most avenues of modern life. Trust in
expertise has increased over time, in large part because consumers are able
to choose which experts to trust. For the same reason, trust in specific
groups of experts has diminished: witness any opinion poll reporting trust
in bankers, doctors, lawyers, and the like. These are still regulated lives—
just not overweeningly so.
For those who find this defense of my book’s title unconvincing,
Jill Anderson has, at least, pointed to a possibly more accurate title waiting
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in the wings: Meanings of Life. Perhaps the least obvious meaning of life
that I described in Regulated Lives, but the one that (as Anderson shrewdly
observes) is at the core of life insurance, is life’s opposite—namely, death.
Death, in more fancy terms, is life’s “other,” without which it would be
hard to pin down what it means to us. Anderson suggests that “we are
always looking at the death side of life.” True enough, especially in
reference to this book—but among the other services that the various
meanings of life (commodification, medicalization, and so on) were called
on to perform, one of the most important was their capacity for distancing
the insured subject from having to tackle death head-on. We can start with
the obvious fact that the business is called life insurance, not death
insurance; and that society appears to have moved from less to more
euphemistic in this regard (sickness insurance has become health insurance,
and fire insurance has become homeowners insurance).
As one would expect, the commodification of life has always been
a handy expedient for distracting policyholders from the fact of their
ultimate demise, even as it deadens the activity of living. Translating death
into the prospect of financial reward performs the same basic alienating
function that is performed by translating labor into wages. Hence the
policyholders in Staring at the Sun were “entranced by the transaction”
whereby they got “the best deal out of being dead.”$ Here, in bold strokes
suitable to the edgy late-twentieth century tone of the novel, is the essence
of commodification, which is capable making death itself seem like an
entrancing opportunity. A Victorian take on the same phenomenon makes
the strangeness of this process even clearer: Elizabeth Gaskell, in
describing the human scenery of Yorkshire for her biography of Charlotte
Bronte, recounted that “West Riding men are sleuth-hounds in pursuit of
money,” and demonstrated this axiom by referring to a small manufacturer
who “fell ill of an acute disease” shortly after buying an insurance policy.
When a doctor informed him of his “hopeless state,” the man jumped for
joy, exclaiming: “By jingo!... I shall do the insurance company! I always
was a lucky fellow!”%
Here we have a nice illustration of what Clark calls “a speculative
atavism from eighteenth-century insurance”; though why we should think
of it as atavistic puzzles me, since speculation never disappeared as the
lifeblood of the financial industry. But Victorians had their limits, as well.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3

See TIMOTHY ALBORN, REGULATED LIVES: LIFE INSURANCE AND BRITISH
SOCIETY 1800-1914 311 (2009).
4
ELIZABETH GASKELL, THE LIFE OF CHARLOTTE BRONTE, 18 (Penguin Books,
1997).
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In this context it’s worth lingering a bit longer on Clark’s example of The
Wrong Box, which he uses to illustrate the revenge of the uninsurable (in
this case the sickly Robert Louis Stevenson). Victorian critics vilified the
book—not because it poked fun at the middle-class moralism associated
with life insurance, but because Stevenson refused to deviate sufficiently
from death. The book’s sense of humor, according to one typical review,
was “revolting when one stays to consider for a moment its nauseating
subject—a corpse left unburied and unembalmed for several days, and
hustled here and there!” The reviewer concluded that “the whole book is in
unpardonably bad taste; its decency is less than the decency of savages.”&
The balancing act between speculative allusions to death and “savage
decency” was one of the many fine lines life insurance companies needed
to walk in the nineteenth century. Viewed from a wider angle, the tension
between selling a sense of security and anticipating misfortune has
remained central to all forms of insurance down to the present time.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5

The Wrong Box, 20 THE LITERARY WORLD 236, 237 (1889).
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INTO THE UNKNOWN:
THE REACH OF ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE IN CASES
Caroline Vazquez
I.

!

INTRODUCTION

Brownfields are the next development frontier in many urban
areas.1 Even the economic recession has failed to deter developers from
entering into new projects focused on reclaiming contaminated sites.2
Developers continue to strike deals with municipalities that are hungry for
new tax revenue, and find state authorities steadfastly ready to help, despite
the country’s struggling real estate market and general financial disarray.3
But, any purchase or planned redevelopment of a brownfield can
have large, sometimes unforeseen, costs. A brownfield is a site with
“actual or perceived contamination,” but with a “realistic potential for
redevelopment.”4 Brownfield rehabilitation generally “involves the sale of
a former industrial, commercial or institutional property to a developer who
intends to redevelop the site for a ’less intensive use.’”5 Experts estimate
that the total remaining costs of decontaminating these polluted sites in the
United States may range from $700 billion to $1 trillion,6 excluding
perhaps “tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars more” in potential toxic
tort suits and industrial spills.7 In the face of these potentially huge
Caroline Vazquez, J.D. candidate, University of Connecticut School of Law.
The author would like to thank Professor Kurt Strasser for his invaluable assistance
in writing this article and Adam Wolkoff for his patience and support.
1
See J. Alex Tarquinio, Once Polluted, Now Profitable for New Jersey
Builders,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Mar.
5,
2008,
available
at
http://nytimes.com/2008/03/05/business/05brown.html; see also, Antoinette
Martin, Why Dumps are Gaining Allure, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2008, available at
http://nytimes.com/2008/03/30/realestate/30njzo.html.
2
Antoinette Martin, Reclaiming Contaminated Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
2009, available at http://nytimes.com/2009/11/01/realestate/01njzo.html.
3
See id.
4
Janice E. Falini, Using Environmental Insurance to Manage Risk
Encountered in Non-Traditional Transactions, 14 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 95, 108
(2003).
5
Id.
6
DAVID J. DYBDAHL, AM. RISK MGNT. RES. NETWORK, A USER’S GUIDE TO
ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE 13, available at http://erraonline.org/usersguide.pdf.
7
Amanda Cohen Leiter, Environmental Insurance: Does it Defy the Rules?,
25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 259, 259, 261 (2001) (arguing that the Shavell model of
!
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liabilities, transactions involving brownfields become contentious when the
parties negotiate rehabilitation cost estimates and the closure of future
liabilities.8 Typically, the seller wants to minimize its indemnification
obligations to the developer and achieve regulatory closure, while the buyer
wants to quantify accurately and carefully manage future costs and
potential liabilities.9
The buyer’s concerns about unexpected clean-up costs and
liabilities can destroy transactions and prevent the rehabilitation of land
otherwise slated for redevelopment.
For example, unexpected
contamination halted a transaction between an auto body shop seeking to
sell its land and a clothing retailer looking to build a fourth boutique.10 The
retailer was enthusiastic about the deal until a site inspector developed an
allergic reaction from exposure to chemicals once used for paint and
enamel work.11 When the contamination was discovered, the retailer
angrily backed out of the agreement, claiming the seller had failed to
disclose this pollution.12 Environmental insurance might have saved this
deal, protecting the buyer from cost overruns and liability associated with
unknown contamination and providing the seller with protection from
liabilities arising after the sale.13
Insurance makes transactions involving these contaminated sites
more feasible and makes ownership of such properties with questionable
use histories less risky.14 For example, a zoo in Fort Worth, Texas
discovered that it sat on land that had served other, possibly industrial,
purposes in the past.15 The zoo’s general liability policy did not cover
environmental liability risks, leading it to seek additional insurance to fill

insurance, which emphasizes the compensation and deterrence functions of
insurance, undervalues the public compensation function in the environmental
rehabilitation context and noting that a well-functioning environmental insurance
market encourages socially beneficial but risky ventures).
8
See generally id.; DYBDAHL, supra note 6.
9
See generally; DYBDAHL, supra note 6; Leiter, supra note 7.
10
John Butler, When You Buy Polluted Land, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 14, 2005.
11
See id.
12
Id.
13
See id.
14
See Falini, supra note 4, at 109; see also Julianne Kurdila &
RindfleischFunding Opportunities for Brownfield Redevelopment, 34 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 479, 499-500 (2007) (citations omitted).
15
Purva Patel, Pollution Insurance Has Broad Market: Municipalities,
Developers, Even Zoos Are Buying It, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 9, 2007.
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the gap in coverage.16 The zoo negotiated and paid a one-time $20,000
premium for a three-year environmental insurance policy with a $3 million
cap.17 The zoo’s chief operating officer explained, "I can't imagine what
could be under [the zoo’s land], but [the policy] was just a fairly
inexpensive way to make sure that gap in our liability was covered.”18 The
environmental insurance policy thus mediated the zoo’s risk of incurring
large costs down the road.
In addition to mediating risk, environmental insurance policies can
help developers secure financing for their projects.19 Lenders are willing to
provide funding up to the market value of a property, but may not cover the
excess costs that are inherent to brownfields, such as environmental
assessments, remedial plans and cleanup.20 By keeping remediation costs
close to initial estimates for the developer, insurance can fill some of this
“financing gap” that would otherwise forestall remediation projects.21
Even as environmental insurance facilitates brownfield
rehabilitation, the increasing popularity of these projects is contributing to
the growth of the environmental insurance market.22 The growing appeal
of brownfield projects can be attributed to a number of factors.23 In
particular, developers are encountering improved regulatory predictability
and incentives on federal and state levels.24 A federal district court in
California noted how state and federal initiatives were expediting
brownfield cleanups by reducing “the cost and burden of returning such
properties to beneficial use.”25 The court observed that these laws had
16

Id.
See id.
18
Id.
19
See Falini, supra note 4, at 104; see also, Patel, supra note 15.
20
Kurdila & Rindfleisch, supra note 14, at 480.
21
See id. at 498-500.
22
See generally Kurdila & Rindfleisch, supra note 14.
23
See William H. Howard, New Issues in Environmental Risk Insurance, 40
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 957, 957 (2005); see also Tarquinio, supra note 1;
Martin, supra note 1.
24
See Tarquinio, supra note 1; see generally Kurdila & Rindfleisch, supra
note 14 (providing an overview of funding and other incentives from state and
federal government sources).
25
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, CA, 302 F.3d 928, 928, 948 (9th
Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) (involving an action brought by insurers against city
and city officials to prevent enforcement of a municipal ordinance permitting the
city to investigate and remediate hazardous waste contamination of soil and
groundwater).
17
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achieved “some level of predictability” for developers, allowing them to
make reasonable estimates of the costs and liabilities associated with taking
on a cleanup.26 “Such certainty,” the court stated, “to the extent that it is
available, greatly encourages prospective purchasers to rehabilitate
contaminated property and put it back into productive use.”27
Developers are also finding that brownfields are increasingly
competitive investments relative to other properties on the market. In some
areas, preservation efforts have removed undeveloped land from the
market.28 And, towns are willing to strike compelling deals with
developers, permitting denser development of a brownfield than the town
would otherwise permit in exchange for the developer taking the property
off the municipality’s hands and overseeing its cleanup.29 Indeed,
developers can combine municipal, state, and federal incentives, which can
make brownfield redevelopment a more profitable investment than building
on an uncontaminated site.30 Developers can sometimes get a substantial
proportion of their investment in brownfields returned to them through
government subsidies more quickly than they would see a return on their
investment in an uncontaminated property.31
Market forces and
government incentives are thus making brownfield projects appealing
investments for developers willing to purchase environmental insurance to
keep attendant risks within reasonable limits.32
Insurance’s risk-spreading function compliments regulatory and
market incentives in reducing the deterrent effects of pollution liabilities.33
Estimates indicate that insurance could pay for as much as two-thirds of the
decontamination costs for U.S. brownfields.34 With brownfields becoming
increasingly attractive investments, the global market for environmental
insurance policies has grown from an estimated $500 million in 1993 to
between $2 billion and $3 billion in recent years, with the big sellers
including American International Group (AIG), ACE, Zurich, Liberty
Mutual, and Chubb.35 Environmental insurance is thus becoming an
26

Id. at 948.
Id.
28
See Tarquinio, supra note 1.
29
See Martin, supra note 1.
30
See id.; Tarquinio, supra note 1.
31
See Tarquinio, supra note 1.
32
See generally Martin, supra note 1; Tarquinio, supra note 1.
33
See generally Martin, supra note 1; Tarquinio, supra note 1.
34
Leiter, supra note 7, at 259.
35
Patel, supra note 15, at 1-2.
27
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indispensable and broadly accepted tool for development projects with a
known or suspected risk of contamination.36
This article examines the role of environmental insurance policies
in the remediation of contaminated lands. Section II provides background
on environmental insurance policies, describing how the policies developed
to fill a gap in coverage caused by general liability insurance “absolute
pollution exclusions” and detailing specific types of environmental
insurance contracts in current use. Section II argues that complex
negotiations, and attendant expenses, associated with environmental
insurance policies have reduced parties’ incentive to litigate, such that the
first disputes have only recently begun to be heard in court. Section III and
IV discuss recent litigation on environmental insurance policies. Section
III provides a framework based on recent litigation for interpreting
environmental insurance policies and argues that courts should consider the
web of agreements that may influence a policy. Section IV discusses
recent litigation regarding “known conditions” exclusions. Section IV
argues that contra proferentem should generally apply to these exclusions
where the scope of “known conditions” is ambiguous to encourage insurers
to assume an information-forcing role when issuing coverage.
II.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE LANDSCAPE
A.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE
POLICIES

Policies explicitly covering pollution costs and liabilities have
emerged only since the late 1980s in their modern form.37 They developed
to fill a gap that insurers purposefully manufactured in Commercial
General Liability (CGL) policies,38 which provide businesses with broad
coverage for liabilities not specifically excluded by the policy’s terms.39
Prior to the 1970s, CGL policies did not specifically exclude
pollution coverage; but then, modern environmental liability law and the
concurrent demand for pollution coverage did not yet exist.40 Growing
awareness of environmental issues and risks combined with federal
36

See id.; see also Howard, supra note 23, at 957-58.
See Falini, supra note 4, at 95-97.
38
See DYBDAHL, supra note 6, at 17.
39
Ralph A. DeMeo, et al., Insuring Against Environmental Unknowns, 12 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 61, 62 (2007).
40
See id. at 63.
37
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legislation such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which forced businesses to bear
the costs of remediating the environmental harms they caused, led
businesses to bring claims for pollution liabilities under their CGL
policies.41 Insurers had not anticipated the number and scope of these
environmental claims and began taking steps to exclude pollution-related
liabilities for future policyholders.42
Insurers meandered somewhat before excluding pollution liabilities
from CGL policies entirely. To relieve the pressure on CGL policies,
insurers introduced a “sudden and accidental” occurrence exclusion in
1973, which was intended to exclude leaks and spills of contaminants from
coverage.43 However, courts found the exclusion ambiguous and required
insurers to cover many pollution liabilities regardless.44 Thus, in 1985,
many CGL policies included “absolute pollution exclusions,”45 broadly
defining the exclusion to ensure no ambiguity.46 Thereafter, policyholders
faced with pollution liabilities could not obtain coverage under their CGL
policies.
Demand for environmental coverage remained even as CGL
policies solidified the “absolute pollution” exclusion.47 In response,
insurance policies that specifically covered environmental risks gradually
entered the market,48 with demand intensifying throughout the 1980s.49
Reasons for the spike in demand included growing corporate concern over
environmental risks and disclosure requirements, financial incentives for
41

See supra n. 14-28 and accompanying text; see also John Conley, Hidden
Dangers: Taking Uncertainty Out of Mergers and Acquisitions, 47 RISK MGMT.
12, 14 (2000) (explaining environmental insurance developed in response to
legislation that required clean-up of contaminated properties);Falini, supra note 4,
at 95 (noting that insurers created environmental insurance policies in response to
government legislation that increased environmental liabilities during the 1970s).
42
See supra n.14-19 and accompanying text.
43
See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability
Insurance, 87 VA. L. REV. 85, 93, 97 (2001).
44
See id. at 97.
45
See id. at 99.
46
Falini, supra note 4, at 96 & n.14.
47
See DYBDAHL, supra note 6, at 1, 19-20; see also Falini, supra note 4, at 9597 (“Environmental insurance has been available for commercial clients since
1979.”).
48
DYBDAHL, supra note 6, at 1.
49
Falini, supra note 4, at 97 & n.16.
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redevelopment of brownfields, and stricter enforcement of federal and state
environmental laws.50 Moreover, developers began finding projects on
contaminated sites to be savvy business decisions, but required insurance to
mitigate the financial risks associated with rehabilitation projects.51
Today, the annual sales volume for environmental insurance
exceeds $1 billion and continues to grow.52 By 2002, demand for
environmental insurance was growing at a twenty percent annual rate to
more than $2 billion of premiums.53 This growth is particularly striking in
contrast to the 1990s “when premium volume was less than one-tenth the
current level.”54
This growing market contains numerous, highly
specialized policies, each covering a particular type of risk associated with
projects on potentially contaminated lands.
B.

AN OVERVIEW OF MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE
POLICIES

Pollution Legal Liability (PLL) policies55 and Cost Cap policies
dominate the market for environmental insurance, although the options
continue to diversify.56 PLL policies provide third-party insurance
coverage against liability resulting from contamination at or emanating
from properties that the policy covers.57 More specifically, PLL policies
50

Howard, supra note 23, at 957-58; see also Brent C. Anderson, Valuation of
Environmentally Impaired Properties, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT. 100, 137
(2000) (“Environmental insurance has been in the marketplace for the past decade.
However, only in the past several years has it become a viable means of
transferring environmental risks.”).
51
See supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
52
DYBDAHL, supra note 6, at 1.
53
Howard, supra note 23, at 957 n.1.
54
Id.; see also Dave Lenckus, Pollution Risk Transfer Continuing to Evolve:
Market for Clean-up Coverage Growing, 36 BUS. INS., June 10, 2002, at 10.
55
The precise name for the policy varies somewhat by insurer. Alternate
names include “Pollution Legal Liability Select,” “Environmental Impairment
Liability,” and “Pollution and Remediation Legal Liability.” DeMeo et al., supra
note 39, at 76.
56
Newer, highly specialized forms of environmental insurance have emerged
that are “considerably more tailored” than their broader predecessor environmental
insurance policies. These specialized policies are often geared towards specific
industries, such as education, health care, or real estate development. Howard,
supra note 23, at 958-60; see also DeMeo, supra note 39, at 82.
57
Howard, supra note 23, at 959.
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offer claims-made58 coverage for on-site cleanup of unknown preexisting
and new conditions, off-site cleanup resulting from unknown preexisting or
new conditions, and coverage for injuries occurring on neighboring
property.59 Such policies may also include coverage for third-party claims
for bodily injury and property damage, liability arising from waste
transportation, business interruption, and a duty to defend.60
Cost Cap policies compliment PLL policies. Whereas PLL
policies protect against liabilities associated with the remediation of
unknown environmental harms and resulting injuries to people and
property,61 Cost Cap insurance protects parties that plan to remediate a site
from vastly exceeding their estimated costs.62 Cost Cap insurance is thus
“designed to address the risk and uncertainty associated with beginning an
environmental remediation project.”63 Insurers design the policies to cover
clean-up expenses that accrue beyond expectations and the “self-insured
retention,” which functions as the policy’s deductible.64
To obtain coverage, the policyholder must submit detailed plans
and cost estimates from environmental consultants to insurers,65 who
require “substantial analytical data, agency-approved work plans,
sophisticated cost estimates, and formal contractor quotations . . . to

58

Claims-made policies cover claims first made during the policy period. See,
e.g., Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 656 A.2d
1094, 1095 (Del. 1995) (“Claims-made policies provide coverage only where the
underlying claim is first made, in writing, during the policy period. Therefore, the
initial focus under a claims-made policy is on the date of the first written assertion
of the claim, rather than the date of the injury or damage alleged within that
claim.”). Many PLL policies contain language similar to the following: “Many of
the coverages [provided herein] contain claims-made-and-reported requirements.
Please read carefully.” Howard, supra note 23, at 962.
59
Howard, supra note 23, at 959.
60
Id.
61
Id. “Cleanup cost cap coverage generally excludes coverage for bodily
injury, property damage, third-party liability, fines, penalties, and policyholder
noncompliance for criminal acts,” the very coverage offered through PLL policies.
Id. at 960.
62
Id. at 959-60 (“Cleanup cost cap insurance coverage is first-party coverage
designed to protect the policyholder against possible cost overruns in the course of
performance of planned environmental remediation projects.”).
63
Id. at 960.
64
Id.
65
Id.
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underwrite” policies.66 These procedures aid parties in accumulating the
information necessary for the policyholder to determine what, specifically,
must receive coverage and the insurer to underwrite the risk accurately.67
However, the nature of environmental contamination makes
accuracy only a roughly achievable goal, despite hefty investments in due
diligence.68 “Each environmental cost is the product of probability and
consequence,” requiring the use of mathematical models to eliminate bias
and to account for the interrelationship between numerous environmental
factors.69
Ultimately, these models achieve estimates of liability,
rendering it necessary for developers to offset the risks that “cannot be
accurately determined” via insurance.70 Those environmental costs that
parties cannot anticipate in advance are those best suited for environmental
insurance.71
Such uncertainty, combined with the size of potential liabilities,
means that both developers and insurers have a clear incentive to negotiate
the terms of environmental insurance policies carefully.72 Since absolute
accuracy regarding the risks is difficult to obtain on the contaminated site,
accuracy must exist in the policy’s negotiated terms to circumscribe the
unknown costs on either side.73 Unlike property, casualty, and liability
insurance, which insurers sell in standard form, the terms of environmental
policies are often rigorously negotiated.74
The cost of accumulating the relevant information and negotiating
the terms of the policy is the first major expense associated with purchasing
66

See e.g., Frazer Exton Dev., LP v. Kemper Envtl., Ltd., No. 03 Civ. 0637,
2004 WL 1752580, at *1 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2004) (citations omitted).
67
See Anderson, supra note 50, at 137.
68
See id. at 101.
69
Id. at 137.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.; Video Webcast: Tips for Negotiating & Using Envtl. Ins. Policies &
Selected Case Law Concerning Claims (ALI–ABA 2008) available at
http://www.aliaba.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=online.mp3downloads_detail&segmentid=14764
[hereinafter ALI-ABA Video Webcast].
73
See Anderson, supra note 50, at 137 (“Environmental insurance is a
particularly effective tool for transferring low-probability, high consequence risk
…. Moreover, thoughtful use of environmental insurance can effectively reduce
the impact of the risks transferred under the policy to a financial consequence
defined by the premium cost and applicable deductibles.”).
74
See ALI-ABA Video Webcast, supra note 72.
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environmental insurance.75 Because of the high financial stakes and the
degree of uncertainty, the party purchasing the insurance will often engage
a team of professionals to assist in the negotiations, including lawyers,
environmental consultants, insurance brokers, and high-level
representatives of the insured.76 The cost of this upfront risk assessment
and negotiation generally benefit the policyholder.77
Although
environmental insurance policies prior to negotiations may not provide
significant transfer of environmental risks, “careful manuscripting of
endorsements to integrate coverages between policies and to integrate
insurance into the overall transaction can provide a very effective means of
allocating risk.”78 As a result, properly drafted environmental insurance
may be the most certain and successful means of defining environmental
risk.79
The high costs associated with environmental insurance policies do
not end with the upfront costs of risk assessment and representation for
policy negotiations.80 The second set of costs involves the actual purchase
price of the policy.81 Premiums for PLL policies, for example, can start at
between $5,000 and $15,000 per year with a minimum deductible between
$5,000 and $10,000 dollars per incident.82 Policy limits for PLL policies
range from $1 million to $100 million, with higher limits frequently
possible through negotiation.83 Similarly, Cost Cap policies often carry
hefty premiums and deductibles.84 Typically, a minimum premium for a
Cost Cap policy will run between eight and fifteen percent of a site’s
estimated clean-up costs with a policy limit of twice the estimated clean-up
cost.85 Insurers will generally not provide coverage for cleanups estimated
to cost less than $1 million, but will provide coverage limits as high as
$300 million depending on whether reinsurance is available.86 In addition
to paying premiums, policyholders are responsible for paying a “self-

75

See id.
Id.
77
See Anderson, supra note 50, at 103.
78
Id. at 137.
79
Id.
80
See DeMeo et al., supra note 39, at 77.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
See id. at 83.
85
Id.
86
See DeMeo et al., supra note 39, at 83.
76
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insured retention” (SIR) before the insurer will begin paying.87 The SIR
functions as the policy’s deductible, and is equal to the estimated clean-up
cost of the property plus ten to thirty percent “to eliminate any incentive for
underbidding and to account for losses almost certain to occur … ”88 Thus,
when a policyholder purchases Cost Cap insurance, he agrees to pay
premiums, all estimated clean-up costs, and a certain amount of costs above
that estimate before the insurer begins covering unanticipated costs.89
Environmental insurance policies thus require substantial contributions
from policyholders both at the time of purchase and whenever a claim
arises.90
With such high stakes, a third cost associated with environmental
insurance policies may be litigation. But, even though environmental
insurance has been available in some form since the late 1970s,91 litigation
has been infrequent.92 Until recently, few cases have gone to trial, perhaps
because, with such high stakes, the parties prefer to settle disputes out of
court.93 Another explanation for the lack of case law is that the costly,
team-based negotiations described above may reduce both the need and the
incentive to litigate.94 On one hand, thorough negotiations generally mean
that parties have brought all available information to the table, allowing the
insurer the opportunity to underwrite accurately and the potential
policyholder the opportunity to carefully assess and define the specific
risks that require coverage.95 On the other hand, negotiations reduce the
incentive of either party to commence litigation because they effectively
create (or demonstrate) equal bargaining power between the parties,
thereby rendering judicial treatment of the policies uncertain.96
Generally speaking, the common law doctrine of contra
proferentem governs all ambiguities in insurance policies when coverage is
litigated, dictating that ambiguous terms should be construed against the
insurer, who deals in the subject matter routinely and had the benefit of
87

Id.
Id.
89
See id.
90
See id.
91
Falini, supra note 4, at 95.
92
Interview with David Platt, Attorney, Murtha Cullina LLP, in Hartford,
Conn. (Oct. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Platt Interview].
93
Id.; see also Falini, supra note 4, at 98.
94
See ALI-ABA Video Webcast, supra note 72.
95
See Falini, supra note 4, at 98.
96
See ALI-ABA Video Webcast, supra note 72.
88
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drafting the terms.97 However, where parties individually negotiate terms
and have relatively equal bargaining power, as with environmental
insurance policies, the rationale for applying contra proferentem may be
diminished.98 Lack of knowledge as to how courts will treat environmental
insurance policies reduces the incentive for either the insurer or the insured
to bring a dispute to trial.99 Thus, up until recently, few cases involving
disputes over environmental insurance have made it to court.100
Despite this apparent reluctance to litigate, courts have heard the
first batch of cases involving environmental insurance policies in recent
years.101 One increasingly litigated issue involves allocation and priority of
coverage.102 A second litigious issue involves the known risk doctrine,
which dictates that an insurer should not be obliged to provide coverage for
a liability that the policyholder knew about or reasonably should have
foreseen.103 Section III discusses the allocation and priority of coverage
and provides a framework for interpreting environmental insurance
policies. Section IV analyzes the issue of “known conditions” and argues
that contra proferentem should be applied to environmental insurance
policies to encourage insurers to assume an information-forcing role during
negotiations.
III.

ALLOCATION AND PRIORITY OF COVERAGE LITIGATION

Environmental insurance policies generally consist of a standard
form policy and numerous, individually negotiated endorsements
modifying the standard terms.104 Policyholders may have multiple
environmental insurance policies to cover risks associated with different
aspects of their operations; each of these policies may contain exclusions
intended to eliminate coverage of risks that are not insured or that are
insured against by other types of policies.105
Thus, complicated
relationships may exist within a policy and also between multiple types of
environmental insurance policies, each with different focuses, exclusions,
97

Id.
Id.
99
See id.
100
Id.; see also Platt Interview, supra note 92.
101
See Platt Interview, supra note 92.
102
See Howard, supra note 23, at 979.
103
See ALI-ABA Video Webcast, supra note 72.
104
Id.
105
See Platt Interview, supra note 92.
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and individually negotiated endorsements.106 Broader indemnification
agreements and other forms of liability coverage may further complicate
coverage, leading policyholders and insurers to dispute issues of allocation
and priority of coverage.107 Furthermore, the opinions and requirements of
environmental agencies and regulations may bear upon the interpretation of
environmental insurance policies.108
Given this complex of interrelated obligations, both within a policy
and in related agreements, confusion may arise regarding the interpretation
of a policy’s terms. This section argues that environmental insurance
policies must be considered within the context of multiple agreements, and
proposes a framework for interpreting these policies based on recent
litigation. Under the framework, courts should first determine the policy
terms by considering the relationship between a policy’s standard form
terms and endorsements, which may modify the terms in the standard
contract. Second, courts should evaluate the policy’s exclusions to
determine the intended scope of coverage. While this analysis is done
primarily on the basis of the policy’s language, consideration of other
environmental insurance policies held by the same insured may clarify the
intended scope of each agreement assuming the parties sought to avoid
coverage overlap during drafting. Third, courts should consider broader
business and indemnification agreements, if any, between the insured and
other parties working on the contaminated site covered by the policy.
Fourth and finally, courts should consider how the policy treats agency
preferences and regulatory requirements in determining the application of
the policy terms.
A Pennsylvania case, URS Corporation v. Tristate Environmental
Management Services, illustrates the first element of the framework:
determining the policy’s terms by assessing how the individuallynegotiated endorsements modify the “standard form” coverage.109 This
step helps determine liabilities covered by the environmental insurance
policy, such as cost overruns, harms to people or property resulting from
environmental contamination, or harms to people or property arising from
negligence in the remediation process.110

106

See Howard, supra note 23, at 957-58.
See infra pp. 20-22.
108
See id. at 23-24.
109
See, e.g., URS Corp. v. Tristate Envtl. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 08-154,
2008 WL 2944875, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2008).
110
See id. at *1, 2, 4, 5.
107
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In URS Corporation, URS purchased a PLL policy to cover
liabilities resulting from an environmental remediation project that
included significant drilling.111 The policy’s standard form contained a
broad exclusion for “professional services,” which exempted coverage for
harms caused by negligence during the remediation project to people or
property.112 During the course of drilling, the corporation damaged cables
belonging to Amtrak and was sued for negligence to recover appropriate
damages.113 When URS requested indemnification and defense under its
PLL policy, the insurer disagreed with URS about whether an endorsement
modified the broad standard form exclusion of professional services from
coverage.114
In reaching its decision, the court determined that the policy could
be divided into three parts: the policy declarations, the portion with eight
individually negotiated endorsements, and the standard form.115 The
standard form included a broad exclusion for “professional services,”
excluding coverage for “any professional service, including but not limited
to…. [s]upervision, inspection, construction or project management, quality
control or engineering services” (emphasis omitted).116 But, in one of the
individually negotiated endorsements, the insurer agreed to provide
coverage for professional and contracting services narrowly defined to
include certain environmental consulting services and certain
environmental drilling.117 The court held that the narrower definition in the

111

See id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
113
Id. at *1.
114
Id. at *2-3.
115
See URS Corp., 2008 WL 2944875, at *1 (emphasis omitted).
116
Id. at *2. The professional liability exclusion from general liability
coverage, in pertinent part, reads as follows: “‘Bodily injury’ or ‘property
damage’ arising out of the rendering or failure to render any professional service,
including but not limited to (1) The preparing, approving or failure to prepare or
approve maps, drawings, opinions, recommendations, reports, surveys, change
orders, designs or specifications; (2) Supervision, inspection, construction or
project management, quality control or engineering services . . . .” Id.
117
Id. at *1-2. “This Policy applies to a ‘claim’ based upon or arising out of
the following ‘Professional Services’ or ‘Contracting Services’ only …. ” It then
lists “professional services” and “contracting services,” defining them as
“environmental consulting services” and “environmental drilling and probing
activities,” respectively. Id. at *2.
112
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endorsement should be applied in this instance and that the insurer should
provide indemnification.118
The court’s rationale demonstrates the importance of considering
how a policy’s endorsements modify standard form provisions.119 Courts
should consider what terms the endorsements are meant to modify and read
that modification into the standard form.120 Because the endorsements
represent the individually-negotiated component of the policy, they take
precedence over other terms, including broad exclusions, within the
standard form.121 Thus, endorsements may indicate that the policyholder
may be indemnified for environmental harms—or, as in this case,
accidental or negligent damage to people or property—that would
otherwise be excluded within broad and general standard form
provisions.122
Identifying the scope of a policy’s coverage for
environmental or negligent harms thus relies upon careful consideration of
how endorsements modify standard form coverage.123
Another case, Denihan Ownership Co. v. Commerce and Indus.
Ins. Co., illustrates the second step within the framework for interpreting
environmental insurance policies.124 This step entails consideration of the
scope of policy exclusions, and potentially implicates the interplay between
multiple environmental insurance policies held by the same insured.125 In
Denihan Ownership, the company purchased a PLL policy to supplement a
Cost Cap policy purchased in connection with the remediation of several
parcels of land containing low-rise commercial property, such as a parking
garage, a car repair shop, and a dry cleaner.126 The insured purchased the
insurance policies based on due diligence performed by an environmental
consultant to provide estimates for the land’s remediation.127 During
118

Id. at *3. In fact, the court held that the policy’s definition of “professional
services” was ambiguous and construed the terms in favor of the insured. Id. at *3,
4. Thus, the court applied “contra proferentem” in the case although the parties
were both, arguably, sophisticated and the policy entailed individual negotiations.
See URS Corp., 2008 WL 2944875, at *3; see also infra, Part II. A.
119
See URS Corp., 2008 WL 2944875, at *5.
120
See id.
121
See id.
122
See id. at *4-5.
123
See id. at 4.
124
See, e.g., Denihan Ownership Co., v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 830
N.Y.S.2d 128, 129-30 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).
125
See, e.g., id. at 129.
126
Id.
127
Id.
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remediation, the insured accrued expenses beyond the Cost Cap policy’s
coverage limit. The insured claimed that this excess expense should be
covered under the supplemental PLL policy.128 The insurer denied this
claim.129
Ensuing litigation between these parties illustrates the interplay
between conditions covered under a Cost Cap policy and a PLL policy
purchased by the same insured.130 The policyholder claimed that the
insurer should be required to pay the excess costs of remediation under the
PLL policy, which provided coverage for liabilities arising from “unknown
and unidentified conditions.”131 The excess costs, the policyholder further
argued, derived from “unknown and unidentified” contamination that the
environmental consultants had overlooked, and thus fell within the scope of
the PLL policy’s coverage.132 In contrast, the insurer argued that the
“unknown and unidentified” contamination had been contemplated if not
specifically identified by the reports the environmental consultants
submitted.133 Thus, the insurer urged that the PLL policy, which was not
intended to cover the excess of contemplated remediation costs, should not
be obliged to pay for the costs of remediating the specific conditions at
issue.134 Rather, the Cost Cap policy was specifically intended to cover the
excess costs of remediation; the fact that the policyholder had accrued
excess expenses beyond the Cost Cap policy’s limits did not make the PLL
policy suddenly applicable to liabilities resulting from excess costs.135
Evaluating the language of the PLL policy, and therein considering
its relationship to the Cost Cap policy, the court held for the insurer.136 The
court evaluated the PLL policy’s language, noting that it contained a broad
exclusion of contamination “‘arising from’” pollution conditions in the
environmental consultant’s report.137 The court held that, because the
contamination the insured wanted the PLL supplemental policy to cover
was “contemplated,” if not expressly listed, in the environmental

128

Id.
Id.
130
See Denihan, 830 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Denihan, 830 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
137
Id. at 130.
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consultant’s report, the court said it fell within the broad exclusion’s
scope.138
In reaching this decision, the court cited the existence and scope of
the Cost Cap policy as evidence of the policy’s intended scope. The court
noted that the known condition exclusion “was clearly intended to ensure
no overlap between the underlying [Cost Cap] policy, which provided
coverage for petroleum contamination on the site, and new and different
pollution conditions covered by the [PLL] policy.”139 Thus, even as the
court based its decision on the PLL policy’s language, it gave a nod to the
scope of a sister policy as an interpretive tool in clarifying the intended
scope of the policy in question.140
Indeed, since policies like PLL and Cost Cap insurance are
intended to compliment each other,141 each may contain exclusions that
broadly eliminate risks insured against in a complimentary policy.142 The
exclusions and scope of coverage in one policy can inform the intended
scope of coverage of the other policy.143 In interpreting a policy’s
language, courts may consider the relationship between policies in the same
insurance portfolio to reinforce the intended scope of each policy and
perhaps resolve ambiguities.144 Doing so prevents overlap, ensuring
efficient coverage and giving force to the parties’ original intentions.145
A third consideration when construing ambiguous environmental
insurance policies may entail an assessment of broader indemnification
agreements. A 2001 dispute between General Motors (GM) and American
Ecology illustrates the complicated relationship between environmental
insurance policies and other business agreements held by the same
company.146 GM hired American Ecology, a waste management company,
to dispose of some of its hazardous waste.147 The parties entered into a
138

Id.
Id.
140
Id.
141
See infra Part II.B.
142
See Denihan, 37 A.D.3d at 315.
143
See id.
144
See Denihan, 37 A.D.3d 314.
145
See id. at 315.
146
See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., No. Civ. A
399CV2625L, 2001 WL 1029519 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2001).
147
The predecessor to American Ecology was called Gibraltar. For the
purposes of this case, the two companies are the same entity and the court indeed
uses the two names interchangeably when referring to the waste management
company. See id. at *2, n.4.
139
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mutual indemnification agreement, which included a provision that
American Ecology would secure PLL coverage and name GM as an
additional insured.148 The purpose of this provision was to ensure that GM
would be covered should a toxic tort suit be brought against American
Ecology and, by extension, GM.149 American Ecology purchased PLL
insurance, but failed to name GM as an “additional insured” as stipulated in
the mutual indemnification agreement.150 Thus, GM found itself lacking
indemnification when several hundred plaintiffs brought a toxic tort suit for
improper disposal of GM’s waste and claimed that GM was directly and
vicariously liable for American Ecology’s improper actions.151
In response, GM brought a suit against American Ecology
primarily to recover several hundred thousand dollars in attorneys fees
incurred in defending a declaratory judgment action that the insurer
brought seeking subrogation.152 American Ecology claimed, firstly, that it
was not required to indemnify GM under the agreement because the suit
involved a “mixed” claim of both direct and vicarious liability which was
not stipulated in the contract.153 It also claimed that it was excused from its
contractual obligation to add GM to the PLL policy because the insurer,
Zurich, did not permit the practice of naming “additional insureds” on PLL
policies.154
148

Id., at *2.
See id. Under the indemnification agreement, American Ecology was
required to “obtain and maintain all insurance required herein,” including PLL
policy with a $4,000,000 per occurrence combined single limit for personal injury
and property damage and an $8,000,000 annual aggregate limit. Id., at *2, *11.
Additionally, American Ecology was required to purchase a CGL with a
$5,000,000 per occurrence combined single limit, and an Automobile Liability
insurance policy with a $5,000,000 per occurrence combined single limit. Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. For details pertaining to the underlying toxic tort case against American
Ecology and GM, see Virgie Adams v. American Ecology Environmental Services
Corp., Cause No. 236-165224-96, in the 236th Judicial District Court in Tarrant
County, Texas.
152
See Gen. Motors Corp., 2001 WL 1029519, at *8. ("GM contends that it
incurred . . . $505,800.45 in attorneys' fees and expenses including guardian ad
litem fees, expert witness fees, jount counsel fees and fees incurred in . . . [the
Zurich litigation].").
153
Id., at *5.
154
Id. (noting that Zurich, in fact, does not add clients of principal
policyholders as additional insureds on their environmental impairment liability
policies because it would “broaden the coverage of the policy to an unacceptable
degree”). Id., at *12.
149
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The court rejected American Ecology’s arguments regarding its
responsibilities under both the mutual indemnification provision and the
PLL policy.155 The court interpreted the company’s responsibilities under
the mutual indemnification agreement to require indemnification of GM
and an obligation to purchase a PLL policy with GM as a named insured,
absent notice to GM to the contrary.156 The court remanded the case for a
factual determination of damages GM incurred as a result of American
Ecology’s failure to name it as an additional insured on a PLL policy.157
In this case, the court determined a party’s responsibility to obtain
environmental insurance on the basis of a broader indemnification
agreement, thereby illustrating the need for courts to take other business
agreements into account.158 These other agreements may inform the issue
of coverage and will, in particular, shed light on the liabilities parties
agreed to incur as part of a project.159 The sheer number of interrelated
business agreements may make this process complicated. However, the
exercise may frequently be worthwhile considering the immense liabilities
that a party left without coverage may face.160
Finally, courts should consider a fourth element when construing
the terms of an environmental insurance policy.161 Unless terms expressly
exclude the risk that agency preferences and regulatory requirements may
impact the costs a policyholder incurs at a covered site, such costs should
be covered under the policy.162 Because environmental contamination is
subject to numerous regulations and is under the auspices of both state and
federal agencies, a contaminated site may be subject to more stringent, or
simply different, remediation requirements than the parties originally
anticipated.163
For example, environmental agencies may set new
remediation requirements or play a role in choosing the course of site
clean-up.164 As a result, many environmental insurance policies take the
future determinations of environmental agencies into account because
155

Id.
Id., at *13. (holding that the only way American Ecology could be excused
from naming GM as an additional insured was by providing notice that it was
unable to do so within 30 days, but that such notice was not provided in this case).
157
Id., at *14.
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See Gen. Motors Corp., 2001 WL 1029519, at * ___.
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See id.
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See id.
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See, e.g., Frazer, 2005 WL 2850247, at *1.
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See, e.g., id.
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agency opinions and regulations may directly alter the scope of risk.165
Litigation may emerge as to whether a policy should cover liabilities
arising from changes in the law governing remediation where the policy
does not expressly account for this contingency or does so ambiguously.166
For example, in Frazer Exton Development v. Kemper
Environmental, Kemper refused an insurance claim under an environmental
insurance policy because the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
required that the policyholder undertake remediation measures that Kemper
maintained were not covered by the policy.167 The insured, Frazer, argued
that the policy included Cost Cap coverage for any remedy the EPA
required.168 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's order finding for Frazer, holding that the policy provided broad Cost
Cap coverage subject to EPA-selected remedies.169 The court based its
holding on its reading of the policy language, which it held to be
unambiguous, but stated that it would have reached the same result even
had ambiguity existed.170 The court noted, “[e]ven if the policy is
ambiguous, the outcome is dictated by the principle of interpretation known
as contra proferentem.”171 Thus, the court held that all ambiguities in the
insurance policy should be construed in favor of the insured.172 Moreover,
it acknowledged the need for environmental insurance policies to cover
liabilities arising from changes in law where the policy does not expressly
exclude such risks.173
Complicated relationships exist between an environmental
insurance policy’s standard form and endorsements, complimentary
environmental insurance policies, other agreements between parties, and
the laws that influence remediation requirements. This complicated
landscape creates substantial room for misunderstanding, conflicting
information and expectations, and, thus, litigation. Courts must be
prepared to navigate these relationships when determining coverage.
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See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., id.
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KNOWN AND UNKNOWN CONDITIONS LITIGATION

Another litigious area relates to the issue of “known condition”
exclusions. This section provides background about the role of the “known
condition” exclusion in environmental insurance policies. It then details
litigation that has emerged over the exclusion, and argues that courts
should construe these conditions in a manner consistent with the doctrine of
contra proferentem so that insurers feel compelled to play an informationforcing role during negotiations. Finally, this section discusses litigation
involving claims of misrepresentation of “known conditions” and again
argues that placing the burden on the insurer to clearly identify known
conditions will reduce claims of misrepresentation by giving the insurer
added incentive to seek information during negotiations.
A.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE “KNOWN CONDITION” EXCLUSION

Environmental insurance policies typically exclude coverage of
pollution liabilities that are known to the insured at the time the policy is
purchased.174 During the risk assessment and negotiation stage of issuing a
policy, the insurer has particular incentive to identify, and broadly define,
“known conditions” to minimize the scope of future liabilities.175
Likewise, the insured has the incentive to narrowly define “known
conditions,” to ensure coverage for as many liabilities as possible down the
road.
To trigger the “known condition” exclusion, specified employees176
must have known or reasonably foreseen that the pre-existing condition
would give rise to a claim under the policy.177 The term typically excludes
from coverage all otherwise covered liabilities “[a]rising from Pollution
Conditions existing prior to the Inception Date and known by a
Responsible Insured and not disclosed in the application for” this policy or
a renewing policy.178 Through this exclusion, insurers seek to eliminate
174

See Howard, supra note 24, at 973; see also DYBDAHL, supra note 7, at 31.
See infra Introduction.
176
DYBDAHL, supra note 7, at 31 (“To provide a reasonable degree of
protection for the insurer without eliminating all pre-existing conditions, EIL
policies commonly exclude only those pre-existing conditions that are known to an
individual or a group of designated persons. The exclusion usually limits the list
of employees who must have knowledge of pre-existing conditions to (1) those
directly responsible for environmental affairs or (2) senior managers.”).
177
Id.
178
Howard, supra note 24, at 973.
175
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coverage where the policyholder anticipated a claim.179 The goal is thus to
avoid moral hazard rather than to eliminate coverage simply because the
insurer “should have anticipated” a particular, coverable occurrence.180
The “known condition” exclusion implicates the common law
“known loss doctrine,” which stands for the principle that an insurer should
not be obliged to assume losses known or reasonably knowable to the
policyholder, but not to the insurer, at the time a policy is purchased.181
This doctrine, in turn, derives from the “fortuity principle” which states that
all risks or losses insured against must be fortuitous or contingent.182 Lack
of contingency necessarily negates insurance coverage given that insurance
is, at its fundamental level, a “method of managing risk by distributing it
among numbers of individuals or enterprises” where risk means “the
possibility of injury or loss.”183 Where a loss is “known,” a “possibility” of
injury or loss is no longer possible, but certain, and insurance is thus no
longer appropriate.184
Though uncontroversial in itself, the fortuity principle resulted in
litigation when applied to CGL pollution coverage suits that predated
separate environmental insurance coverage.185 These suits led to divergent
applications between courts and substantial confusion.186 Under CGL
policies, the difficulties in application arose because of the information
asymmetry that often occurs when purchasing or issuing an insurance
policy.187 An applicant might seek to transfer a loss he knows has already
occurred or is likely to occur to an insurer that believes the loss is still a
contingent event.188 Obliging an insurer to pay for an event that was not
179

DYBDAHL, supra note 7, at 31.
Id.
181
Howard, supra note 24, at 973.
182
See Richard L. Freuhauf, Note, The Cost of Knowledge: Making Sense of
“Nonfortuity” Defenses in Environmental Liability Insurance Coverage Disputes,
84 VA. L. REV. 107, 112 (1998).
183
Id. at 111 (internal citations omitted).
184
See id. at 118. (“[T]he known loss doctrine is the most straightforward
application of the fortuity principle among the three non-fortuity defenses.”).
185
See id. at 110.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 112.
188
A frequently cited case on this point is Summers v. Harris, 573 F.29 869
(5th Cir. 1978), in which the insured attempted to claim indemnification under a
flood insurance policy that he purchased after floodwaters had reached within a
few feet of his home. The court barred coverage under the loss-in-progress rule.
See id. at 115, n.37. Another classic example of this danger is when an insured
180
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actually contingent would disregard the bargain the parties struck, which
was to exchange a certain premium for the chance that a loss might occur
later.189 Hence, the fortuity principle is necessary to ensure that the
policyholder does not exploit the information asymmetry to his
advantage.190
Environmental insurance policies are no less prone to abuse
concerning information asymmetry and thus run-ins with the fortuity
principle than CGL or any other type of insurance policy.191 Typical cases
surrounding the known conditions exclusion fall into two categories.
In the first category, the insurer argues that a claim brought by the
insured was a “known” condition, thus exempt from coverage. This section
argues that courts should apply a narrow definition of “known condition”
through the doctrine of contra proferentem where the exclusion is
ambiguous and the insurer is in a superior position to play an informationforcing role during due diligence and negotiations.
In the second category, the insurer acknowledges that the liability
was “unknown,” as defined by the policy, but argues that the insured in fact
knew about the liability and misrepresented the facts (and thus the risk) to
the insurer.192 This section again argues that courts should give deference
to the policyholder because of the difficulty of identifying material facts
without the benefit of hindsight. Doing so would place the burden on the
insurer to request all relevant information during negotiations and bring
greater clarity to cases involving misrepresentation. However, in both
types of dispute, courts may be justified in limiting their application of
contra proferentem where the bargaining power and familiarity with
environmental risks is relatively equal between the parties.193

attempts to collect on a fire insurance policy that he purchased after learning his
property was destroyed by fire. Id. at 112.
189
See id. at 112.
190
Id. (“The potential for a policyholder to exploit the information asymmetry
inherent in the insurance contract by fraudulently seeking indemnification for a
loss that the carrier did not bargain to insure is the rationale for the ‘fortuity’
requirement in all insurance contracts, as well as for the doctrines of concealment
and misrepresentation found in general contract law.”)
191
See id.
192
See, e.g., Goldenberg Dev. Corp. v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill., No. CIV. A.
00-CV-3055, 2001 WL 872944 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (discussing insurer’s argument that
insured allegedly did not give insurer engineering reports saying that there was
substantial underground trash that would result ins significant remediation costs).
193
RICHARD A. LORD, 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 32:12 (4th ed. 2008).
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LITIGATION ABOUT THE DEFINITION OF A “KNOWN CONDITION”

Disagreement over whether a condition is “known” at the time a
policy was purchased arises because of the difficulty in defining
environmental risks, given the uniqueness and complexity of conditions on
any given property.194 Early in the development of the environmental
insurance market, experts urged insurers to develop a clear set of standards
for evaluating environmental risks.195 While insurers have certainly heeded
this recommendation, as evidenced by the substantial data collection
required during the negotiation of an environmental insurance contract,
obtaining “clear” standards is a lofty goal considering the context.196 When
an insurer issues a policy for, say, car insurance, it may collect information
from the insured pertaining to age, location, demographics, car type and
age, and more. This data can be used to facilitate the underwriting process,
because the insurer can compare it to reams of like-data and determine
relative risks.
In contrast, when an insurer negotiates an environmental insurance
policy, it is assessing risk in a relative vacuum.197 Certainly, it may collect
large quantities of data from the insured about the site to determine what,
exactly, represents a risk on that location.198 But, no comparable sites, with
the same soil, water tables, and use history, necessarily exist.199 Although,
“[g]eneral procedures for dealing with contaminated site evaluation and
remediation have been developed . . . the wide variety of natural site
conditions and release characteristics have made it difficult to establish
useful databases” to assist actuaries in evaluating the risk being
transferred.200 Absent comparable sites, insurers have difficulty assessing
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See Anderson, supra note 50, at 137; see also David E. Langseth, Valuing
Environmental Remediation Liability Transfers, 20 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 2, 2–3 (Jan.
2008).
195
See, e.g., Paul K. Freeman & Howard Kunreuther, The Roles of Insurance
and Well-Specified Standards in Dealing with Environmental Risks, 17
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECON. 517 (1996).
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See, e.g., id.
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See Langseth, supra note 194, at 2–3.
198
See id.
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See id.
200
See id. (noting that “[t]his situation has led some insurance companies to
adopt site-specific approaches, of varying degrees of sophistication, for assessing
[risk values] and created considerable variability in pricing methods for
remediation cost cap insurance”)
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what other conditions might exist and how great the risk might be for this
particular site verses any other.201
Facing this relative actuarial void, insurers wish to construe
“known” risks broadly, implicating anything alluded to in initial surveys
and data collection.202 Meanwhile, policyholders typically define the term
“known conditions” literally, referring to specific contamination or risks
clearly identified, defined, and labeled on a site map at the time of the
initial surveys and data collection.203 These divergent definitions of
“known conditions” have lead to litigation construing the meaning of the
exclusion in different situations.
For example, in Denihan Ownership Co., discussed supra,204 the
policyholder and the insured were essentially litigating the breadth of the
definition of a “known condition” in addition to the issue of whether the
PLL policy or the Cost Cap policy provided the appropriate coverage.205
Whereas the policyholder claimed that storage tanks not specifically
identified in the environmental consultant’s reports should be considered
unknown conditions, the insurer argued that the possibility of discovering
additional storage tanks had been contemplated by the report and were thus
excludable known conditions.206 In this case, the court agreed with the
insurer, adopting a broad definition of “known conditions.”207 The holding
suggests that, because additional conditions similar to those already
discovered were reasonably foreseeable to the insured and the insurer, they
may be deemed “known” for the purposes of the policy.208
In contrast, the court in Chambliss v. Commerce and Industry
Insurance Company refused to adopt a broad definition of “knowledge,”
holding that knowledge should be handled as an issue of fact.209 This
holding leaves open the possibility that a narrow, technical definition of
knowledge will be applied in some cases. In this case, Chambliss owned
property with underground storage tanks.210 Inspectors of the property told
Chambliss that they suspected a leak from one of the storage tanks and
201

See id.
See id. at 204.
203
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recommended that Chambliss seek laboratory analysis for confirmation.211
Before receiving the laboratory results, Chambliss purchased storage tank
third-party liability and Cost Cap coverage, stating on the application
questionnaire that no known conditions—that is, contamination from the
storage tanks—existed on the property.212 When laboratory reports
confirmed that one of the storage tanks was leaking, Chambliss submitted a
claim to its insurer, which denied coverage on the basis that Chambliss had
misrepresented what known conditions were on the property when it
applied for coverage.213
In the subsequent litigation, Chambliss argued that
coverage for the clean-up hinged on “its knowledge of a
confirmed release . . . at the time of applying for that
coverage.”214
The company urged that “only an
investigation and confirmation of a release can elevate a
pollution condition to a confirmed release.”215 Since the
laboratory results had not confirmed a release at the time
Chambliss applied for coverage, the company argued that
it did not misrepresent its knowledge of pollution
conditions.216 The insurer, in turn, argued that knowledge
under the policy included a reasonable expectation of a
pollution condition, which should have had because of the
inspectors recommendation to obtain additional testing.217
The court ultimately declined “to issue summary judgment on the
issue of knowledge.”218 However, the court might have more accurately
held that it declined to issue summary judgment on the definition of
knowledge—which was really the point in dispute. The parties did not
disagree over the relevant facts, but over whether those facts gave rise to
“knowledge” within the meaning of the policy, which included a
reasonable expectation of a pollution condition within its definition.219
211
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Taking the definition of the policy, the court might have asked: could the
company have reasonably expected the laboratory tests to come back
positive for contamination from the storage tanks given the findings of the
inspector prior to applying for the insurance policy? Because the court left
the issue of knowledge as a factual determination subject to ambiguity, it
refused to issue a holding as to whether the definition of known condition
should be construed narrowly or broadly.220
Although the facts of this case suggest that Chambliss was relying
on a technicality to avoid liability for a foreseeable future risk, the court
might have been justified in adopting a narrow definition of “knowledge.”
A narrow definition of a known condition would be consistent with the
judicial doctrine of contra proferentem, which states that all ambiguities in
a contract should be interpreted against the insurer.221 The general
justification for contra proferentem is that insurers had the benefit of
drafting the document, and thus should not receive any benefit from
ambiguous terms they incorporated.222 This justification holds less force
with environmental insurance policies because they are often rigorously
negotiated by both sides.223 Indeed, as previously discussed, it is uncertain
whether this doctrine is applicable in the environmental insurance context
because they have negotiated components in addition to the standard
form.224
However, contra proferentem may be justified in many
environmental insurance cases where the policyholder is not a repeat
player, does not hold a portfolio of contaminated sites, and may lack the
expertise necessary to identify material information that the insurer fails to
request. Insurers typically are repeat players in issuing environmental
insurance and therefore have an advantage in understand the risks of
environmental remediation over policyholders that are relative novices.
While some policyholders may be able to spread their environmental risks
across a portfolio of brownfields, insurers often have the unique advantage
of being able to spread risk across many sites. Moreover, insurers may
not disclosed in the application for the Policy, if the Insured knew or reasonably
could have expected that such Pollution Condition could give rise to a Claim,
Corrective Action or Cleanup.”) (emphasis added).
220
See id.
221
See Waeger, supra note 73.
222
LORD, supra note 194, §32:12.
223
Id.; see also, DeMeo, supra note 40.
224
However, the Second Circuit has applied it in this context, creating
persuasive precedent for other jurisdictions. See Frazer, 2004 WL 1752580, at *2.
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have far more knowledge of brownfields generally because of their status
as repeat players issuing coverage for many sites at any given time. As a
result, insurers are better able to identify uncertainty when negotiating a
policy. Their superior ability to know what questions to ask about a site
and what uncertainty remains even after the questions have been answered
justifies placing pressure on them to identify known conditions as clearly
and narrowly in the policies they issue. Given that uncertainty is
inevitable, clear drafting of known conditions will at least encourage the
highest quality risk assessment and potentially avoid unnecessary litigation
due to ambiguity. Litigation about knowledge of a pre-existing condition
would thus become limited to cases involving misrepresentation on the part
of the policyholder. Application of contra proferentem in this context may
be less justified where the bargaining power and familiarity with
environmental sites is relatively equal between the parties, such as where
the policyholder has a portfolio of properties and routinely purchases
environmental coverage.
C.

THE KNOWN CONDITION EXCLUSION AND
MISREPRESENTATION DISPUTES

The second category of “known condition” litigation contains
misrepresentation cases. In such cases, one party fails to disclose
information that is material to the decision to enter into the policy, but that
is not otherwise reasonably ascertainable by the other party.225 The
contract law principle that dictates misrepresentation and concealment void
contract obligations also applies to insurance policy misrepresentation
cases.226 To prevail in court on a denial of coverage because of
misrepresentation, an insurer must prove that: 1) the representation was
untrue or misleading, 2) it was material to the risk transferred, and 3) it was
relied upon by the insurer in writing the policy at an agreed-upon
premium.227
The facts of Goldenberg Development Corporation v. Reliance
Insurance Company of Illinois perfectly illustrate the relationship between
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“known conditions” and misrepresentation.228 In this case, Goldenberg
sought summary judgment regarding whether Reliance had breached a Cost
Cap policy purchased to protect against unforeseen remediation costs for a
number of Goldenberg’s development sites.229 Reliance’s underwriters
granted a policy extension for the site in question, which was purchased
after the issuance of the initial policy.230 They did so after Goldenberg
provided them with a summary report of the land’s conditions that
indicated “no further action” was needed to remedy any problems
regarding construction debris, woodchips, and chemicals found in the
soil.231
After the insurer extended the policy to cover the site, however,
Goldenberg performed additional environmental review and discovered
significant “solid waste,” including tires, telephone poles, and appliances,
which required expensive remediation.232 Goldenberg filed a claim under
its environmental insurance policy that Reliance denied on the basis of the
policy’s “known conditions” exclusion.233 The term excluded coverage for
losses arising from conditions that pre-dated the policy and known to
Goldenberg employees responsible for environmental affairs, unless “all
material facts relating to the pollution conditions were disclosed to [the
insurer] prior to the inception of this Policy.”234 In this instance,
Goldenberg had disclosed a summary report, but not two reports with
further detail, which were cited in the summary but not fully provided to
Reliance.235
Reliance claimed that Goldenberg’s failure to disclose these reports
constituted misrepresentation because they contained evidence that
suggested additional, costly remediation was necessary.236 Goldenberg
countered that the reports had been appropriately disclosed because they
were expressly cited in the summary report, and that Reliance could have
asked to see them had it needed more information to effectively underwrite
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Goldenberg Dev. Corp. v. Reliance Ins. Co., No. 00-CV-3055, 2001 U.S.
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the policy extension.237 Goldenberg further argued that the detail about the
debris contained in the two reports had been sufficiently integrated into the
summary, which referred to the presence of “trash” and thus contained
language that unambiguously encapsulated the debris eventually
uncovered.238
Ultimately, the court denied summary judgment to the insurer,
Reliance, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding
whether the details contained in the reports, namely the presence of smallscale trash on the property, were relevant to the underwriting decision and
barred coverage because they were not disclosed.239 The court also rejected
Reliance’s request for summary judgment under the known loss doctrine,
holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Goldenberg could reasonably have foreseen the costs incurred for the
cleanup based on the additional reports which suggested relatively less
expensive remediation measures than were ultimately required.240
The facts of this case and its subsequent appeal241 reveal the
difficulty in determining the materiality of information where there is at
once a flood of facts and an inability to know what those facts signify in the
big picture.242 Parties may have plenty of information on a property and
237

Id. Goldenberg also argued that the reports in question were immaterial to
the claim under the policy because they did not identify the larger solid waste
items and recommended a remediation technique that was significantly less
expensive than what was ultimately required. Id.
238
Id.
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Id., at *2. (The existence of smaller-scale trash may or may not have been
material to the policy extension, since the possibility of additional cost may or may
not have influenced defendant's determination of the premium, or the decision to
issue the policy extension in the first place. When, as here, reasonable minds can
differ on the question of the materiality of a fact, materiality is a question for the
fact-finder, rather than a question of law for the court and summary judgment is
inappropriate.).
240
Goldenberg I, supra note 233, at *7 (applying the standard, “The ‘known
loss' doctrine precludes insurance coverage of a loss when the insured knew or
reasonably should have known of a likely exposure to losses which would reach
the level of coverage.”)
241
See Goldenberg Dev. Corp. v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill., No. Civ. A. 00-CV3055, 2001 WL 872782 (E.D. Pa., June 26, 2001) (denying appeal of summary
judgment because affadavit from underwriter stating that she “would have wanted
to see the information contained in the [undisclosed] reports” does not establish
that the information was material to the policy as a matter of law). [hereinafter
Goldenberg II].
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even information pertaining to a hypothetical future claim, but limited
means to sort out what will eventually be material and what will remain
irrelevant.243 Thus, what is “known” has a shifting form—knowledge of
facts that will eventually be relevant to a future claim becomes different
from knowledge that the future claim is probable.244 As in Goldenberg,
knowledge that small trash exists could seem irrelevant until one knows
that there is also large trash on the site, which suddenly makes the small
trash a clue to the unknown bigger problems.245 Absent hindsight, it is hard
to know whether the knowledge of the small trash would meet the
materiality test by influencing an insurer’s decision to issue a policy,
evaluate the degree and character of risk on the site, and determine an
appropriate premium.246 The question thus becomes whether hindsight
should be allowed to influence a court’s evaluations of what undisclosed
known facts are material.
An almost identical dispute to Goldenberg arose in Technology
Square, again illustrating the fine line between misrepresenting known
information and not recognizing the relevance of facts.247 In this case,
United National Insurance Company (UNIC) alleged that a policyholder,
Technology Square, misrepresented material facts in an application for
pollution liability insurance to cover a piece of property with a history of
“heavy industrial” use, first as a soap factory, then as a hose factory, and
lastly a gas station.248 Technology Square provided UNIC with a report
chronicling this history.249 On the policy application questionnaire,
Technology Square referred to the report in response to a question asking
whether it was “aware of any circumstances which may reasonably be
expected to give rise to a claim under this policy?”250
Other insurers, with the same report and similar applications, either
refused to issue a policy for the site or would do so only for a very high
premium.251 For example, an AIG Environmental underwriter described
the site as “pretty gnarly” and would not provide coverage out of concern
243
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for “the amount of contamination on the site.”252 Likewise, a Kemper
Environmental underwriter expressed concern about the potential
environmental issues and gave a high premium quote because, absent
additional investigation, he would be issuing the insurance using a “cross
your fingers technique.”253
UNIC, however, extended insurance to Technology Square for
“significantly” less than other offers.254 At no point did UNIC request
additional information about the level of environmental damage or the
likelihood of significant remediation becoming necessary.255 Yet, when
presented with a claim for the overrun of costs for remediating the
property, UNIC denied the claim, stating that coverage was limited by a
“known conditions” exclusion and that Technology Square had failed to
turn over material information—namely, internal documents discussing the
due diligence report handed over to UNIC—when applying for the
insurance.256 Technology Square argued that the full due diligence report
had been disclosed and that the contents of the report were “coextensive”
with their knowledge of the material facts about the property’s condition.
It further argued that UNIC “was capable of deriving from the [report] the
same conclusions and speculations about the pollution conditions on the
property as those contained in” the internal documents that Technology
Square did not turn over.
Considering whether withholding these documents was a material
misrepresentation as a matter of law,257 the court held that “the conclusions
that an environmental professional could have drawn from the Phase I
Report were various” and that it could not be determined as a matter of law,
252
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even with deference to Technology Square, on a motion for summary
judgment.258 The court further held that it could not decide whether the
claim was for a “known condition” on summary judgment “while the facts
that form the basis for providing coverage are in dispute.”259 The court
determined that both the materiality of the information and whether the
facts constituted information about “known conditions” were questions of
fact for the jury.260
Thus, in both Goldenberg and Technology Square the court
determined that the materiality of the information withheld and whether
that information was related to a “known condition” were questions of
fact.261 In both cases, the courts might better have considered who should
bear responsibility for identifying and carefully defining known conditions.
The party bearing this responsibility would shoulder the burden of seeking
out additional information pertaining to the site, requesting additional due
diligence if the scope of the risk was particularly unclear, and sifting
through relevant and irrelevant information to ensure accurate underwriting
and unambiguous policy terms.
This approach would be in line with the policyholders’ arguments
in Goldenberg and Technology Square. In those cases the policyholders
argued that the insurers should bear the burden of seeking additional
information about risk.262 The implication of this argument is that a
policyholder cannot misrepresent facts that it simply failed to recognize as
important and that, if the insurer wants this information, it should ask for
all the available data. The insurer should not be allowed to claim
misrepresentation when, in retrospect, it wishes it had known certain facts
but never asked for such information—even though it knew more reports
and data were available.
Put more simply, the insurer should bear the burden of filtering
through all the information in the name of efficiency. If all reports are
requested and the insured does not turn over certain documents, the case for
misrepresentation of known conditions would be relatively clear. If all the
258
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reports are requested and turned over, and the insurer fails to identify preexisting conditions from the reams of data, ignorance of the pre-existing
condition becomes similarly clear. After all, the insurer is the repeat player
with respect to performing risk assessment, and if it does not identify a risk
when it has all relevant information, it would be hard to attribute superior
knowledge to the insured. Moreover, the insurer has the incentive to
broadly define the known condition, whereas the insured may choose to
turn a skeptical eye on the relevance and implications of the facts before
them. The result would be fewer cases going to trial, because the scope of
known information would reside in the hands of an insurance underwriter,
rather than the subjective hands of the policyholder.
A recent complaint by the Los Angeles Unified School District
against AIG illustrates how this scenario might play out in practice. The
school district was engaging in a school rehabilitation and construction
project for which it purchased a PLL policy, which also contained Cost Cap
provisions, from AIG after a bidding process. During negotiations, AIG
agreed to assume responsibility for identifying all “known conditions” and
to include policy endorsements expressly listing those conditions.263 The
goal of this arrangement was to provide the school district with certainty
that no dispute would later arise about whether a condition was known or
unknown at the time the Policy was issued.264 According to the school
district’s complaint, the policy included two endorsements containing
exhaustive lists of known pollution conditions.265 AIG initially denied
certain claims as known conditions, but entered into settlement negotiations
with the school district after the initial complaint was filed.266
The case thus demonstrates the effectiveness of assigning the
responsibility of identifying known conditions to the insurer.267 The
approach clarifies what conditions should be deemed “known” under the
policy, by producing the standard that anything the insurer failed to identify
as a pre-existing condition is unknown for the purposes of the policy,
assuming the policyholder turned over all requested information. Where
the insurer has the upfront responsibility of delineating what is “known” by
collecting all pertinent information, the insurer has added incentive to play
an information-forcing role. It cannot, after a claim is produced, argue that
the insured should have more clearly called attention to facts suggesting
263
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additional risk because the responsibility of doing so rested with its
underwriters. Misrepresentation cases will thus be limited to those
situations where the insured withheld explicitly requested information.
Applying contra proferentem to policies and adopting a narrow
definition of “known conditions,” discussed earlier, would compliment
burden-shifting the identification of known conditions to the insurer. With
the responsibility of identifying known conditions and the knowledge that
the conditions will be narrowly defined, insurers will assume responsibility
for drafting clearer, specific terms. Furthermore, the insurer may feel
compelled to set rigorous due diligence standards and disclosure
requirements of all environmental reports. Having thorough information
on the table will reduce the gray area between known and unknown
conditions that are leading to litigation.
V.

CONCLUSION: A TALE OF THREE BROWNFIELDS

As environmental insurance policies continue to play a key role in
the redevelopment of brownfields, courts should be aware of the policies’
unique role relative to other liability coverage. Courts should interpret the
terms of a policy in light of its relationship to its endorsements, while
considering complimentary policies and regulatory influences. When
construing its terms, particularly those pertaining to “known conditions,”
the court should generally apply contra proferentem to encourage the
insurer to play an information-forcing role while underwriting the policies.
However, courts may wish to exercise their discretion and not apply contra
proferentem where the policyholder is sophisticated and experienced with
brownfield rehabilitation.
An illustration of three brownfield projects may elucidate how the
recommendations of this Note might play out in practice. In each example,
the court should first look to the policy language for guidance, analyzing
the relationship between the endorsements and the standard form, perhaps
considering complimentary policies for further guidance, and also taking
into account relevant regulatory issues. Should ambiguities remain, the
court must assess whether application of contra proferentem is justified.
At one extreme, Brownfield A is a “light” brownfield with little
suspected contamination. The site’s developer does not usually deal with
contaminated properties and purchases a PLL policy to cover possible
liabilities, including clean up of “unknown” conditions. Remediation is not
anticipated to be costly enough to justify the purchase of a Cost Cap policy
to cover cost overruns in remediating “known” conditions. Since initial
due diligence reveals little evidence of contamination other than some
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trash, the insurer and developer agree on a policy with relatively few
negotiated endorsements. Then, the developer discovers an oil barrel
among the trash that has been leaking into the soil. The insurer refuses to
cover the clean-up, arguing that the harm was caused by a “known
condition,” namely the trash on the property. In this situation, a court
would be justified in applying contra proferentem to the “known
conditions” exclusion and holding that the spilled oil was not “known” for
the purposes of the PLL policy. The bargaining power between the parties
was relatively unequal and the policy had few individually negotiated
components. And, unlike the insurer, the policyholder was not a repeat
player and did not own a portfolio of sites. The insurer was thus in a better
position to clarify the environmental risks and to ask questions about what
due diligence might be necessary, assuming an information-forcing role.
On the opposite extreme, Brownfield B is a site with more
substantial suspected contamination. The developer is a large multinational
corporation that is currently remediating ten brownfields nation-wide and
has successfully developed one hundred brownfields in the past twenty
years. After substantial due diligence, the developer holds a series of
meetings between its project managers, lawyers, and environmental
consultants and representatives of its insurer. The parties discuss and
thoroughly negotiate expanding the developer’s current PLL policy to
cover Brownfield B and obtain a Cost Cap policy for the same purpose.
The developer performs further due diligence at the prompting of the
insurer, and the parties carefully identify the site’s “known conditions”
before issuing coverage. Thereafter, a dispute arises over whether the
developer misrepresented its knowledge of four storage tanks not marked
on a map turned over to the insurer. A court in this case would be justified
in refusing to apply contra proferentem because both parties were in a
position of familiarity with environmental remediation and insurance
policies.
Less justification thus exists for placing the burden of
information-forcing on the insurer.
Somewhere along the middle of the spectrum is Brownfield C
which has substantial contamination and a sophisticated developer
remediating it. The developer has redeveloped several brownfields in the
past, but does not have a portfolio of properties. When a known condition
dispute arises over insurance coverage for this site, the court will have a
more difficult task than with Brownfield A and B in assessing whether
contra proferentem is appropriate. Factors the court might consider would
be the relative sophistication of the developer and the extent of the
developer’s experience with brownfield rehabilitation. The court could
also consider whether the insurer failed to perform adequate due diligence
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in the underwriting or if the policyholder misrepresented information it
should reasonably have known would be relevant to assessing the site’s
risks.
Generally speaking, courts may wish to give deference to the
policyholder, and apply contra proferentem unless the policyholder is truly
as sophisticated in assessing environmental risks as the insurer. Greater
predictability regarding interpretation considerations and reduced litigation
over potentially ambiguous terms will enhance environmental insurance’s
appeal as a tool for managing risk when redeveloping brownfields.
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THE LIABILITY INSURANCE REGULATION OF
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AFTER THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
SEXUAL ABUSE SCANDAL
Alana Bartley1
INTRODUCTION
Both religion and insurance play important roles in the lives of
many around the world. And while one may never think of religion and
insurance as being interrelated, they can both be seen as serving the same
underlying purpose. As William Sumner has suggested, religion is an
ancient form of insurance, since mankind “has tried in all ages somehow to
insure himself – to take out a ‘policy’ of some sort on which he has paid
regular premiums in some form of self-denial or sacrifice.”2 This view
presents an interesting comparison when considering the role of insurance
in the sexual abuse scandal of the Roman Catholic Church.
The sexual abuse scandal within the Roman Catholic Church
occurred in two distinct waves.3 The first instance in which knowledge of
clergy sexual abuse became public was in the 1980s, when accounts of
molestation by a widely-regarded priest in Louisiana surfaced in the
media.4 Yet, like most news phenomena, the stories eventually faded from
the news until another resurgence occurred in the 2000s.5 In 2002, many
people throughout the United States began coming forward with allegations
that they had been victims of sexual misconduct by Roman Catholic
priests. 6 There were so many allegations that it was impossible for Church
officials to dispute the claims of sexual misconduct.7 Although similar
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

J.D. Candidate, University of Connecticut School of Law, 2010; B.A.,
College of the Holy Cross, 2007.
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See Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A
Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 47980 (1961) (quoting SUMNER & KELLER, THE SCIENCE OF SOCIETY 749 (1927)).
3
See infra text accompanying notes 25 to 68.
4
See infra text accompanying notes 25 to 37.
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See infra text accompanying notes 38 to 68.
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Nearly 200 people have come forward so far–all alleging that they were
abused by the same priest, Father John J. Geoghan. See THE INVESTIGATIVE STAFF
OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, BETRAYAL: THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 6
(Little, Brown & Co. 2008). However, Geoghan was one of many priests who
committed acts of sexual misconduct against parishioners. Id.
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See infra text accompanying notes 56 to 61.
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allegations had been previously made public, the shear number of
allegations arising at this time and the extensive media coverage of these
stories of sexual misconduct made it seem like clergy sexual abuse was a
relatively new problem for religious institutions;8 however, allegations of
sexual misconduct by members of the Roman Catholic clergy were not a
recent phenomenon, 9 and allegations have plagued other religious groups
as well.10 One study conducted estimated that approximately four percent
of all Catholic priests serving between 1950 and 2002 have been accused of
sexual misconduct.11 The problem of sexual misconduct by priests within
the Catholic Church was even confirmed by the repeated apologies of Pope
John Paul II.12
As victims of clergy sexual abuse came forward, courts became
overwhelmed with the unique legal issues the sexual abuse cases
presented.13 When the first wave of accusations arose in the 1980s, diocese
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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See infra text accompanying notes 42 to 45.
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Need for Power, Misplaced Sexual Urges Play Roles, DEMOCRAT & CHRON.
(Rochester, N.Y.), Aug. 18, 2002, at 10A (featuring decades-old accusations of
abuse against a Capuchin priest); Draft Survey: 4,450 Priests Accused of Sex
Abuse, CNN, Feb. 17, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/02/16/church.abuse/
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2002).
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possessed general liability insurance to cover injuries occurring on church
property.14 One of the main issues within the cases arising during this time
was whether the general liability insurance for the Churches covered the
lawsuits and injuries arising out of the priest’s sexual misconduct.15 Often,
this question rested on the Court’s interpretation of the definition of
“occurrence,”16 which is commonly defined as “an ‘accident’ that ‘results
in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured.”17 Courts found that the question of whether
there is coverage turns on the Court’s interpretation of what is an “accident
. . . neither expected nor intended.”18 Courts have reached varying
outcomes on this issue.19 As a result, liability insurance companies began
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
church and state; how would courts be willing to extend applicable statute of
limitations in instances where victims' memories of abuse were recovered only
after years of repression; how should criminal penalties and civil sanctions be
adjusted to address the particularly heinous nature of these acts; how would further
governmental oversight of internal church activities be implemented to interrupt
the common church practice of nonreporting the allegations filed by parishioners;
how would courts mandate that the Catholic diocese's insurance carriers indemnify
any awards to abuse victims as the perpetrator's employer; how would courts
determine liability for conduct that was often repeated, involved numerous victims,
and extended over long periods of time.”).
14
See TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE: HOW
LAWSUITS HELPED THE CATHOLIC CHURCH CONFRONT CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE 76
(Harvard Univ. Press 2008).
15
See infra text accompanying notes 77 to 85.
16
Liability insurance policies can either afford coverage for claims or
occurrences. A claims-based insurance policy covers all claims made in the year
of the policy. See Graman v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 409 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980) (“It is well-established that the 'claims made' or 'discovery' policy is
characterized by coverage for negligent acts or omissions only if such are
discovered during and brought to the attention of the insurer within the policy
term.”). Compare Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 59
(3d Cir. 1982) (“Occurrence policies indemnify the insured for acts or occurrences
which take place within the policy period.”). Whether coverage is based on an
occurrence policy or a claims-based policy depends on the language of the policy
and the court’s interpretation of the policy. James A. Serritella, Insurance
Coverage Issues in Cases of Clergy Misconduct, 39 CATH. LAW. 55, 57 (1999).
This article deals solely with occurrence policies.
17
ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 518-19 (1988)
(1988).
18
Id.
19
McAuliffe v. N. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 69 F.3d 277, 279 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding
that a liability insurance policy held by the Catholic Diocese of Jefferson City,
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including clauses specifically exempting injuries and lawsuits arising out of
sexual misconduct in policies sold to religious institutions.20 The
exemption of sexual misconduct from general liability insurance policies
has caused religious institutions to specifically purchase insurance against
clergy sexual misconduct, in addition to their general liability insurance
policy.21 However, even when the sexual misconduct policies have been
purchased, not all claims are accepted under the policy, and the vast
majority of claims are denied.22 This article will show that through these
actions, liability insurance companies have shifted the risk back to the
religious institutions and have, in a sense, “regulated” religious institutions,
causing them to be more proactive in taking precautions to prevent their
clergy from committing acts of sexual misconduct with parishioners.
Part I of this Note describes the history of the Catholic Church
sexual abuse scandal, delineated into two periods of litigations, each
induced by a significant case. Statistics of the amount of clergy sexual
abuse claims are also discussed. Part II addresses liability insurance
generally, and then details how liability insurance has affected the Catholic
Church sexual abuse scandal. Part III discusses the litigation of clergy
sexual abuse cases, including how the term “occurrence” in liability
insurance policies has been interpreted by the courts. Part III also describes
how “bodily injury” has been interpreted by courts in clergy sexual abuse
cases. Part IV addresses the aftermath of litigation, including how courts
have dealt with self-insured retentions when damages are awarded. Part IV
also discusses how liability insurance policies for religious institutions have
changed in the aftermath of the Catholic sexual abuse scandal.
I.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH SEXUAL ABUSE SCANDAL
A.

HISTORY

Reports of sexual abuse by priests within the Catholic Church can
be found dating back to the nineteenth century.23 However, these instances
attracted little to no press coverage and were largely unknown because the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Missouri excluded coverage of claims arising out of a priest’s sexual relationship
with a parishioner). Compare infra text accompanying notes 133 to 156.
20
LYTTON, supra note 14, at 76-77.
21
See id. at 76.
22
Id. at 77.
23
Id. at 43.
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resulting civil claims were quietly settled.24 In 1984, a civil lawsuit
alleging clergy sexual abuse filed against Father Gilbert Gauthe and the
Diocese of Lafayette attracted national attention to clergy sexual abuse. As
a result, many other victims of clergy sexual abuse came forward and also
filed claims. Yet, as what occurs with many news phenomena, the stories
of clergy sexual abuse faded from the public’s consciousness until 2002,
when another shocking case of clergy sexual molestation claimed the
media’s attention. As with the Gauthe case, the Geoghan case also led to a
surge of victims to come forward and make claims against the Church.
1. 1984-1991
Father Gauthe was a highly regarded priest in Henry, Louisiana.25
However, during his five and a half year tenure, he sexually molested
young boys in his parish.26 Gauthe was first accused when a 9-year-old
child told his parents of the abuse, stating that the incident made him think
that “God doesn’t love [him].”27 When the boy’s parents discussed the
matter with other parents in the community, it was discovered that
Gauthe’s exploitation did not end with one boy.28 The parents of the
violated children went to a local attorney, who voiced a complaint to the
bishops of the diocese.29 In response, the bishops removed Gauthe from
the diocese, but they refused to publicly announce why he was removed or
what he had done.30 Frustrated by the Church’s response to their
complaint, the families filed suit.31
At the time of the Gauthe case, other cases alleging clergy sexual
abuse had been previously filed in California, Oregon, Idaho, Wisconsin,
Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.32 Yet
the Gauthe case gave clergy sexual abuse national attention as it was
covered in Time magazine, the New York Times, and the Washington
Post.33 However, only the American public was first learning of the clergy
sexual abuse epidemic; the Catholic Church had known about the problem
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24

Id.
Id. at 1.
26
LYTTON, supra note 14, at 1.
27
Id. at 1.
28
Id. at 1-2.
29
Id. at 2.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
LYTTON, supra note 14, at 2.
33
Id. at 14.
25
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of clergy sexual abuse for years.34 In response to the media attention on the
case, states increased reporting requirements and relaxed their statute of
limitations for child sexual abuse.35
In addition, youth programs
implemented required fingerprinting, background checks, and references of
people working with children.36
The Gauthe case paved the way for the national attention on clergy
sexual abuse cases. After the case hit the mainstream media, victims of
clergy sexual abuse began coming forward with their stories and a number
of cases alleging clergy sexual abuse were filed. 37 However, similar to the
previous era where the allegations did not make national headlines, most of
these cases quietly settled.38 As a result, clergy sexual abuse faded from
the nation’s conscience. In 2002, clergy sexual abuse was once again
thrust onto the front pages of the newspapers with the emergence of sexual
abuse claims against Father Geoghan and the Boston Archdiocese.
2. 2002- Present
Stories of the most current wave of clergy sexual abuse within the
Catholic Church first began appearing in the Boston Globe in the winter of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34

“[P]ersonnel files in dioceses around the country document complaints
dating back to the 1930s.” Id.
In 1976 the Servants of the Paraclete [a Catholic religious order]
opened what was perhaps the first program in the world with a
treatment regime designed to treat psychosexual disorders
including disorders involving the sexual abuse of minors. The
ability of the Catholic community to design and implement such
a program is both a reflection of the need for such a program and
the degree of knowledge of the scope of the problem of sexual
misconduct with children by Catholic priests and religious. The
fact that preparations for the opening of the program were years
in the making demonstrates widespread knowledge of existing
sexual misconduct with minors by Catholic clergy by the late
1960s and early 1970s.
A.W. Richard Sipe, Sipe Report (BishopAccountability.org, Waltham, MA), at ¶
48, available at www.bishopaccountability.org/tx-dallas/resource-files/snipereport.htm.
35
LYTTON, supra note 14, at 15.
36
Id.
37
According to a study commissioned by the U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops, 328 abuse reports were made in the five years prior to the Gauthe case,
while 817 were received in the five years following. Id.
38
See INVESTIGATIVE STAFF, supra note 6, at 3-4.
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2002.39 What differentiated these stories from the previous wave was that
the stories not only featured the acts of sexual abuse committed by
individual priests, but they also detailed the lengths other high-ranking
priests, including Cardinal Bernard F. Law, the most influential American
Catholic priest, had gone to cover up the incidents of sexual abuse.40 The
public was shocked by the accusations, as the acts of sexual misconduct
violated childrens’ innocence, parents’ trust, priestly vows, bishops’
responsibilities, and the basic tenants of the Catholic Church.41 However,
the evidence supporting the claims of the acts of sexual abuse, and the
massive cover-up of these claims, was irrefutable.42
Before the news of the Geoghan sexual abuse cases broke, lawyers
for the Church would quietly settle cases with sexual abuse victims.43
However, after the news broke, these same lawyers publicly declared the
private settlement agreements not to be in the Church’s or the public’s best
interest, as the extent of the sexual abuse remained concealed.44
Additionally, law enforcement officers in Boston, who had previously
turned a blind eye to accusations of sexual misconduct due to fear of
exposing the Church they belonged to, began to seek records so they could
decide whether to prosecute priests who had committed sexual abuse.45
Within these records, there was overwhelming evidence that the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39

Id. at 3.
[Boston] became the epicenter of the scandal, because the story
broke there, because of the sheer number of priests implicated
there, and because of the Catholic character of the city. More
than 2 million of the 3.8 million people who live in the
metropolitan Boston area are Catholic. It is the only major
archdiocese in the United States where Catholics account for
more than half of the population. In no other major American
city are Catholics more represented in police precincts,
courtrooms, or boardrooms.
Id. at 7.
40
Id. at 3. Cardinal Law and the members of the Boston Archdiocese were
not the only Church officials to cover up accusations of clergy sexual abuse. The
practice of removing accused priests to other dioceses was widespread. Cardinal
Law’s involvement was shocking to the public, however, because he was a widely
known and influential figurehead of the Catholic Church. Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
See INVESTIGATIVE STAFF, supra note 6, at 3-4.
44
Id. at 4.
45
Id.
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Archdiocese of Boston chose to protect the reputation of the Church at the
expense of the sexual abuse victims.46
Boston was not the only Archdiocese implicated by the Catholic
Church sexual abuse scandal.47 Across the country, many priests were
pulled from their assignments;48 Bishops across the United States and
Europe resigned.49 The Pope addressed the scandal in his Holy Thursday
letter to priests, but his statements in this letter were meant to “comfort
good priests,” and did not mention the victims at all.50
Others within the Church were more sympathetic to the sexual
abuse victims. In his Good Friday letter, Cardinal Law stated,
Betrayal hangs like a heavy cloud over the Church
today…While we do not presume to judge anyone’s
relationship with God, there is no doubt that a betrayal of
trust is at the heart of the evil in the sexual abuse of
children by clergy. Priests should be trustworthy beyond
any shadow of a doubt. When some have broken that trust,
all of us suffer the consequences.51
Even with his sympathetic public statements, opinion polls found a
sense of disillusionment among parishioners with the Cardinal’s handling
of the sexual abuse scandal; many called for Cardinal Law to resign.52
Many Catholics responded to the church’s handling of the scandal by
withholding money from the archdiocese.53
Three months after the news of the scandal broke, the Pope
summoned all of the American cardinals to the Vatican for an emergency
meeting.54 At this meeting, the Pope’s tone changed drastically from his
Holy Thursday letter. He stated that the sexual abuse of minors by priests
was not only an “appalling sin” but was also a crime.55 Also unlike his
previous letter, the Pope addressed the victims of the clergy sexual abuse,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46

Id.
See id.
48
In the United States, 176 priests were pulled in the first four months of
2002. Id.
49
.Id.
50
INVESTIGATIVE STAFF, supra note 6, at 4
51
Id.
52
Id. at 5.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
INVESTIGATIVE STAFF, supra note 6, at 5.
47
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stating “[t]o the victims and their families, wherever they may be, I express
my profound sense of solidarity and concern.”56
In contrast to the past, the Church could not deny the existence of a
sexual abuse problem when the documents from the Boston Archdiocese
clearly demonstrated Cardinal Law and his aides were repeatedly warned
about certain priests, but took no action to keep them from sexually abusing
children.57 The alarming case of Father Geoghan was the most prominently
featured in exposing the cover-up.58
Geoghan was a serial molester.59 Almost two hundred claims of
sexual abuse were filed against him and his supervisors, and some believe
that the number of his actual victims could be three to four times as many
as have made claims.60 Geoghan’s astounding number of victims is due to
the fact that when a complaint was filed against him in a particular parish,
he would be moved to a new parish and his new parishioners would not be
made aware of the previous allegations of sexual abuse made against him.61
Although Geoghan’s case is the most notorious, and perhaps the most
egregious, moving accused priests from one parish to another was a
common practice throughout the Catholic Church when allegations of
sexual misconduct arose.62
Geoghan’s victims came forward and filed suits against him and
the Church. The Church’s lawyer successfully moved to have the case files
sealed, as was common in clergy sexual abuse cases.63 However, the
Boston Globe, who was looking to do a series on clergy abuse, sued to have
the case files unsealed.64 The Judge ruled in favor of the Globe, and the
resulting series was the spark that re-ignited national attention on the clergy
sexual abuse cases.65 These documents provided much of the proof that the
Church knew of the abuse complaints against Geoghan, yet continued to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56

Id.
Id. at 5-6.
58
See id. at 6.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
INVESTIGATIVE STAFF, supra note 6.
62
See id. In one case, Cardinal Law wrote another diocese and gave a priest,
who he knew had been accused of sexual abuse, a good retirement letter and stated
that the priest should head a Church-run guest home, whose guests included
youths. Id.
63
LYTTON, supra note 14, at 33. It is for this reason that there have only been
periods of media coverage of clergy sexual abuse cases.
64
Id.
65
Id.
57
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move him from parish to parish.66 As with the Gauthe case, the national
attention of the Geoghan case induced a resurgence of suits by victims of
clergy sexual abuse.
B.

STATISTICS

The fact that the Gauthe and Geoghan cases caused increases in
clergy sexual abuse claims can be illustrated by insurance company data
during this time period. Between 1989 and 2005, “Company A” provided
sexual misconduct coverage to U.S. Catholic dioceses.67 Between 1990 to
the present, “Company A’s” market share of clergy sexual misconduct
coverage was “30 percent in 1990, 40 percent in 1995, 45 percent in 2000,
and 50 percent in 2005.”68 Of a total of 275 clergy sexual abuse
misconduct claims made against policies, over one-third of the claims were
made in the times after the Gauthe case and during the Geoghan case.69
Therefore, the data shows that the media attention of these two sexual
abuse cases caused a dramatic increase in clergy sexual abuse claims.
However, the fact that a claim of clergy sexual abuse has been
made by a victim does not guarantee the victim will see restitution.70 The
surge of claims filed after the Gauthe cause opened the door for a bounty of
insurance issues that needed to be resolved before it was decided if victims
would receive damages.
II.

HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE HAS AFFECTED THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH SEXUAL ABUSE SCANDAL
A.

LIABILITY INSURANCE IN GENERAL

A basic tenant of liability insurance is that it compensates for
accidental injuries or unexpected loss; intentional acts are not covered.71
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66

Id.
Id. at 53.
68
Id.
69
See LYTTON, supra note 14, at 53.
70
McAuliffe, 69 F.3d at 280 (holding that a liability insurance policy held by
the Catholic Diocese of Jefferson City, Missouri excluded coverage of claims
arising out of a priest’s sexual relationship with a parishioner).
71
Serritella, supra note 16, at 55; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mauldin, 869 F. Supp.
478, 479 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (noting "courts afford coverage for fortuitous damages
but deny coverage when damages are the natural and probable consequences of
intentional conduct.").
67
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“If a single insured is allowed to consciously control the risks covered by
the policy, a central concept of insurance is violated."72 For example, most
owners of commercial property obtain a commercial general liability
insurance policy to protect themselves against the risk of liability for
accidents and injuries occurring on their property.73 Religious institutions
are no different.
When a policy is obtained, the insuring agreement obligates the
insurer to pay any legal obligations of the insured due to bodily injury or
property damage caused by an occurrence during the policy period.74 The
coverage for these policies typically provides for bodily injury or property
damage to a third party, medical expenses accruing to the underlying
incident, and the costs of defending lawsuits.75 The cost of a lawsuit
includes investigations and settlements, and any bonds or judgments
required during an appeal process.76
Whether coverage will be extended under the policy is determined
by whether the claimed event can be considered an “occurrence.”77 In
commercial general liability insurance policies, an “occurrence” is typically
defined as “[a]n accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions, which results during the policy period in bodily injury or
property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
insured.”78 When claims are made against them, the insured turns to the
general liability carrier for defense and indemnification in the event
damages are awarded.
In the context of the Catholic Sexual Abuse scandal, “[d]efinitions,
exclusions, and occurrence provisions make up the significant policy
language where damages are sought against the Diocese.”79 These terms
have been extremely relevant when parishioners allege priests have
committed unthinkable crimes against them.80 As most parishes only
carried general liability insurance when the initial wave of claims of clergy
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72

Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1392 n.7
(8th Cir. 1996).
73
Commercial general liability insurance policies can also insure businesses
from exposure to liability related to their products.
74
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 408 (3d. 2000).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Cooke, supra note 13, at 1043.
80
Id. at 1044.
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sexual abuse arose,81 courts were forced to use definitions, exclusions, and
insurance provisions to decide whether and how church insurance policy
language applies in cases where victims of clergy sexual abuse were
awarded civil damages.
The analysis of what constitutes an occurrence in resolving
whether there is liability insurance coverage has many crucial
determinations. Concluding what events are considered to be occurrences,
the time an occurrence is found to have taken place, and the number of
occurrences that took place is critical, especially when coverage is
disputed.82 Insurance coverage for an incident often depends on the event
falling within the policy’s definition of an occurrence.83 Also, when a
policyholder has taken a succession of policies over time, the date of the
occurrence determines which policy the claim falls under.84
The
determination of which policy covers the claim is important because all
liability insurance policies are sold with specific limits on the amount of
money that the insurer is obligated to pay for a particular claim or event.85
The insurer’s payment will not exceed this amount even if damages owed
by the insured are greater.86 Therefore, the amount of insurance coverage
available to the insured is affected by the number of occurrences found to
have taken place during a specific period of time.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81

See LYTTON, supra note 14, at 76. “ . . . Michael Bemi, president and CEO
of The National Catholic Risk Retention Group, one of the primary liability
insurance providers to the Catholic Church” stated:
[T]he Gauthe claims, we’ve all since learned, were just the tip of
the iceberg. But they were spectacular at the time and
[reinsurance] underwriters at Lloyd’s . . . took 100 percent loss
ratios [i.e., zero profit on the coverage sold], simply based on
sexual misconduct claims that they never expected to pay
because they didn’t think there were going to be sexual
misconduct claims . . . So they really took a beating.
82
Cooke, supra note 13, at 1043.
83
See ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 408.
84
Cooke, supra note 13, at 1043.
85
Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways That Liability
Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L. J. 1, 6 (2005). In addition
to per-claim or per-event limits, an insurance policy may also have a specified
limit on the amount of money the insurer is obligated to pay for all claims covered
by the policy as a whole. Id.
86
Id.
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LIABILITY INSURANCE AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH SEXUAL
ABUSE SCANDAL

As insurance has become increasingly more entwined with tort
law, it has been noted that “[i][i]nsurance has a fundamental effect on . . .
the defendant’s ability to pay and the facility with which the defendant can
be made to pay.”87 Because of consumer debt, the ability of bankruptcy to
discharge civil liabilities, and the existence of exemptions to the assets that
must be liquidated in a bankruptcy proceeding, “liability insurance is the
only asset that plaintiffs can count on collecting.”88 Guaranteed collection
is a very important notion in the context of the sexual abuse claims against
the church as priests have little to no assets. As a result, for a claimant to
be successful in obtaining damages, and a lawyer working on a
contingency basis to want to handle their case, there has to be a party who
has the ability to pay the damage award. For this reason, the diocese and
their respective insurers are always named as defendants in claims alleging
clergy sexual abuse.89 They have much larger bank accounts than the
priests who commit the offenses.90
The problem with the insurance coverage for sexual abuse acts is
that sexual abuse, by definition, is never an accidental act.91 Yet, as
previously discussed,92 liability insurance policies have an exclusion for
intention harm,93 and only apply to “occurrence[s]…neither expected nor
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87

Id. at 4.
Id.
89
See id.
90
Derrick Z. Jackson, Archdiocese Adds Up as Big Business, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 13, 2002, available at http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/
021302_jackson.htm (“Nationally, the Catholic Church takes in $8.2 billion a year
in donations at the parish level . . . plac[ing] the church ahead of R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco, Pepsi bottling, John Hancock Financial Services, General Mills, Kellogg,
America Online, Union Carbide, Campbell’s Soup, and Quaker Oats [in terms of
revenues.]”).
91
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 2242 (West 2000) (“Whoever . . . knowingly . . .
engages in a sexual act with another person if that other person is . . . incapable of
appraising the nature of the conduct; or physically incapable of declining
participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act; or
attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for any term of
years or for life.”).
92
See supra text accompanying notes 76 to 82.
93
Baker, supra note 85, at 8 (“[T]he exclusion for intentional harm . . . is
nearly universal in liability insurance policies in the U.S. covering bodily injury.”).
88

518!
CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 16:2
!
intended.”94 Because of this exclusion, plaintiffs looking to recover large
damage awards must allege a form of negligence on the part of the Church
in order for their incident to be covered under the Church’s insurance
policy. In cases alleging clergy sexual abuse, this has been done under the
theories of respondeat superior, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
clergy malpractice, and negligent/reckless hiring and supervision.95 Claims
made under the theory of negligent supervision have had the most
success.96
Within the theory of negligence, liability attaches to a person if the
person fails to employ reasonable care and subsequently injures another
person.97 However, liability only exists under these circumstances when
(1) the injury that occurred could have been reasonably foreseen and care
could have been taken to prevent it and (2) where the risk of the injury did
not arise due to third party conduct, unless a special relationship exists
between either the liable person and the third party injurer or the liable
person and the victim.98
When defending against a claim of negligent supervision, the
diocese needs to show that it did not expect nor intend for injuries to occur
to be covered by liability insurance.99 Any evidence that would establish a
reasonable foreseeability on the part of the diocese would make it
impossible for an event to be considered an occurrence.100 During the
Catholic Church sexual abuse scandal, it was discovered that many
churches kept extensive documentation of internal Church communications

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94

ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 408.
Cooke, supra note 13, at 1051.
96
Soc’y of the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Lafayette & Lake
Charles, Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 26 F.3d 1359 (5th Cir. 1994) (denying
parent’s claims, but awarding negligent supervision claims); Rita M. v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685, 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(setting aside respondeat superior claims because the abuse was not a required duty
of the priest and abuse was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
priest’s duties); O’Reilly & Strasser, supra note 10, at 39 (“State courts have
tended to decline the invitation to apply respondeat superior to clergy sexual
misconduct.”).
97
LYTTON, supra note 14, at 58.
98
Id.
99
See id.
100
See id.
95
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revealing the Church’s awareness of priests who had numerous abuse
allegations made against them, and their resulting relocations.101
The Church practice of relocating priests who had sexual
misconduct allegations lodged against them was longstanding.102 This
practice continued until the media discovered the extensive sexual abuse
allegations and more careful scrutiny was placed on the Church.103 The
documentation proving that the Catholic Church authorities were aware of
many abusive priests and did little to prevent the abuse from continuing
made them susceptible to claims of negligence within lawsuits.104
Although the Church did know about the sexual abuse allegations,
law enforcement officials did not.105 Victims who came forward usually
filed formal complaints against the priest with the Church, so many of the
matters were handled informally and kept away from the public
knowledge.106 The practice of relocating accused priests, in part, stems
from the fact that most laws which compel the disclosure of sexual abuse

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101

Cooke, supra note 13, at 1051-52. The Catholic Church, when an
allegation of sexual abuse was received, would, either verbally or in writing,
reprimand the priest, mandate therapy, and then relocate them to a different area
where the allegations would be unknown to the parishioners. Id.
102
See supra text accompanying notes 57 to 62.
103
See, e.g., INVESTIGATIVE STAFF, supra note 6, at 53 (stating that Father
John Geoghan committed known sexual abuse for thirty years in six different
parishes).
104
A February 9, 1996 letter from the Archbishop of Boston to Father
Graham, a priest accused of sexual abuse, shows the Church was aware of the
allegations and did nothing to prevent them. The letter reads, in part:
The Review Board and the Delegate have recommended that
your case be determined to be a case reported and handled
appropriately before the present Policy was in place, and thus
one to which the Policy does not apply. They recommended that
you do not require further assessment and there should be no
limits or restrictions on your ministry. I hereby approve the
recommendation.
Letter from Cardinal Bernard Law, Archbishop of Boston, to Reverend Daniel M.
Graham,
Saint
Joseph
Rectory
(Feb.
9,
1996),
available
at
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/documents/law_letter_020996.htm.
105
See supra text accompanying notes 43 to 46.
106
See, e.g., INVESTIGATIVE STAFF, supra note 6, at 53 (stating that Father
John Geoghan committed known sexual abuse for thirty years in six different
parishes).
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accusations apply specifically to professional organizations.107 These laws
do not expressly require Church officials to report these accusations.108 In
the states that require disclosure from religious institutions, the churches
claimed they were not aware of mandatory-reporting laws, argued that
these types of matters were best handled within the Church, or contended
that reporting these types of matters to law enforcement would have been
contrary to the Church’s “culture of forgiveness.”109
III.

LITIGATING CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
A.

HOW “OCCURRENCE” HAS BEEN INTERPRETED BY THE
COURTS

On its own, the Catholic Church has taken a very passive stance in
redressing the harms to the clergy sexual abuse victims. Many times, the
Church would make an accused priest go to therapy for their molestation of
children.110 The Roman Catholic Church has internal rules that inhibit a
priest’s discharge for sexual misconduct,111 although the Church forbids
sexual misconduct.112 Perhaps for this reason, courts have tried to work
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Mark Clayton, Why Child Abuse Goes Unreported, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Mar. 18, 2002, http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0318/p01s05-usju.html
(noting that “[eighteen] states have mandatory-reporting laws that do not
specifically require clergy to report sexual abuse of children . . . [nineteen]
mandate that church officials . . . pass on information . . . [and in six states] the
clergy’s status is unclear. Seven states always require churches to relay
information, even what’s heard in the confessional . . .”).
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Kate S. Lombardi, Parish Recalls Priest in a Sex Case, N.Y. TIMES, July
25, 1993, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/25/nyregion/parishrecalls-priest-in-a-sex-case.html.
111
For instance, the Code of Canon Law mandates the intervention of the
Vatican before releasing a priest from his duties for sexual misconduct where
psychological or physical deficiencies are present. See 1983 CODE c.1324, § 1,
available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/_P4W.HTM (stating that
punishments for violations “be tempered” if the violation was committed “by a
person who had only the imperfect use of reason . . . because of drunkenness or . . .
similar culpable disturbance of mind.”). See also id. at c.1342-53, available at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/_P50.HTM (limiting the unilateral
actions of those administering penalties).
112
Id. at c.1395, § 2, available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/
ENG1104/_P56.HTM.
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with the policy language to find coverage so victims can receive some form
of remedy.
Courts seeking to redress victims of clergy sexual abuse have had a
difficult time with the accidental nature of occurrence defined in the policy
language. “Clever judicial constructions of occurrence have resulted in
unpredictable, often excessive, coverage awards to churches found to be
liable to abuse victims.”113 Single-injury cases have proved to be the
exception, however, as they have almost unanimously been found to
involve only one occurrence.114 Cases where the abuse has occurred over a
long period of time, where many victims are involved, where multiple
insurance providers have been used by the diocese, and where varying
layers of coverage exist require a more intricate analysis.
1. The Fifth Circuit
Society of the Roman Catholic Church v. Interstate Fire &
Casualty Co.115 presented the question of how many occurrences took place
in a sexual abuse situation involving two priests who abused over thirty
children over a six-year time span.116 Although the exact number of
instances of molestation was not disclosed in the case, it was agreed to by
the parties that each child had been abused at least one time per year over
the six year period.117 During this time frame, the diocese had numerous
primary and excess insurance policies.118
The District Court held that each abused child constituted an
occurrence and that the first encounter rule should be used in delegating
coverage among insurers.119 In reaching this conclusion, the Court applied
the effects test, which treated each individual victim as an individual
occurrence.120 The rationale of the effects test is that the number of
occurrences should be determined from the standpoint of the insured, not
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
113

Cooke, supra note 13, at 1054.
ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 442.
115
26 F.3d 1359.
116
Id. at 1361.
117
Id. at 1361-62.
118
Id. at 1362.
119
Id. at 1362-63. The first encounter rule is defined by the court as saying
that “the insurance carrier covering the Diocese during the occurrence of the first
molestation of each child was responsible for all resulting damages to that child…
including damages from molestations occurring after the expiration of that carrier’s
policy.” Id. at 1363.
120
26 F.3d at 1363-64.
114
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its victims,121 as it does not take into account the number of times the
victims may have been abused.
However, the Court of Appeals rejected the lower court’s holding
and stated that “the church’s continuous negligent supervision of a priest,
the negligent supervision of a priest with respect to each child, the
negligent supervision of a priest with respect to each molestation, or each
time the diocese became aware of a fact which should have led it to
intervene,” were all events that could be an occurrence depending on the
court’s approach.122 The Court of Appeals took the occurrence analysis
from asbestos cases,123 and held that:
When a priest molested a child during a policy year, there
was both bodily injury and an occurrence triggering policy
coverage. All further molestations of that child during the
policy period arose out of the same occurrence. When a
priest molested the same child during the succeeding
policy year, again there was both bodily injury and an
occurrence. Thus, each child suffered an “occurrence” in
each policy period in which he was molested.124 Any
instances of CSA that followed the coverage-triggering act
and occurred in the same coverage year, were not deemed
occurrences, but conditions from which “repeated exposure
. . . unexpectedly result[ed] in personal injury.”125
Here, the court, in holding that the first encounter rule should not
apply because “a subsequent molestation, occurring outside the policy
period, is not a consequential damage of the previous molestation; it is a
new injury, with its own resulting damages,”126 strikes a balance between
finding an occurrence for every instance of molestation and denying that an
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121

Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1364.
123
Porter v. Am. Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981); Ducre v. Mine
Safety Appliances Co., 645 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. La. 1986); Cole v. Celotex Corp.,
599 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1992); Houston v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 506 So. 2d 149
(La. Ct. App. 1987). These cases applied the exposure rule to conclude that
inhalation of asbestos constituted a single occurrence each year that asbestos was
ingested. Soc’y of the Roman Catholic Church, 26 F.3d at 1365.
124
Soc’y of the Roman Catholic Church, 26 F.3d at 1364.
125
Id. at 1366.
126
Id.
122
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occurrence has taken place altogether.127 In this sense, the analysis “would
lessen coverage to a church whose negligent supervision allowed a child to
be abused one hundred times in one policy year (thus constituting one
occurrence), than to a church that allowed two instances of [clergy sexual
abuse] over two policy years (thus two occurrences).”128
2. The Ninth Circuit
In Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Archdiocese of Portland in
Oregon, 35 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1994),129 the Court of Appeals reversed the
finding of the District Court and held that there had been four occurrences
involved in the claim.130 This amounted to one occurrence in each policy
period.131 The Court stated:
[B]ecause each policy covers only damages stemming
from [the child's] exposure to the [priest] occurring during
the policy period, and because the parties do not contest
that [the child] was exposed to the negligently supervised
priest in each of the four policy periods, we conclude that
[the] claim implicates four occurrences.132
Based on the policy definition of occurrence, the Court found that
"the repeated 'exposure' of the boy to the negligently supervised priest,"
rather than the negligent supervision alone, resulted in injury.133 Also, the
court found it significant that the policy only covered injuries arising from
occurrences “happening during the period of insurance.”134 Therefore, the
court concluded that although the child’s injuries arose from the same
general conditions, based on the facts, the child’s “exposure to the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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It is important to note that the coverage is not being provided for instances
of molestation, but rather for the negligent supervision that facilitated the instances
of abuse.
128
Cooke, supra note 13, at 1056.
129
35 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1994).
130
Id. at 1331.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 1329.
134
Id.
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negligently supervised priest in each of the four different policy periods
constituted a separate occurrence.”135
3. The Seventh Circuit
In Lee v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co.,136 the court rejected the
insurer’s argument that the “continuous exposure” language rendered a
priest’s molestation of one child during two policy years and in two distinct
places to constitute one occurrence.137 The court held that Rhode Island
law “would not treat negligent supervision as invariably one
‘occurrence.’”138 The court also rejected the analogy of asbestos cases to
clergy sexual abuse cases and stated:
The language defining “cause” does not speak directly to
this question. It assumes a two-party perspective- that an
insured tortfeasor has harmed a victim. Its language is a
mismatch for a case in which the tort is negligent
supervision of an intentional wrongdoer. “[C]ontinuous or
repeated exposure to conditions” sounds like language
designed to deal with asbestos fibers in the air, or leadbased paint on the walls, rather than with priests and
choirboys. A priest is not a “condition” but a sentient
being, and of course the victim was never “exposed” to the
Diocese’s negligent supervision.139
The court decided neither to rule on the occurrence issue nor
remand the case for further findings, claiming that the parties submitted
insufficient information to make a determination of the number of
occurrences and refusing to make a decision based upon the policy alone.140
Although it did not formally rule on the issue, the court undermined the
analogy between toxic torts and clergy sexual abuse.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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35 F.3d at 1330; see also Soc’y of the Roman Catholic Church, 26 F.3d at
1363-64 (the court reached a similar conclusion on almost identical facts).
136
86 F.3d 101 (7th Cir. 1996).
137
Id. at 104-05.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 104.
140
Id. at 105.
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It is…doubtful that the insured could reasonably expect
[the toxic tort] language to afford coverage for sexual
abuse by church employees. This language clearly
contemplates contact with contaminants like asbestos,
radiation, or noxious gases (preceded by the insured’s
neglect, at worst, and where only extended contact
produces injury). Stretching such language to cover child
molestation (where a single intentional act results in
immediate injury) strains logic to the breaking point.141
Courts routinely caution against judicial expansion of insurance coverage
to arenas outside the agreed policy terms.142
4. Other Jurisdictions
Some jurisdictions have questioned the finding that negligent
supervision could amount to an occurrence for general liability insurance
purposes. Courts in these jurisdictions do not recognize the negligent
supervision of priests on the part of the Church as triggering insurance
coverage.
“[T]he occurrence is not the Archdiocese’s negligent
supervision of [the priest] as such, but the ‘exposure’ of the boy to the
negligently supervised priest . . . ”143 “[E]ach child was ‘exposed’ to the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141

Cooke, supra note 13, at 1057.
See, e.g., Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 73
(Wis. 2004) (“If it is clear that the [insurance] policy was not intended to cover the
claim asserted, the analysis ends there.”); Nicholls v. Zurich Am. Ins. Group, 244
F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1156 (D. Colo. 2003) (“[Under Colorado law,] insurer cannot be
held liable beyond the scope of risks which have been clearly covered in the
insurance policy.”); Yale Univ. v. Cigna Ins. Co., 224 F. Supp. 2d 402, 410 (D.
Conn. 2002) (“[Under Connecticut law,] mere absence of specific exclusions,
standing alone, does not create coverage where it otherwise does not exist under
the express terms of the policy.”); Hallum v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
257 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“To establish a prima facie case on a
claim under a policy of insurance, the insured must show the occurrence was
within the risk insured against.”); Turner v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 112 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 277, 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“[W]hen an occurrence is clearly not
included within the coverage afforded by the insuring clause, it need not also be
specifically excluded.”); Bush v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 124 F. Supp. 2d
1203, 1205 (D. Or. 2000) (“Under Oregon law, analysis of insurance coverage
issues is based on specific terms of the policy, not on the court’s general concepts
of what coverage various kinds of insurance should provide.”).
143
Archdiocese of Portland, 35 F.3d at 1329.
142
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pedophilic employee, not to [the insured’s] negligent employment
practices.”144
Most courts apply the causal test, which encompasses the separate
acts of clergy sexual abuse and only recognizes instances where a new
person is exposed.145 These courts count the parish-to-parish relocations as
a single occurrence, despite the number of parishioners that were abused by
the priest while at a single parish.146
Additionally, a few courts have required a high level of Diocese
awareness to establish that the Church should have known of the high
probability of sexual misconduct. In Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire
& Cas. Co.,147 the court stated that “[t]he issue…is whether a reasonably
prudent person in the position of the Diocese…knew or should have known
that [the priest’s] abuse of [the victim] was substantially probable as a
result of the continuing exposure caused by their willful indifference.”148
The priest accused of sexual abuse in this case had admitted to eight
instances of sexual abuse prior to the instance concerning the case at
hand.149 There were reports that the priest had previously attempted to
molest a boy on “five or six occasions” and had admitted to the diocese that
he had touched the boy.150 In another instance, the priest told a diocese
official that he had asked two boys to disrobe.151 The priest also admitted
to the diocese that he had tried to molest a boy in a swimming pool; the
priest admitted to touching another boy in a sauna a year later.152 In that
same year, the diocese received allegations that the priest had molested
over twenty boys during the past fifteen years, and that at least one child
had been molested for over a decade.153 In response to these allegations,
the Church moved the priest to different churches, insisted the priest take
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
144

H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 526, 533 (5th
Cir. 1998).
145
See, e.g., Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, No. 912321, 1997 WL 10243, at
*20-*21 (E.D. La. Jan. 8, 1997) (In discussing a priest who molested children at a
parish for over a decade, the Court stated, “[a]lthough this negligence was present
in each of the policy years at issue, it was continuous negligence, and not a number
of discrete episodes of negligence.”).
146
Id.
147
89 F.3d 1386.
148
Id. at 1391.
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Id. at 1393.
150
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
153
89 F.3d 1386.
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leave of absences, and imposed treatment programs in which the Bishop
testified that he “didn’t have any confidence.”154
The district court found that the diocese “neither expected nor
intended the injuries cause by [the priest], and that the abuse therefore
constituted an ‘occurrence’ as defined in the insurance policies.…”155
However, after reviewing the numerous reports, considering the failed
therapy treatments, parish-to-parish relocations, multiple confessions, the
Court of Appeals found that “[a] reasonably prudent person in the position
of the diocese should have known there was a substantial probability that
[the priest] would continue to sexually abuse children.”156
B.

HOW “BODILY INJURY” HAS BEEN INTERPRETED BY THE
COURTS IN CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE CASES

Commercial general liability insurance policies generally obligate
the insurer to pay any legal obligations of the insured due to bodily injury
or property damage caused by an occurrence during the policy period.157 In
cases of clergy sexual abuse, courts have interpreted “bodily injury” to
refer to actual physical injury, rather than mental or emotional injury.158
Therefore, a claim arising out of clergy sexual abuse may not fit within the
coverage of the insurance policy if it does not allege a physical injury, but
only alleges emotional injuries such as humiliation or embarrassment.159
However, some courts have found emotional injuries to fall within
“bodily injury,” and thus within the policy terms. In Servants of the
Paraclete, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co.,160 the court found psychological and
emotional injuries, such as depression, anxiety, poor self-esteem, and self!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Id. at 1393.
Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 916 F. Supp. 923, 926 (D.
Minn. 1995).
156
Diocese of Winona, 89 F.3d at 1394.
157
ABRAHAM, supra note 74, at 408.
158
See e.g., Kline v. Kemper Group, 826 F. Supp. 123, 129 (M.D. Pa. 1993),
aff'd mem., 22 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The Pennsylvania courts have soundly
rejected the contention that policy definitions of injury or bodily injury encompass
mental or emotional harm.") (citing Jackson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 606 A.2d 1384
(Pa. 1992)).
159
Lapeka, Inc. v. Sec. Nat'l Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp. 1540, 1548-49 (D. Kan.
1993) (finding claims for pain, humiliation, and embarrassment outside the
definition of "bodily injury" covered by policy).
160
857 F. Supp. 822 (D.N.M. 1994), modified on other grounds, 866 F. Supp.
1560 (D.N.M. 1994).
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destructive behavior to be covered under a policy that defined “bodily
injury” as “bodily injury, sickness or disease.”161 Additionally, courts have
held that a policy provided coverage for current bodily injuries that were
the result of sexual abuse that had taken place years before.162
IV.

THE AFTERMATH OF LITIGATION

The varying outcomes of cases alleging clergy sexual abuse have
had an effect on liability insurance coverage of religious institutions. More
and more cases are finding that self-insured retentions are to be used,
causing the Diocese themselves to have to pay damage awards awarded to
victims of clergy sexual abuse. Additionally, the liability insurance
policies of the religious institutions have changed, where sexual abuse is
specifically exempted from coverage. This has caused religious institutions
to purchase insurance specifically covering sexual abuse. However, this
new form of “sexual abuse insurance” remains insufficient to cover the
damage awards handed down to victims. Therefore, religious institutions
have been forced by insurance companies to increase their efforts to stop
the sexual abuse of parishioners by clergy members, as the continuing of
both the practice of sexual abuse by clergy members and the turning a
blind-eye by the institutions causes large damage awards to come out of the
institution’s own pocket.
A.

HOW HAVE COURTS DEALT WITH SELF-INSURED RETENTIONS
WHEN DAMAGES ARE AWARDED IN CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE
CASES

The determination of how a court will deal with a self-insured
retention in each policy period can significantly affect the parties’ financial
responsibilities for damages. How a party is financially affected by a
court’s treatment of self-insured retentions is best understood through this
scenario: A claim was brought in which there was five years of abuse, and
the case was settled for $500,000. The diocese had five one-year policies,
each with a $100,000 self-insured retention. How the court deals with
these self-insured retentions determine whether the diocese would be
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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857 F. Supp. at 834.
See Milbank Ins. Co. v. J.T., No. C7-96-1225, 1997 WL 10525 (Minn.
App. Ct. Jan. 14, 1997) (finding that the time of "occurrence" is not necessarily
when the act was committed, but rather when the individual was actually
damaged).
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responsible for $100,000 in damages or the whole claim. Based on the
court’s decision in Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co.,163 the
diocese would be responsible for the entire damage award.
In Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co.,164 the court
held that the Church was responsible for the self-insured retention for “each
of the triggered policies.”165 The court had previously determined that the
churches were liable only for a single, weighted self-insured retention;
however, the court changed their decision in light of an intervening
decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court.166 The court in Winona
concluded that the two cases were “factually indistinguishable,”167 and
stated:
Each
litigation
involved
indemnification
under
[comprehensive general liability] policies that contained a
layer of self-insurance (the SIR) for which the insured was
responsible. Each involved injuries incurred over an
extended period of time, a period during which the insured
was covered by a number of distinct insuring agreements.
And, each involved damages that could not rationally be
allocated to specific policy periods in which the damages
actually occurred.168
Based on this reasoning, the court concluded that the diocese had to pay the
entire damage award.169
Additionally, in Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Archdiocese of
Portland in Oregon,170 the Archdiocese argued that a finding that abuse
constituted more than one occurrence would be contrary to public policy
because "such a finding would require the Archdiocese to pay more than
one [self-insured retention]."171 The court rejected this argument because
although the Archdiocese would have to bear a significant burden of the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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916 F. Supp. 923, 929.
Id.
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Id. at 929.
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Id. at 926 (relying upon N. Power Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523
N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994) (a case involving continuous environmental
contamination)).
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Id. at 928.
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settlement, this was “dictated by the terms of the policies the Archdiocese
purchased.”172 The court did not reach the issue of how the damages
should be apportioned among the four insurance policies at issue in this
case.
B.

HOW INSURANCE POLICIES FOR THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
HAVE CHANGED IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SEXUAL ABUSE
SCANDAL

After courts began to interpret insurance policy language to find
ways to award clergy sexual abuse victims damages, insurance companies
began to take more express measures to ensure that they would not be
responsible for large amounts of damages awarded to clergy sexual abuse
victims.173 These measures have ranged from expressly excluding
insurance coverage for claims arising out of the sexual abuse by clergy174 to
limiting insurance company liability for claims arising out of clergy sexual
abuse. Additionally, after being blind-sided by the claims arising after the
Gauthe case, insurance companies began to offer religious institutions
policies specifically covering clergy sexual abuse claims.175
1. Exclusions from Coverage
In the aftermath of the sexual abuse scandal, some insurance
companies extending coverage to religious institutions have expressly
excluded coverage for claims “arising out of” abuse or molestation.176 This
express exclusion will obviously prevent coverage being found for claims
arising out of clergy sexual misconduct, the “arising out of” language has
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Id.
“[S]ince 1982, American dioceses have lost more than $400 million in legal
and medical costs because of sexual misconduct.” In addition, the New Mexico
archdiocese faced “$50 million in liability suits” in the 1990’s. O’Reilly &
Strasser, supra note 10, at 32-33.
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LYTTON, supra note 14, at 77.
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Id. at 76-77.
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See, e.g., McAuliffe, 69 F.3d at 279 (affirming district court's decision that
the abuse and molestation exclusion precluded coverage for claims of tortious
conduct against priest and claim of negligent supervision against Bishop); Hough
v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 481 N.W.2d 393, 397-98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)
(finding no duty to defend because sexual abuse exclusion precluded claims of
negligent counseling which were based on sexual relationship between pastor and
parishioner).
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also been found to preclude claims for negligent hiring and supervision or
retention of the abuser.177 These claims of negligence on the part of the
Church are excluded from “arising out of” abuse due to the fact that the
sexual abuse is found to be an essential element of these claims.178
2. Limitations on Coverage
While some policies have expressly excluded claims arising from
sexual abuse from their coverage, some others have set lower limits on
such claims. One policy included, in its “Sexual Misconduct” provision, a
cap on liability for psychotherapists at $25,000 for "'all claims against any
Insured(s) involving any actual or alleged erotic physical contact, or
attempt thereat [sic] or proposal thereof' by the insured with his or her
former or current patient."179 This cap was considered to apply to other
claims arising out of the professional relationship if sexual misconduct was
alleged.180 The provision limiting liability relates to clergy sexual abuse
cases because the psychotherapist-patient and clergy-parishioner
relationship are usually considered to be analogous.
Both the
psychotherapist and the clergy member can be seen to have a therapeutic
role in relation to the patient or parishioner, respectively.
These types of limitations have been challenged in cases as
violating public policy. However, this argument has had mixed results.
The Seventh Circuit has rejected arguments that a limitation for liability for
sexual misconduct claims violates public policy.181 Yet, the Ninth Circuit
has affirmed a decision finding that a provision limiting liability for sexual
misconduct is void as against public policy.182 In finding the cap void, the
court reasoned that it caps liability on non-sexual misconduct claims when
sexual misconduct claims are also involved.183
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See, e.g., IPCI Ltd. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 758 F. Supp. 478, 480 (E.D.
Wis. 1991) (sexual abuse exclusion precluded coverage for claims of negligent
supervision against nursing facility where patient was sexually abused).
178
See All Am. Ins. Co. v. Burns, 971 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1992) (sexual
molestation by volunteer bus driver was an essential element of negligence claims
against church and its directors).
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Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Stone, 61 F.3d 1321, 1323 (7th Cir. 1995).
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See id.
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Id. at 1328 (noting that the provision was approved by the Illinois
Department of Insurance).
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See Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Cohen, 815 F. Supp. 365, 370-71 (W.D.
Wash. 1993), aff'd mem., 67 F.3d 305 (9th Cir. 1995).
183
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3. Clergy Sexual Abuse Insurance Policies
In the early 1990s, after a period of excluding coverage for acts of
sexual misconduct completely, insurance companies began to offer
coverage for clergy sexual abuse.184 However, these policies were subject
to many conditions and, in effect, provided little coverage to the religious
institutions.185 Examples of conditions imposed on the policies include an
exclusion for claims involving a “previously identified perpetrator” or an
exclusion for instances of abuse occurring before a certain date.186 In
addition, low limits may be imposed on the amount of coverage and some
insurance companies require religious institutions to “implement risk
management programs that include policies for screening personnel,
guidelines for interacting with children, and procedures for investigating
and responding to allegations.”187 Because of the conditions imposed on
the sexual misconduct policies, coverage for religious institutions is usually
not adequate.188 These actions by the insurance companies in the aftermath
of the Catholic Church sexual abuse scandal have had a regulating effect on
religious institutions and how they approach clergy sexual misconduct.
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LYTTON, supra note 14, at 77.
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“The National Catholic Risk Retention Group, which is comprised of sixtyfour dioceses and archdioceses, rejects the overwhelming majority of claims made
by its members.” Id. Bemi, the president and CEO, states that:
[O]f all of the sexual misconduct claims that have been reported to us
historically, on average in any given year, in excess of 90 percent- most
recently the average was about 93 percent- will be denied by us. And that
is a function of the claims being pre-retro to us [i.e., based on abuse that
occurred prior to 1988 and therefore excluded from coverage] . . . or . . . it
was clear that the diocese had knowledge but did not report to us within
the 120 days that our forms stipulate to report the claim to us or because
we’re an excess carrier and we don’t [cover the first] $250,000 of loss
from ground, . . . and the claim . . . is just not big enough to get to us.
Id.
185
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HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANIES HAVE
REGULATED RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH SEXUAL
ABUSE SCANDAL

The evolution of liability insurance policies throughout the
Catholic Church sexual abuse scandal has shed light on how the insurance
companies issuing liability insurance to religious institutions have
regulated their behavior. Because of the transition from general insurance
policies that courts interpreted to find coverage for acts of clergy sexual
misconduct to the explicit exclusion of these acts from general liability
insurance policies, religious institutions have been forced to seek additional
insurance to cover possible acts of sexual abuse of their clergy. Yet, even
with the added coverage, acts of sexual abuse are still more likely than not
to not be covered by these policies, due to the many conditions and
exclusions placed on the policy.189 As a result, religious institutions have
oftentimes been forced to bear the burden of judgments themselves.190 As
the cost of judgments climbs higher, the religious institutions are forced to
take a more proactive effort in reducing the acts of clergy sexual abuse.
Additionally, in granting insurance coverage, insurance companies
themselves are insisting on reformed policies aimed at curtailing the
occurrences of clergy sexual misconduct.191 As a result, a greater emphasis
on reform within the Church has arisen and policy, such as personnel
screening and strict guidelines for dealing with children, has been
implemented to prevent acts of clergy sexual misconduct from
continuing.192 The move toward discouraging Church officials from
covering up acts of clergy sexual abuse is definitely a much-needed reform,
and while it is hard to believe acts of clergy sexual abuse has stopped
because of these policy changes, it seems like a move in the right direction
towards eradicating them. As judgments against the Church rise, and
insurance companies craft new ways to avoid paying for them, we will see
even more reform aimed at curtailing clergy sexual abuse until it does
become a thing of the past.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
189

LYTTON, supra note 14, at 77.
“Current estimates indicate that of the more than $2.6 billion paid by the
Church in response to clergy sexual abuse claims, less than 30 percent was covered
by insurance.” See id. at 78.
191
See id. at 77.
192
See id. at 78.
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The evolution of liability insurance policies for religious
institutions, as a result of the Catholic Church sexual abuse scandal, has
been the result of the widespread problem of clergy sexual abuse.
However, the resulting lawsuits by the victims caused the liability
insurance carriers of religious institutions to craft conditions and exceptions
to policies, and placed the majority of the liability for the acts of clergy
sexual misconduct in the hands of the religious institutions. Religious
institutions, like the Catholic Church, , prompted either by liability
insurance companies or on their own accord, were forced to make drastic
policy changes to avoid the resulting liability from lawsuits of clergy
sexual abuse victims.
In this way, liability insurance companies
incentivized religious institutions to implement policies to curb clergy
sexual misconduct. While these policies may not yet have completely
eradicated the problem of clergy sexual abuse, continuing liability as a
result of exclusions and restrictions within liability insurance policies
combined with expansive policies aimed at preventing clergy sexual
misconduct could make this abuse a thing of the past.

COVERAGE FOR KIDNEYS:
THE INTERSECTION OF INSURANCE
AND ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
Melissa Wong*
INTRODUCTION
At its best, the medical practice of organ transplantation
demonstrates the most gracious qualities of generosity and sacrifice, where
a decision by a living organ donor or a deceased donor’s grieving family
can mean the difference between a second chance at life or years spent
waiting before time runs out. Fundamentally, organ transplantation also
remains a stark example of the classic economic theory of supply and
demand. Despite medical advancements, the growing acceptance of organ
donation, and policy efforts to increase the donation rate, the waiting list of
potential recipients grew 64% over the past ten years while the number of
donors rose by only 39% during that same span of time.1 More than
100,000 individuals are listed currently on the national organ transplant
registry.2 Last year alone, 6,453 candidates died waiting for an organ
donor match, or an average of 18 patients per day.3 For these reasons, the
life and death decisions behind how to allocate available organs for
transplantation must be sensitive to the ethical and policy interests of
objectivity, efficiency and fairness.
The health insurance sector plays a critical role in the organ
transplantation specialty. Insurance may interact with this medical field in
ways which yield significant benefits, assisting patients in funding
otherwise prohibitively expensive procedures or setting appropriate
*
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See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OPTN/SRTR ANNUAL REPORT
app. at 1–1, 1–3 (2008).
2
United Network for Organ Sharing, http://www.unos.org (last visited Mar.
10, 2010).
3
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov
(select “View Data Reports,” “National Data,” “Waiting List Removals” in Step 1 dropdown menu; then follow “Death Removals by UNOS Status by Year” hyperlink in Step
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standards of care in this practice. Still, insurance coverage issues also tend
to expose glaring disparities with how organs are allocated among potential
recipients based on the ability to pay for these life-saving procedures.
This Note examines both the positive and negative consequences
which result when insurance matters intersect with the practice of organ
transplantation. Part I summarizes the medical developments behind organ
transplantation and subsequent legislative efforts to support the
infrastructure and health policies of this field. Part II examines the primary
forms of insurance coverage for both organ donors and recipients and the
most commonly litigated issues which arise based on each funding option.
Part III then addresses the unexpected and unintended connections formed
as a result of this interaction, such as the correlation between insurance
status and the likelihood of receiving or donating an organ. Finally, Part IV
proposes recommendations to promote the beneficial interplay between
insurance and organ transplantation while minimizing the more negative
effects of the relationship.
I.

MEDICAL AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION

While the earliest attempts at organ and tissue transplantation date
back thousands of years, the era of modern transplant surgery has been
established only in the past few decades.4 In 1954, the kidney was the first
major organ to be transplanted successfully, followed rapidly by the first
transplants for the pancreas, heart and liver all within the next fifteen
years.5 Further advancements stalled due to the complications of future
organ rejection, but with the development of Cyclosporine and other antirejection immunosuppressive drug therapies in the 1970s and 1980s,6 as
well as other surgical improvements such as the use of laparoscopic or
single-incision techniques, the practice of organ transplantation has grown
to include lung and intestinal transplants, dual organ transplants, artificial
or animal organ transplants, stem-cell transplants, and most recently, face,
4

Laurence A. Turka, M.D., Historical Overview, PRIMER ON
TRANSPLANTATION 1 (2nd ed. 2001).
5
UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, UNOS FACTS AND FIGURES 4,
http://www.unos.org/resources/brochure.
6
Jed Adam Gross, E Pluribus Unos: The National Organ Transplant Act and
Its Postoperative Complications, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 145, 170
(2008). With the introduction of cyclosporine therapy, one-year kidney transplant
survival rates climbed from 55% from 85% while five-year liver transplant
survival rates increased from 18.2% to 68%. Id.
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limb and ovary transplantation.7 Today, more than 250 medical facilities
across the United States perform major organ transplant procedures at a
rate of 27,000 per year.8
A.

THE UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT

Shortly after the first successful heart transplant procedure and as
major organ transplantation became more commonplace, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws established the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) in 1968.9 The UAGA represents
the first attempt to codify in some form the standards and guidelines for the
donation and receipt of anatomical gifts. The UAGA provides that any
individual aged eighteen years or more, may give all or any part of his or
her body upon death for any purpose specified in the Act.10 This is a right
that was not clearly recognized in common law at the time.11 The UAGA
also mandates that surgeons remove the gifted organ “without unnecessary
mutilation”12 and that the time of death of the potential donor be
determined by a physician who does not participate in the transplant
procedure itself.13 This stipulation is intended to combat fears that
overeager doctors could declare brain or cardiac death prematurely in the
hopes of salvaging organs for donation.14 The UAGA also exempts from
criminal or civil liability a hospital, physician, public health officer or other
person who acts in good faith in accordance with the terms of the Act or a
similar anatomical gift statute of another state or foreign country,15
presumably in the public interest of encouraging medical professionals to

7

See, e.g., UNOS FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 5; Lawrence K. Altman
and Anahad O’Connor, Cleveland Clinic Gets Victim of Chimp Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at A26; Jon W. Jones, M.D. et al., Successful Hand
Transplantation: One-Year Follow-Up, NEW ENG. J. MED. 468 (Aug. 17, 2000);
Robert Dobson, Ovarian transplant raises hope for women facing cancer
treatment, 319 BRIT. MED. J. 871 (Oct. 2, 1999).
8
UNOS FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 5, at 1, 10; United Network for
Organ Sharing, supra note 2.
9
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, at p. 3 (amended 2009).
10
Id. § 4.
11
Id. at p. 3.
12
Id. § 14(h).
13
Id. § 14(i).
14
See id. at p. 3.
15
See id. § 18.
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participate in the removal of organs after death for the purpose of
donation.16
While all jurisdictions had enacted into state law the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act of 1968, only twenty-six states adopted the later 1987
revisions to the UAGA.17 Several states have since incorporated their own
non-uniform amendments to original statutes.18 As a result, there is
significance divergence in previously consistent state anatomical gift laws,
posing a serious impediment to organ transplant processes extending
beyond state lines. Since only a short window for transplantation exists, as
brief as four to six hours for a heart or lung,19 there may not be enough time
for extensive research into and compliance with each state’s policy. The
UAGA has been revised again in 2006 and 2009 in attempts to re-secure
more uniform adoption across the states and to align more closely with
federal laws regulating organ transplantation.20 Thirty-seven states have
enacted this latest set of revisions to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, with
five more states scheduled to introduce the bill in 2010.21
B.

THE NATIONAL ORGAN TRANSPLANT ACT

The National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) of 1984 sets federal
guidelines for organ donation and transplantation. Congress enacted
NOTA to address the growing competition for donor organs and the
unequal distribution of available organs.22 The Act set a new national
health policy to ensure the equitable allocation of organs through the
16

See Williams v. Hoffman, 223 N.W.2d 844, 848–49 (Wis. 1974) (stating
that the “limitation on liability ... is justified by the legitimate public purpose of
encouraging doctors to participate in the removal of organs following death, and
therefore increasing their supply.”). See also Ramirez v. Health Partners of
Southern Ariz., 972 P.2d 658, 666 (Ariz. 1998) (“There is a critical state interest in
encouraging organ donation and protecting procurement personnel who engage in
that important work.”).
17
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, at p. 1 (amended 2009).
18
Id.
19
UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, PARTNERING WITH YOUR
TRANSPLANT TEAM: THE PATIENT’S GUIDE TO HEALTH 10, http://www.unos.org/
resources/brochures.asp. For example, the liver or pancreas lasts for 12-24 hours
and the kidney up to 72 hours. Id.
20
See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, at p. 4 (amended 2009).
21
Uniform
Anatomical
Gift
Act,
http://anatomicalgiftact.org/
DesktopDefault.aspx (follow “Enactment Status”).
22
See United Network for Organ Sharing, supra note 5, at 5; National Organ
Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 273-74 (2000).
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establishment of a national organ procurement and transplantation network,
while at the same time working to increase the overall number of organs
available for transplantation.23 The Act also authorized funding for fiftynine regional Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs) to consolidate and
coordinate donation efforts and help foster public awareness about the
critical need for organ donors.24 Finally, NOTA expressly forbids the
buying and selling of human organs and body parts, imposing up to a
$50,000 fine or five years imprisonment for organ trafficking and other
actions to commercialize the donative process.25
Prior to the enactment of NOTA, private regional transplant
networks managed the donor matching process but were limited by strict
regional borders and a lack of coordination across systems.26 As a result,
medical facilities in some areas were forced to compete for available
organs while in other localities, donor organs went unused.27 NOTA
authorized the creation of a centralized Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network (OPTN) to better facilitate organ matching,
delivery, and transplant surgeries.28 Congress contracted with a private
entity, the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), to oversee this
network in the hopes that management by a private entity would be the
fastest method to establish nationwide coordination given bureaucratic
delays with federal ownership and the initiative of the private sector in
establishing original networks in the first place.29
UNOS is responsible for coordinating organ transplant efforts
among 58 organ procurement organizations (OPOs) and 250 hospital and
medical facilities which maintain organ transplant programs.30 UNOS also
formulates the network’s membership criteria and the ensuing medical
standards for transplant procedures.31 Each hospital with a transplant
program is a member of the OPTN and must adhere to the standardized

23

See National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 273-74 (2000); R. R.
Bollinger et al., Organ Procurement Organization (OPO), Best Practices, 15
CLINICAL TRANSP. 16 (2001).
24
Id. § 273(a).
25
Id. § 274(e).
26
United Network for Organ Sharing, supra note 2.
27
Id.
28
National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2000).
29
See UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, supra note 5, at 5.
30
UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 3, 18,
http://www.unos.org/docs/AnnualReport2009.pdf).
31
Id. at 4.
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criteria for patient eligibility and wait-list priority.32 Eligibility and priority
factors include the degree of medical compatibility between the donor and
donee and the urgency for medical intervention.33 The patient’s location is
also an important consideration, since decreased transfer time leads to
better preservation of the organ and better survival rates.34 Additionally,
the network measures the amount of time a donee spends on the waiting list
to determine priority over other potential recipients.35 In certain cases, the
highest-ranked patient on the waiting list may be passed over if the
individual cannot be located, is temporarily sick, would likely reject a
transplanted organ, or would benefit only minimally from the procedure
because of age or medical condition as determined by his or her transplant
team.36
C.

ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION TODAY

As thousands of patients join the organ transplant list each year, the
continual shortage of available organs lingers as a major challenge despite
widespread efforts to increase the rates of donation.37 Some of the reasons
behind diminished donation numbers are attributable to positive medical
advancements, such as more rigorous medical screening processes, an
overall decrease in accidental death, and the increase in survival rates for
infants delivered prematurely.38 Other explanations reflect problems which
32

See Organ Procurement and Transplant Network Policy 1 on Member
Rights and Obligations, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/policiesAndBylaws/
policies.asp.
33
See Organ Procurement and Transplant Network Policies 3.2-3.4 on Organ
Distribution UNOS Patient Waiting List, Acceptance Criteria, and Organ
Procurement, Distribution and Allocation, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/
policiesAndBylaws/policies.asp
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
See id.
37
Additional efforts to promote organ donation include the Organ Donation
Insert Card Act, which established a national initiative through the Department of
Health and Human Services to increase donation by 20% by 2000 and authorized
the mailing of organ donor cards along with income tax refunds. Organ Donation
Insert Card Act, Pub. L. No. 104-91 (1996).
38
See Raja B. Khauli, Issues and Controversies Surrounding Organ Donation
and Transplantation: The Need for Laws That Ensure Equity and Optimal Utility
of a Scarce Resource, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1225, 1226 (1993); see also Mark F.
Anderson, The Future of Organ Transplantation: From Where Will New Donors
Come, To Whom Will Their Organs Go?, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 249, 278 (1995).
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have plagued the donation process for decades, including common
scenarios where potential donors fail to sign directives or medical
personnel neglect to search for donor cards, leaving the decision in the
hands of family members who may refuse consent or are unaware of the
patient’s wishes. 39 Meanwhile, the demand for organs continues to grow.
To cite just one statistic, the national diagnosis rate for diabetes, a leading
cause of kidney failure, has increased from 2.7% in 1985 to 5.5% in 2005
and will continue to rise based on obesity, aging and ethnic demographic
trends.40
Still, there is little to justify the overwhelming deficit in the overall
number of donors. Almost every religion supports organ donation as
consistent with its beliefs, though some may not be aware of their particular
religion’s support for the practice or instead experience general reluctance
to donate based on other principles.41 Non-traditional donors, such as
living donors and donors over 50 who would have been previously
ineligible to donate due to age, are compensating for lower donation rates
elsewhere. For example, the number of living donors increased by 245%
over the past twenty years, while donors aged 50 and older increased by
456% over the same period of time.42 Comparatively, the average rate of
growth in the amount of all donors increased only by 125% overall.43
Additionally, hospitals are evaluating new protocols which allow for organ
donation after cardiac death instead of brain death, creating an expanded
class of donors beyond the diminishing number of eligible brain-dead
patient-donors.44

39

Andrew C. MacDonald, Organ Donation: The Time Has Come to Refocus
the Ethical Spotlight, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV., Winter 1997, at 177, 180 (1997).
40
Gross, supra note 6, at 241.
41
Summary Statements of Various Religious Groups About Organ and Tissue
Donation, http://www.unos.org/news/newsDetail.asp?id=236 (last visited Mar. 10,
2010); see also Larissa MacFarquhar, The Kindest Cut, NEW YORKER, July 27,
2009, at 39 (“Reluctance that many feel toward donating organs, even after death,
is not selfishness or superstition but a sign that our sense of body as something
whole, something human, something sacred has not yet withered.”).
42
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov
(select “View Data Reports,” “National Data,” “Waiting List Removals” in Step 1 dropdown menu; then follow “All Donors By Donor Type” hyperlink in Step 2) (last visited
Mar. 10, 2010).
43
Id.
44
Darshak Sanghavi, When Does Death Start?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2009, at
MM38.
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Even without incorporating new subsets of organ donors, according
to the medical and ethical standards set by the National Organ Transplant
Act, current donor eligibility guidelines are in fact expansive enough to
include 13,091 patients who died under the age of 70 and were otherwise
eligible for donation in 2005.45 Of that subset, only 58%, or 7,593 patients,
became actual donors, generating a supply of over 23,000 organs for
transplantation.46 Living donors, primarily for the donation of a kidney,
contributed about 6,800 more organs to yield a combined total of about
28,000 organs transplanted that year.47 This data suggests that there were
still 5,498 eligible individuals who died in 2005 without donating their
organs upon death.48 That number of individual donors would have
generated 17,000 additional organs for transplantation, more than enough
to make up for the deficits in our donated organ supply.49
II.

INSURANCE COVERAGE AND ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION

The following section will focus on private and governmentfunded insurance options for organ donors and recipients. While private
insurers serve as major sources of funding for organ transplant procedures,
disputes between insurers and insureds often arise due to ambiguities in
policy language which dictate coverage or professional disagreement in the
health care and insurance sectors as to whether a certain transplant
procedure should be covered given its experimental nature or predicted
success rate. In addition, government benefit programs like Medicaid and
Medicare come with its own host of conflicts, including whether the federal
government or the state may set its own coverage criteria in jointly funded
and administered programs. Ultimately, the affected parties are forced to
balance legitimate concerns of cost and funding health care for the masses
with the most intrinsic ideals of saving the life of one identifiable human
being.

45

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, at p. 6 (amended 2009), available at
http://www.anatomicalgiftact.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=1&tabid=63.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
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PRIVATE OR EMPLOYER-BASED INSURANCE

As the court in Delmarva Health Plan v. Aceto50 notes, insurers
“must make difficult, and at times excruciating, decisions about which
medical services to cover.”51
It is a regrettable reality that the more extensive the
coverage that is provided under a health insurance policy,
the higher the cost of that policy and the fewer individuals
who can afford to purchase it. The question of how to
balance this tension between access and adequacy is an
enormous one with which health insurers and our society
as a whole grapple.52
Organ transplants are expensive. A heart transplant can cost up to
$300,000.53 Lung or liver transplants come in at $250,000 per procedure
while a kidney transplant is priced at $100,000.54 The cost of a bone
marrow transplant, a procedure with its own extensively litigated body of
case law, is estimated at around $500,000.55 In some cases, a patient must
provide a down payment or prove coverage that guarantees payment even
before he or she can be listed on the active transplant list.56
1. Express Coverage
Most insurers provide coverage for traditional organ transplant
procedures, even if they are not expressly listed as covered benefits, as long
as the treatments are considered medically necessary and non-experimental.
For example, in Aceto, a Delaware court held that an insured’s lung
transplant was an included benefit even though the health insurance policy
listed coverage only for kidney, bone marrow and cornea transplants.57
While the insurer argued for the maxim inclusio urius est exclusio,
asserting that the inclusive list for organ transplant coverage automatically
50

750 A.2d 1213 (Del. Ch. 1999).
Id. at 1218.
52
Id.
53
United Network for Organ Sharing, supra note 2.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See, e.g., Montoya v. Johnston, 654 F. Supp. 511 (W.D. Tex. 1987); see
also Ellis ex rel. Ellis v. Patterson, 859 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1998).
57
Delmarva Health Plan v. Aceto, 750 A.2d 1213, 1216 (Del. Ch. 1999).
51
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excludes items not on the list, the court instead found the lung transplant,
“a medically necessary, non-experimental, surgical procedure,” falls within
the policy’s broader definition of covered services.58
At the same time, private insurers have no obligation to provide
coverage if it is specifically excluded, even if the transplant is determined
to be medically necessary. In Hawaii Medical Serv. Assoc. v. Adams,59 the
health insurer denied coverage for an allogenic stem-cell transplant to treat
the insured’s multiple myeloma.60 Policy guidelines specifically classified
the use of this procedure as “investigational” when used as a treatment for
multiple myeloma, though the therapy would be covered by the insurance
policy if used to treat a listed set of other conditions.61 The court in Adams
held that if the language of the plan “‘specifically excluded’ from coverage
the requested allo-transplant for treatment of . . . multiple myeloma,” the
insurer had “no obligation to provide coverage.”62 Here, the insurer
successfully claimed inclusio urius est exclusio where this argument failed
in Aceto. If the insurer were required to list every special medical
exclusion instead of including only the conditions that the policy would
cover, then the insurer would have to list “every conceivable medical
condition for which coverage for allo-transplants would be excluded,” an
expectation the court found neither “practical” nor “reasonable.”63
2. Contract Ambiguities
Where policy exclusions and inclusions are not as specific,
insureds challenging coverage decisions argue that, according to contra
proferentem, ambiguities in the policy language are construed against the
insurer and in favor of the insured, since the insurer drafts the language and
“must suffer the costs of its own drafting imprecision.”64
In Simkins v. NevadaCare, Inc.,65 the insured sought coverage for
high-dose chemotherapy with peripheral stem cell rescue (HDC/PSCR) as a
treatment for breast cancer.66 As part of the HDC/PSCR procedure, stem
58

Id.
209 P.3d 1260 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009).
60
Id. at 1263. During an allogenic stem-cell transplant, stem cells from a
matched donor are harvested and transplanted into the recipient. Id.
61
Id. at 1263–65.
62
Id. at 1268.
63
Id. at 1271.
64
Delmarva Health Plan, Inc. v. Aceto, 750 A.2d 1213, 1218 (Del. Ch. 1999).
65
229 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2000).
66
Id. at 731-32.
59
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cells are harvested and filtered as blood is drawn from the patient’s body
and later reintroduced in the system after chemotherapy, in the hope that
the stem cells will grow to produce healthy red and white blood cells and
platelets.67
While the insurance policy included coverage for the
administration of blood and blood plasma and chemotherapy, the only
transplants approved for coverage under the policy were for heart, kidney,
cornea, liver, and tissue transplants limited to allogenic bone marrow
only.68 The court in Simkins found that a “person of average intelligence
and experience” would not understand stem cells to be tissue under the
policy’s tissue transplant exclusion.69 Instead, the court believed the
average person would consider stem cells to be a component of the
patient’s blood. Especially since the policy “specifically discusses blood
transfusions separately from tissue transplants and places tissue transplant
coverage within the organ transplant section,” the policy retained the
“distinct potential of misleading and confusing average plan participants”
(emphasis omitted).70 “[T]he insurer should be expected to set forth any
limitations on its liability clearly enough for a common layperson to
understand; if it fails to do this, it should not be allowed to take advantage
of the very ambiguities that it could have prevented with greater
diligence.”71
On the other hand, in Hilliard v. BellSouth Medical Assistance
Plan,72 the court refused to find a similar insurance policy description
ambiguous.73 The insured was diagnosed with multiple myeloma and
sought coverage for an autologous bone marrow transplant (ABMT), where
the patient’s own bone marrow is extracted for reinfusion.74 Similar to
Simkins, the insurance policy only covered cornea, heart, kidney and bone
marrow transplants, further specifying coverage for autologous bone
marrow transplants in the treatment of three specific conditions: Hodgkin’s
disease in individuals where conventional therapy has failed, resistant nonHodgkin’s lymphomas, and acute leukemia in remission but with a high
probability of relapse.75 The court in Hilliard agreed with the plan
67

Id. at 732.
Id.
69
Id. at 735.
70
Id.
71
Simkins, 229 F.3d at 736 (quoting Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910
F.2d 534, 540 (9th Cir. 1990)).
72
918 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
73
Id. at 1024-25.
74
Id. at 1019-20.
75
Id. at 1020.
68
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administrator that the plan provided coverage only for these three
conditions and that multiple myeloma was “simply not covered.”76 It also
noted that the insured’s employer offered a Supplemental Transplant
Assistance Plan at a nominal premium for the purpose of providing
additional coverage for autologous transplants and other medical
procedures not covered by the primary plan.77
B.

MEDICARE AND MEDICAID

Government benefits programs, including Medicare and Medicaid,
may be used to finance an organ transplant procedure. Medicare is a
federally run program that provides health insurance coverage to
individuals who are age 65 and older as well as individuals with who meet
other special criteria, including patients who suffer end-stage renal disease
(ESRD) and require either dialysis or a kidney transplant.78 Medicaid is a
cooperative program between the federal government and individual states
to fund certain health care expenses for low-income or disabled persons
who qualify.79 The state pays medical facilities for health care provided to
those eligible under Medicaid.80 The federal government subsequently
reimburses the state for a substantial portion of that outlay as long as the
state is compliant with federal statutory and regulatory requirements.81
1. State Discretion in Medicaid-Funded Organ Transplants
While the federal government may set broad policies and ensure
state compliance with the Medicaid statute, it is up to the states to develop
state eligibility and coverage criteria subject to federal approval and
reimbursement.82 For instance, the Medicaid statute was amended in 1985
to include specific organ transplant criteria that states were required to
adopt in order to receive for federal financial assistance for these types of
procedures.83 Under this provision, the federal government will not
76

Id. at 1023.
Id. at 1027.
78
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(a) (2006).
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reimburse states for organ transplants unless the state develops written
standards for transplant coverage where similarly situated individuals are
treated alike and the accessibility of high quality care is maintained.84
Whether this statute functions as an express grant of discretion to the states
in their decisions to fund organ transplants under Medicaid, or merely sets
forth the conditions for federal matching funds in transplant procedures,
remains unsettled.85 The Eighth Circuit in Ellis by Ellis v. Patterson and
the Ninth Circuit in Dexter v. Kirschner have held that states have complete
discretion in choosing whether or not to fund organ transplants within state
Medicaid plans.86 However, the Fourth Circuit in Pereira v. Pereira v.
Kozlowski and the Eleventh Circuit in Pittman by Pope v. Secretary,
Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services have held that
states must fund organ transplants that are medically necessary, albeit for
different reasons.87
In Ellis, the Eighth Circuit held Arkansas was not required to fund
through Medicaid a liver transplant for a ten-month-old infant suffering
from a fatal liver condition.88 The court found that the federal organ
transplant provision governing payment for organ transplants, 42 U.S.C. §
1396b(i), “can be read as merely laying out additional standards the states
must meet to receive federal funds for organ transplants, but the legislative
history of the provision reveals that Congress intended the states to have
discretion whether to include organ transplants in the Medicaid plans.”89
Just as states are permitted to limit other medically necessary services, such
as the number of doctor visits or the length of hospital stays, state
discretion in funding medical procedures was found to be consistent with
an overarching policy to “provide the largest number of necessary medical
services to the greatest number of needy people.”90 Furthermore, the court
84
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in Ellis determined Congress “did not intend to require states to provide
funds for exotic surgeries which, while they might be the individual
patient’s only hope for survival, would also have a small chance of success
and carry an enormous price tag.”91
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Eighth Circuit’s line of reasoning
and held in Dexter that Arizona likewise retained discretionary power to
fund autologous bone marrow transplants but not allogenic bone marrow
transplants through its Medicaid program.92 The same federal statute cited
in Ellis applicable to payments for organ transplants “does not make
payments mandatory [but] . . . states only what must occur in the event a
state should decide, in its discretion, to pay for organ transplants.”93 The
court in Dexter also found compelling the fact that while medical facilities
in Arizona could perform autologous bone marrow transplants, no
corresponding program for allogenic bone marrow transplants existed in
the state at the time.94 “Arizona’s decision not to fund the additional
expenditures despite the similarity in cost for both types of bone marrow
transplants was . . . rational.”95
One year later, the Fourth Circuit in Pereira expressly rejected the
findings of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits and held that Virginia was
required to fund medically necessary organ transplants for patients who
qualify under Medicaid.96 The court rejected “the . . . contention that
section 1396b(i)(1) affirmatively confers upon the states the unqualified
discretion whether to fund transplants.”97 Even if “Congress intended . . .
to afford the states absolute discretion whether to fund organ transplants . .
. (and there is no evidence in either the statute or its history that this was its
intention), it did not embody that intention in statute.”98
The Eleventh Circuit in Pittman drew the same conclusion as the
Fourth Circuit and mandated Medicaid coverage for a fifteen-month-old
child’s liver-bowel transplant based on statutory requirements that states
provide medically necessary services to children receiving early and
periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment (EPSDT) services under
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Medicaid.99 Even where courts have granted state discretion in coverage
determinations, Medicaid participants under the age of 21 would still be
funded for organ transplants since the EPDST program requires coverage
for all medically necessary treatment for eligible recipients.100
2. Arbitrary and Unreasonable Standard
Even in jurisdictions where courts have decided in favor of state
discretion in their ability to set their own coverage criteria for funding
organ transplants, Medicaid participants nevertheless are protected against
standards that result in arbitrary or unreasonable outcomes. A state
Medicaid agency “may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, duration
or scope of a required service . . . to an otherwise eligible recipient solely
because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition.”101 “[O]nce a state
has adopted a policy to cover a category of organ transplants, it may not
arbitrarily or unreasonably deny services to an otherwise eligible Medicaid
recipient.”102
In Montoya v. Johnston,103 two plaintiffs aged six months and six
years, respectively, could not be listed on the liver transplant waiting list
because of a required $100,000 pre-payment or insurer guarantee of
coverage.104 The children were covered under Medicaid but Texas capped
in-patient hospital services at $50,000 over the course of twelve months.105
The court held that this state cap violated federal standards which “prohibit
the arbitrary and/or unreasonable denial of services to otherwise eligible
recipients.”106 Since the cost of the medically appropriate and nonexperimental liver transplants would cost approximately $200,000, the
$50,000 cap would functionally deny otherwise eligible recipients benefits
even though liver transplants are covered under Texas Medicaid.107
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Ellis held that any state-imposed cap on
funding that would prevent a patient from being listed on a transplant
99
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waiting list would functionally deprive that patient of the procedure and
therefore result in an arbitrary and unreasonable denial of that benefit.108
In addition to reimbursement caps, plaintiffs have successfully
challenged specific state Medicaid criteria for transplant eligibility using
the arbitrary and unreasonable standard. Michigan, for example, employed
patient selection criteria which required that a prospective liver transplant
recipient suffering from alcoholic cirrhosis must have a documented twoyear period of abstinence from alcohol.109 In Allen v. Mansour, the court
deemed this requirement arbitrary and unreasonable since it would screen
“out an entire class of otherwise qualified liver transplant applicants” who
would die before completing that two-year period or would develop such
severe complications that they would be rendered ineligible for an
operation anyway.110 Although the state retained “substantial discretion to
choose the proper mix of amounts, scope, and duration limitations for the
services offered in its Medicaid plan,”111 the court deemed this two-year
abstinence requirement as arbitrary due to a lack of expertise on alcoholism
and recidivism or statistical data to make a rational and scientific decision
on the proper length of an abstinence requirement.112 The court also found
significant that “[i]f a potential donee could survive two years without a
transplant, the donee did not need the transplant in the first place.”113
3. Medicare Designations of Experimental or
Investigational Treatments
Organ transplantation coverage under Medicare is most frequently
invoked by litigants to support or rebut a contention that a specific
transplant procedure should be considered experimental or investigational
and therefore excluded under most private insurance and government
benefit program policies.
These insurers may utilize the expert
determinations and findings of Medicare’s oversight and quality assurance
agency, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), to help define
or inform how they view unproven medical technologies or procedures.
For instance, in Bechtold v. Physicians Health Plan of Northern
Indiana, Inc.,114 the private insurer “chose to link the experimental nature
108
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of a treatment to the neutral (third party) determination of the medical
experts responsible for drafting the HCFA Medicare Coverage Issues
Manual.”115 The insurer’s express intent was to avoid resorting to a “caseby-case battle of the experts each time a self-proclaimed ‘expert’ publishes
a new article” about a new procedure.116 The court in Bechtold allowed the
insurer to rely on HCFA opinions to determine whether a procedure should
be considered experimental because this deference was unambiguously
expressed in the policy language.117
Other courts, however, have looked for reasons to circumvent
HCFA classification of experimental procedures. The Third Circuit in
Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp.118 explained why reliance on Medicare
guidelines could be problematic:
First, the guidelines themselves are, by their terms,
directory rather than mandatory...
Second, expert
witnesses for both sides agreed Medicare relied on dated
literature and data in determining the appropriate
conditions for coverage of liver transplants... Third,
Belden & Blake's health coverage expert admitted it is “not
uncommon in the health care industry” for insurers to
approve treatments even though Medicare has not
approved them.119
In Meusberger v. Palmer, Iowa’s Medicaid agency denied
coverage of a participant’s pancreatic transplant because their policy was
“to fund only those organ transplants designated non-experimental by
Medicare.”120 The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s holding that
reliance on Medicare’s designation of non-experimental was “intended as
an administrative convenience rather than an inalterable adherence.”121 “A
state cannot avoid scrutiny and evade review of unreasonable policies by
simply delegating absolutely the decision-making to a federal agency
charged with a substantially different mission.”122 Furthermore, in Nichols
115
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v. Trustmark Insurance Company,123 the court noted that the actual
language of the insured’s policy granted coverage for “drugs, therapies or
other treatments... that are approved for reimbursement by the Health Care
Financing Administration.124 However, the policy did not specify HCFA
approval under Medicare as opposed to Medicaid.125 In this case, Ohio’s
Medicaid policy did cover the insured’s high-dose chemotherapy with
autologous bone marrow transplant (HDC/ABMT) procedure where the
federal Medicare policy did not.126
C.

INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR DONORS

The medical procedures involved with extracting an organ from a
donor for transplantation is considered part of the recipient’s overall
procedure and is funded as such. Still, insurance coverage becomes a
significant issue in the event that a living donor experiences unanticipated
post-transplant complications.
Any costs incurred by an organ donor, from medical evaluation and
testing to the actual surgery, are covered by the eventual organ recipient.127
After an organ donation, the hospital will bill the organ procurement
organization, which then bills the recipient or recipient’s insurer.128 In
Zwerin v. Group Health Incorporated,129 the insurer was obligated to
reimburse the costs of tests performed on the insured’s sister in the course
of an evaluation to determine her suitability as a potential bone marrow
transplant donor.130 The insurer had claimed that since the sister was not a
covered dependent under the insurance policy, her medical tests, “even if
for the claimant’s benefit or as part of his overall treatment,” would be
excluded from coverage.131 The court in Zwerin, however, rejected the
insurer’s “illogical and tenuous position” and instead relied upon the
insurance policy’s broad provision for the coverage of “general medical
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care” and “treatment of illness.”132 These tests were “a necessary step in
exploring the possibility of a bone marrow transplant operation as part of
the claimant’s treatment.”133 The insured “is permitted to explore all
reasonable avenues of treatment which might arrest and reverse the
progress” of his debilitating disease and therefore entitled to recover the
costs of the medical tests performed for his benefit.134
While the costs of the immediate tests and procedures related to
organ donation are funded by the recipient, additional costs incurred as a
result of unexpected complications or adverse long-term effects may fall to
the living donor. The number of living organ donors have matched or
exceeded the number of traditional cadaveric donors since 2001, mostly
through directed donations by family members. 135 The probability of
adverse effects continues to be quite low and most complications are minor
when they do occur, especially since unlike most surgeries, living organ
donors are usually in excellent health before undergoing the operation.
Even so, in an analysis conducted by Seoul National University
College of Medicine, the morbidity rate of a specific type of liver
transplant, where the right section of the liver of the living donor is
extracted, reached a high of 78.3%.136 While most of this subset
experienced only minor post-operative complications, several patients
suffered potentially life-threatening complications which required
additional treatment.137
Even organ donation through less-invasive
laparoscopic procedures versus conventional open operations has its risks.
In a medical comparison study of these two technologies, two out of twenty
patients who underwent laparoscopic donor nephrectomies still experienced
poor oxygen saturation in the immediate postoperative period and unilateral
pulmonary congestion.138
Despite the low incidence of post-surgical complications for an
organ donor, health problems related to but following the actual donation
may not be covered by the recipient’s insurer. If a recipient’s insurance
policy provides coverage for a limited time but the recipient dies, coverage
132
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for the donor may also disappear.139 In theory, a kidney transplant donor
who suffers the loss of the remaining kidney later in life moves to the top
of the transplant waiting list, but the patient must cover the cost of the
operation herself, even though the original donation necessitated the second
transplant.140 Other financial expenses, including the personal expenses of
travel, housing and lost wages or even the increased difficulty and cost in
obtaining health, disability or life insurance, remain the responsibility of
the living donor.141
III.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES WHEN INSURANCE AND
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION INTERSECT

Insurance intersects with the medical practice of organ
transplantation to yield surprising connections beyond the more basic
issues of coverage and funding. This section reveals the insurance sector’s
unintended or unexpected influence in determining which entities or
individuals have the opportunity to participate in the organ donation and
receipt process.
A.

INSURERS MAKE MEDICAL DETERMINATIONS

While assessments of a patient’s need for certain procedures seem
best left to the expertise of medical practitioners, many of the cases
discussed above demonstrate that insurers act at least as a key participant, if
not the final arbiter, in the medical decision-making process. Both public
and private insurers include explicit requirements of medical necessity for
coverage and insert exclusions for procedures considered experimental or
investigational. In the field of organ transplantation, these exclusions may
serve to preclude reimbursement or access to emerging transplant
technologies, like dual organ transplants, or accepted therapies applied for
the treatment of certain conditions, such as the use of bone marrow or
stem-cell transplants to treat cancer.
Experimental treatment exclusions originally arose out of concerns
that procedures have limited or no medical value and that this potentially
unnecessary medical care might actually be harmful to patients.142 Today,
139
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the economics of health care play a bigger role. “By requiring clinicians to
prove that new procedures are efficacious before they are covered, the hope
is that existing resources will be better allocated to maximize the health
status of the overall population.”143 Either way, insurers still act as
gatekeepers where medical professionals must petition for the approval of
non-medical entities on medical matters.
B.

INSURANCE STATUS DETERMINES ACCESS TO DONATED ORGANS

A potential organ recipient’s access to donated organs is
determined in large part by the patient’s ability to fund the life-saving
transplant procedure through insurance. An uninsured patient or one
subject to reimbursement caps may be excluded from a transplant waiting
list without a substantial deposit or proof of insurance coverage.144 More
than 99% of organ recipients are covered by insurance at the time of the
procedure.145 Private insurance and Medicare were equally the most
common sources of payment for organ recipients at 44.2% each.146 Only
9% of total organ recipients were covered by Medicaid, even though
Medicaid participants comprised 18.5% of the general in-patient
population.147 Consequently, Medicaid organ recipients are less likely to
be funded for organ transplants than other procedures requiring hospital
admission.148
While some organ transplant recipients may be funded through
specific benefit programs, such as Medicare’s ESRD Program or similar
state benefit plans, or through the admirable efforts of transplant social
workers and financial coordinators to obtain financing on a patient’s behalf,
the highly disproportionate number of insured versus uninsured organ
recipients is troubling in a system that is explicitly mandated to ensure
equality in access.149 A ground-breaking 1999 study examining California
143
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ESRD patients revealed for the first time the strong correlation between
health insurance status and access to organ transplant procedures.150 Nearly
all ESRD patients are entitled to benefits offered under Medicare’s ESRD
program, though about 8% of ESRD dialysis patients were ineligible for
the program in 1992, the year the analysis was conducted.151 Many of these
individuals who lack Medicare coverage are forced to rely on state
Medicaid programs for financial support, though beneficiaries must meet
financial eligibility criteria first.152
The 1999 California study separated all California ESRD patients
under the age of 65 into three, mutually exclusive cohorts: Medicaid
participants, Medicare participants, and patients enrolled in both Medicaid
and Medicare.153 Only 31.4% of all Medicaid patients were eventually
listed on the OPTN transplant waiting list, compared to 45% of Medicare
patients and 38.8% of the dually eligible patients.154 This disparity is even
more exaggerated when examining subsets within these patient cohorts.
Only two-thirds of all patients under 15 years old insured by Medicaid
were placed on the transplant waiting list while 91.7% of Medicare patients
under age 15 were listed.155
Further examination of pertinent socio-economic factors revealed
important differences in the Medicaid patient population. Medicaid
participants show a higher incidence of HIV/AIDS, mental illness and noncompliance based on past dialysis attendance, all important considerations
which weigh against a patient’s eligibility for transplant.156 They are also
“clearly more disadvantaged, less likely to be highly educated, potentially
more apprehensive about the transplant procedure, and less assertive about
being wait-listed.”157 However, once an ESRD patient makes it onto the
transplant waiting list and is entered into the system, insurance status does
not influence the receipt of a cadaveric kidney transplant.158
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INSURANCE COVERAGE PREDICTS WHO WILL DONATE

The extent of coverage also plays a significant role in which
individuals are most likely to donate. Unlike presumed consent systems in
other countries, primarily in Europe, where an individual is automatically
presumed to be a donor unless the individual or a representative opts out,
an organ donor in the United States must make an affirmative gift.159 This
reflects the free choice of the individual to elect for donation upon death,
and the latest set of revisions to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
strengthens this right even further by barring others from making a gift
after death if the individual donor previously refused.160
For those who do elect to donate their organs at death, lack of
insurance coverage was a stronger predictor for donation than any other
characteristic or demographic factor except for age. Americans without
health insurance are much more likely to donate a liver or kidney for
transplant than to receive one.161 Nearly 17% of organ donors in 2003
lacked health insurance, but only 0.8% of organ recipients are uninsured.162
Additionally, the percentage for uninsured organ transplant recipients, at
0.8%, is far less than the overall 4.6% uninsured rate for all in-patient
hospitalizations.163 Since transplantation is markedly different than other
procedures in that the operation requires a scarce resource that can only
come from other human beings, the pressure for fairness in patient access
to this treatment is even more pronounced. Instead, while the uninsured
tend to donate organs at relatively high rates, they are much less likely to
receive an organ if they are in need of one.
This disparity is noteworthy particularly given that the 47 million
Americans without health care tend to suffer from illnesses and conditions
that otherwise exclude them from the organ donor pool.164 The uninsured
suffer from higher mortality rates and more restrictive access to
preventative and essential care, increasing the rates of chronic disease in
this subset.165 They are less likely to have regular check-ups, less likely to
see personal physicians managing their long-term care and less likely to
159
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benefit from early diagnosis when diseases are most treatable.166 Their
ability to pay for advanced treatment is also compromised, so that overall,
“the uninsured poor are more likely to suffer untreated health problems that
will disqualify them medically as donors.167 Yet, the opposite is true, that
while the health care system “denies adequate care to many of the
uninsured during life..., in death, the uninsured often give strangers the
ultimate gift.”168
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This last section suggests several options, which address some of
the more troubling effects and negative externalities exposed when
insurance and organ transplantation intersect. The nature of the public and
private insurance sector’s business model presents significant obstacles in
obtaining full or even expanded coverage for organ transplantation, since
the needs of one insured in need of a transplant must be balanced against
the stark economics required to fund health care for the rest. With this in
mind, the following recommendations attempt to promote and prioritize
efforts to establish greater clarity, consistency and fairness in both the
organ donation and transplantation process.
A.

CLEAR COVERAGE POLICIES, INFORMED POLICYHOLDERS

Insurance contract language should be drafted with as much clarity
as possible to indicate to the policyholder whether organ transplants are
covered and if so, the extent of coverage as it relates to the type of
procedures and for the treatment of which specific conditions.
Undoubtedly, insurers have the right to exclude coverage for certain
procedures as long as their exclusionary policies are non-discriminatory,
properly disclosed and otherwise consistent with the law. If the insurer
elects to incorporate organ transplant exclusions, at the very least “it should
do so conspicuously and unambiguously so a reasonable insured can
determine this fact by looking at her policy.”169
Well-drafted insurance policies permit the parties the freedom to
fairly contract according to their own terms without the interference of the
court system. If confronted with unambiguous policy language, courts
166
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“need not look outside the policy for indications of the intent of the
parties.”170 However, once the court system is brought in to interpret the
relevant contract language, courts may “out of deference to treating
physicians... refus[e] to respect the mechanism the parties have chosen to
define the scope of coverage, forcing them to contract in ways they prefer
not to, and even then refusing to enforce the provisions other courts have
imposed.”171 The risk of “judge-made insurance” then is that the court’s
newly defined parameters of coverage may very well serve to create
policies that “informed consumers in the private marketplace would have
chosen not to purchase.”172
Courts have imposed a higher standard for drafting insurance
contracts specifically if such an agreement is considered a contract of
adhesion, where a standardized contract is “written entirely by a party with
superior bargaining power... [while] the weaker party to an adhesion must
‘take it or leave it’... without an opportunity to bargain.”173 Language, and
especially exclusionary language where a limitation of coverage may
disappoint an insured’s expectations, must be precise, conspicuous and
worded in language that is plain and clear.174 For example, an insurer may
be expected to position and format an important exclusion in a way that
would attract a reader’s attention and offer proper notification that a
procedure may not be covered by the insurance policy.175
Still, even the best contracting practices will fail to generate
completely unambiguous and consistent policy language. Too much
precision or specificity only creates complexity and confusion. Using the
context of organ transplantation, an insurer pursuing the highest level of
170
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precision would have to create a “laundry list” of covered services and
exclusions, classifying, at a minimum, each type of organ transplant, each
condition for which an organ transplant may be used to treat, and each
medical procedure or technology employed to execute the transplant.176 A
policy containing all these exponential combinations would result in a “sea
of print” where important policy conditions are so densely packed that they
could be easily overlooked.177 Additionally, given the rapid progress of
new medical research and technology, detailed lists of inclusions and
exclusions would have to be updated constantly to reflect the latest
developments.178
Instead, insurers can more fairly communicate contract terms by
including direct information about their coverage decision processes in the
policy itself.179 Policyholders may not understand arguably vague language
like “medical necessity” or “experimental” unless they are educated as to
how insurers may make these determinations should the need arise. Rather
than listing every experimental procedure that falls outside of the policy’s
coverage, insurers may supplement general exclusions with greater detail
about what the insurer may do to classify a treatment as experimental, such
as whether the insurer relies on data in peer-reviewed academic procedures
or technology assessments performed by reliable third-party governmental
agencies or private organizations.180
Additionally, insurers as well as employers and associations who
maintain health benefit programs for their employees and members should
have mechanisms in place which clearly inform policyholders as to their
organ transplant coverage, especially if insureds were to lose coverage with
the selection of a new insurer or policy. In Swanson v. Sioux Valley
Empire Electric Association, a member organization was forced to switch
to a new health care plan when its previous health insurer sought to raise
premiums by 38%.181 The organization informed all its members through
direct mailings and member newsletters that the new plan excluded
coverage for liver transplants.182 The plaintiff in Swanson therefore could
not sustain claims against the association for negligent misrepresentation or
176
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a breach of good faith and fair dealing since the organization acted to
provide notice of the terms of the new health policy.183
B.

CONSISTENT MEDICAID COVERAGE OF ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION

Despite the circuit split over the question of state discretion in the
funding of organ transplants under Medicaid, coverage should be required
in every state for transplant procedures that are medically necessary,
appropriate, and non-experimental. The Eighth and Ninth Circuit decisions
in Ellis and Dexter respectively fail to look to the plain language of the
federal Medicaid transplant funding provision under 42 U.S.C. §
1396b(i)(1) or account for the political backdrop and legislative intent
when the statute was enacted.184 In addition, consistency across state
borders minimizes existing disparities in access to organ transplants for
Medicaid beneficiaries based on state funding criteria.
First, § 1396b(i)(1) only provides that the federal government will
not supplement state payments “for organ transplant procedures unless the
State plan provides for written standards,” primarily standards to ensure
that “similarly situated individuals are treated alike” and that any
restrictions imposed are at least “consistent with the accessibility of high
quality care to individual eligible for the procedures.”185 Whether a state
has discretion to fund or exclude organ transplants in their programs is a
question that lies outside the scope of this statute. Instead, “by its plain
terms, the statute simply provides that federal Medicaid payments will not
be made for organ transplants unless the state has promulgated the
specified written procedures.”186
Furthermore, the federal transplant funding provision was enacted
in 1985 during continuing legislative efforts to expand Medicaid coverage,
offering additional services including hospice care, case management
services and ventilator care for institutional children.187 Congress also
approved expanded eligibility criteria to extend coverage to individuals
who did not qualify previously.188 Finally, Congress by this time already
took steps to address public concerns over the shortage of donor organs and
183
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the cost of organ transplants, enacting both NOTA in 1984 and the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) in 1986.189 OBRA extended
Medicare coverage for drug therapy related to transplant procedures and
required that hospitals which received Medicare funding to encourage
organ donation and conform to the appropriate organ procurement
protocol.190
These actions combined “demonstrate a congressional
preoccupation with the ability of needy individuals to obtain and pay for
transplants and a genuine commitment to facilitating the procedure.”191
The Seventh Circuit in Miller by Miller v. Whitburn offers perhaps
the best justification for federally mandated coverage of organ
transplantation in state Medicaid programs.192 In Miller, the Seventh
Circuit argued that reliance on §1396b was inappropriate given that organ
transplants that are medically necessary and non-experimental already fall
into the mandatory service category of in-patient hospital service, one of
seven mandatory medical services a state must provide in order to qualify
for federal funding.193 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit limited review of
Wisconsin’s decision to deny funding for the plaintiff’s liver-bowel
transplant only as to whether or not a liver-bowel transplant could be
considered a “necessary treatment” if its effectiveness was unproven.194
C.

COURTS SHOULD AVOID MAKING MEDICAL DETERMINATIONS
1. Courts Exhibit Biases and Lack Scientific Expertise to
Make Medical Determinations

While the court system provides an important mechanism which
works to produce fair results in transplant coverage disputes, judicial
review should accord high deference to the insurers who make coverage
determinations in consultation with independent medical experts. Because
of understandable biases in favor of a plaintiff seeking a life-saving
operation, judges are inclined “to adopt every conceivable argument in
favor of coverage..., essentially preclud[ing] insurers from exercising any
meaningful oversight of medical appropriateness.”195
189
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First, courts tend to “balance the equities between the parties in a
manner that inevitably favors avoiding the possible loss of life over the
insurers’ monetary loss.”196 It is easy to be influenced by a sympathetic
plaintiff who has exhausted all other avenues in the treatment of a serious
illness. In J.D. by Devantier v. Sherman, the plaintiff was an eight-year-old
boy afflicted with a debilitating genetic disorder which could be cured by a
liver transplant.197 However, Missouri Medicaid considered the transplant
an elective option rather than a medical necessity since the disease could be
managed through careful dietary restrictions.198 The court in J.D. held that
“even if it were obvious that the state could save some money by treating,
as opposed to curing J.D., the fiscal harm suffered by Missouri Medicaid is
outweighed by the harm to J.D. should he not receive a liver transplant.”199
In addition, judges are forced to rely on expert testimony presented
in an adversarial setting that often devolves into a battle of the experts. In
this scenario, experts do not present objective and balanced scientific
perspectives focused on truth-finding and accuracy, but rather introduce
arguments most persuasive in supporting their party’s side.200 The Seventh
Circuit in Bechtold proposes an interesting alternative:
In order to resolve the question of whether health insurance
providers should cover treatments..., the prudent course of
action might be to establish some sort of regional
cooperative committees comprised of oncologists,
internists, surgeons, experts in medical ethics, medical
school administrators, economists, representatives of the
insurance industry, patient advocates and politicians.
Through such a collective task force perhaps some
consensus might be reached concerning the definition of
experimental procedures, as well as agreement on the
procedures, which are so cost prohibitive that requiring
insurers to cover them might result in the collapse of the
healthcare industry. While such a committee would in no
way be a panacea for our skyrocketing health care costs, it
may help to reduce the incidence of suits in which one
196
197
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“expert” testifies that a procedure is experimental and
another equally qualified “expert” testifies to the opposite
effect. This so called battle of the experts occurs all too
frequently in federal court.201
But are insurers capable of making educated, independent
assessments of medical necessity when those same companies profit from
avoiding payment of claims? In order to minimize conflicts of interest, the
insurance sector should make sure to engage outside independent medical
experts for consultation before making determinations of medical
necessity.202 These consultants help assure neutrality in the decisionmaking process, particularly if practitioners are compensated in a manner
that does not reward or incentivize the number of claim denials.
2. Coverage of HDC/ABMT
There is perhaps no better example of court interference in medical
decisioning than the substantial case law surrounding high-dose
chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow transplant (HDC/ABMT) as a
last resort treatment for cancer.203 During HDC/ABMT, a patient’s bone
marrow cells are extracted and stored temporarily before the patient
undergoes high-dose chemotherapy, after which the stored cells are
transplanted back into the patient to counter the toxic effects of the
chemotherapy.204 While Phase II clinical studies supported the use of this
procedure at the time, many insurers refused to pay for the treatment based
on exclusions for experimental procedures, since there was a lack of
evidence that HDC/ABMT was superior to chemotherapy alone or safe and
effective in its own right.205 Denials of coverage led to intense litigation
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and lobbying which in turn led to “unpredictable and inconsistent” court
decisions about coverage.206
Rather than fight litigants in this arena, insurers instead quietly
decided to include HDC/ABMT as a covered service anyway despite their
own misgivings about the efficacy of the treatment.207 This trend was due
in large part to the courts’ readiness to regard HDC/ABMT as the legal
standard of care.208 To be fair, both sides could validly argue for and
against the suggestion that HDC/ABMT represented the standard of care
for the treatment of breast cancer.209 The procedure was indeed used to
treat more than 30,000 women before studies discounting HDC/ABMT
were published, showing the “medical community’s inability to control the
procedure’s diffusion.”210 Still, the courts often succumbed to the more
emotional appeals of plaintiffs desperate for this treatment and discounted
medical expert after medical expert presented by defendant-insurers.211
Had the courts, for instance, adopted a standard based on
what a reasonable managed care organization would have
decided..., the result may have been entirely different.
Taking this approach could have had the salutary effect of
compelling a more productive dialogue between physicians
and plans, along with accelerating the clinical trials
process.212
D.

CONTINUING COVERAGE FOR ORGAN RECIPIENTS

Insurance coverage for organ transplants should extend beyond the
transplant operation itself to include continuing coverage for follow-up care
and immunosuppressive drug therapies required to protect rejection of the
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transplanted organ. While courts have found prohibitively low insurance
caps to be arbitrary or unreasonable,213 insurance coverage could still be
limited based on the specific procedure, treatment or total amount of
subsidized drugs per year. Medicare, for example, currently covers the
cost of anti-rejection drugs for participants only 36 months after transplant
even though it fully funds the cost of the transplant itself.214
These restrictions yield particularly harsh results on organ
recipients who may receive transplants at a young age. Younger recipients
have a longer lifespan during which to maintain the costs of on-going care,
since they must be medicated against organ rejection for the rest of their
lives.215 Pediatric patients could lose coverage once their plans expire or
when the patient becomes an adult.216 Additionally, subsequent coverage
may be difficult to obtain as an organ transplant is considered a preexisting condition.217 Some states offer high-risk insurance pools which
guarantee coverage regardless of prior medical history, but such coverage
varies widely by state and premiums remain 50% to 200% higher with
more restricted benefits than the more traditional insurance options
available.218
According to a recent study in Pediatric Transplantation, young
transplant recipients who lose their insurance coverage are more likely to
stop taking anti-rejection drugs.219 Transplant recipients between the ages
213
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of eighteen and twenty-three years face the greatest risk, since one-third of
this subset lacks coverage to begin with.220 Even if pediatric transplant
recipients are insured, coverage is likely to run out 36-44 months after the
transplant or when the child becomes an adult.221 In a study of 1,001
children who underwent kidney transplants between 1995 and 2001, onehalf lacked insurance coverage and experienced a nine times greater chance
of organ failure and death.222
Whether payment is from private insurance, Medicaid, or
Medicare, almost all providers discontinue insurance
coverage for health care and immunosuppressive
medications as these young people complete school and
leave their parent’s care. These patients are frequently
faced with the challenges of transition to independent life,
changing from pediatric to adult transplant centers, with no
clear means of payment for their expensive care and
medications.223
Even if an organ transplant recipient funds the actual procedure
without insurance reimbursement, the Seventh Circuit held that an insurer
can deny coverage for subsequent expenses connected to an underlying
illness or procedure that was not covered in the first place.224 In Loyola
University of Chicago v. Humana Insurance Company, in the middle of
cardiac bypass surgery, the insured’s heart surgeon decided to insert a
Jarvik-7 artificial heart once it was determined that the patient could not
survive the operation otherwise. 225 The artificial heart would serve to
prolong the patient’s life until a suitable organ donor could be found.226
The insurer, however, denied coverage for all expenses after the insertion
of the artificial heart, including the subsequent human heart transplant one
month later, because it believed all following expenses were connected to
the experimental procedure and therefore excluded by the policy.227
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The court agreed with the insurer’s refusal of coverage.228 While
the policy ordinarily covers expenses connected to a major organ
transplant, an exclusionary clause stated that “no benefit is payable for or in
connection with a major transplant” if the coverage for the original
transplant is denied based on the procedure’s experimental nature.229 The
Seventh Circuit admits that its decision could seem “callous,” essentially
finding the insurer is justified in refusing coverage because the patient
“should be dead.”230
It is unfortunate that a transplant recipient’s insured status impacts
the sustainability of a donated organ so directly, especially since posttransplant mortality rates otherwise are extremely low.231 In the event of
organ failure, a transplant recipient must be placed back on the waiting list
for retransplantation.
From 1995 to 2005, retransplant candidates
represented 13.5%, 7.9%, 4.2% and 5.5% of all newly registered candidates
on the kidney, liver, heart and lung transplant waiting lists respectively. 232
In addition, the survival rates for repeat transplants are much lower than the
rates for first-time transplantation.233 Since re-transplantation increases the
overall demand for an already scarce supply of donated organs, and the
benefits for repeat transplant patients are so limited, resources are better
allocated if the original organ transplantation procedure is given the best
possible chance to succeed.
E.

CONTINUING COVERAGE FOR ORGAN DONORS, REMOVE
DISINCENTIVES

Despite the rarity of post-transplant complications, living donors
who are generous enough to donate an organ for the benefit of another
should be protected from any adverse results post-donation. Organ donors
may face many of the same concerns as organ recipients. In one study
sampling a subset of living organ donors, 29% of donors had concerns
about financial repercussions from time missed from work, while 2%
worried about job security and another 2% reported anxiety about future

228

Id. at 898.
Id. at 903.
230
Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 996 F.2d at 903.
231
Id.
232
J.C. Magee, et al., Repeat Organ Transplantation in the United States,
1996–2005, 7 AM. J. OF TRANSPLANTATION 1424 (2007).
233
Id. at 1424.
229

2010]

COVERAGE FOR KIDNEYS

569

health insurance coverage.234 Prospective donors who ultimately did not
donate reported similar concerns.235 Addressing these concerns would not
only satisfy a degree of moral or ethical responsibility we owe to organ
donors for their own sacrifice, but would minimize some of the
disincentives which affect a potential donor’s willingness to donate as well.
At the same time, any actions taken to assist organ donors must
strike a delicate balance between removing disincentives and providing a
form of remuneration. First, according to NOTA, the acquisition of human
organs for valuable consideration is illegal.236 In addition, the use of
incentives or a more deliberate move to an organ market system would
generate unintended but harmful consequences that would undercut any
short-term increase in the total organ supply. In a study of both paid and
unpaid blood donation, Antonio Fernandez-Montoya references continuing
donor concerns in Spain, where 20% of blood donors still fear the
possibility of commercial exploitation even twenty years after the switch
from a paid donation model.237 Even a small decrease in the number of
donors repelled by the notion of payment in a traditionally voluntary blood
donation system “would severely compromise the service” given that donor
numbers are so hard to maintain now.238 A paid donation model also
creates greater vulnerability in the system through decreased safety and
quality in the supply of donated blood or organs. Paid donors are often
“poorly monitored, belong to lower social classes and often
malnourished.”239 They tend to donate in inferior sanitary conditions and
experience higher rates of transmittable disease.240 All parties in the
transplant infrastructure must then assume additional risk and expenses that
come with managing higher-risk donations, including increased monitoring
and testing as well as liability issues if contaminated organs are mistakenly
transferred to recipients.
Instead, we should consider longer-term donor health insurance as
part of “a package of benefits that would not enrich anyone... but rather is
designed to leave the donor as well off (fiscally and physically) as before
234

R.S. Gaston, Limiting Financial Disincentives in Live Organ Donation: A
Rational Solution to the Kidney Shortage, 6 AM. J. OF TRANSPLANTATION 2548,
2550 (2006).
235
Id.
236
42 U.S.C. § 274(e).
237
Antonio Fernández-Montoya, Altruism and Payment in Blood Donation, 18
TRANSFUSION SCI. 379, 383 (1997).
238
Id. at 383.
239
Id.
240
Id.

570

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:2

donation.”241 To offset the slight but present risk of medical complications
after donation, donors should be insured against catastrophic medical
expenses which may occur as a result of organ donation. This specific type
of supplemental, non-transferrable policy would be designed solely to
cover any gaps in an insured’s existing coverage should problems arise in
the future.242
As one option, Medicare’s existing ESRD program could be
modified to allow coverage for kidney donors as well as patients suffering
from renal disease. A 2006 analysis in the American Journal of
Transplantation calculated the estimated cost of this additional coverage.243
Given that the current median donor age is 40 years, on average, Medicare
would have to fund benefits until the donor reaches age 65, the standard
age that all citizens become eligible for Medicare244. The projected cost of
extended coverage based on the current cost of coverage for disabled
beneficiaries is $18,124, but since many donors already have private
insurance and represent an extremely healthy segment of the general
population, actual costs will be much less.245 Additionally, with benefits
targeted to cover only donation-related complications, the comparatively
small number of donors, and the rarity of adverse outcomes post-donation,
the final amount is a small price to pay to ensure living donors are
protected well after their donation.
CONCLUSION
When insurance and organ transplantation intersect, the most
essential principles of both fields collide. Insurance requires a sense of
objectivity and steadfast adherence to policies that serve to sustain its own
survival in economic reality, where the decision to fund one patient’s lifesaving operation will force trade-offs in coverage for the rest of the insured
base. Meanwhile, the practice of organ transplantation necessitates a more
emotional appeal to the values that we admire most in society - qualities of
altruism and gratitude at the foundation of how our donative process
functions. The by-products of the ensuing clash are real, definable and
quantifiable. By recognizing how insurance impacts the practice of organ
transplantation, we may start to salvage the more damaging components of
241
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the relationship and reinforce the ways in which the two fields complement
each other.
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